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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
SABIEN DOBBELAERE
SHERPPA, Ghent University, Belgium
LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, K.U.Leuven, Belgium
1.     ORIENTATION
During the last decades, three important evolutions have been occurring in European countries.
First, there is the process of globalisation, defined as the increasing integration of markets
for products, factors and technology. Whereas there has been a steady increase in capital mobility
since the 1970s, the process of worldwide product market integration has mainly started since the
1990s, pushed within Europe by the Single Market Initiative of the European Union (1992)
(Blanchard and Philippon, 2003). One of the main economic aims of the European integration
process is to foster growth through the benefits of increased competition. The abolition of trade and
non-trade barriers would allow firms from different member countries to compete on equal grounds
and promote product and process innovation.
Second, the opening up of Central and East European countries can be considered as part of
the globalisation process. These emerging economies have been confronted with an unseen
economic, political and institutional transition since the late 1980s. From the beginning of the
1990s onwards, product and labour market regulations have started to become more in line with
European standards (Flanagan, 1998). These countries have become favourite destinations for
foreign direct investment from western European companies.
Third, the process of product market deregulation has been accompanied by a process of
labour market deregulation, although at a different speed (see e.g. Boeri et al., 2000; Booth et al.,
2001). While the process of product market deregulation has been widespread, labour market
reforms have been more piecemeal.
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One of the most debated issues related to worldwide product market integration concerns the
influence of integration on the labour market. In recent years, increased market integration has been
advocated by politicians and economists because it proves beneficial in the long run. By
eliminating static efficiency losses deriving from non-competitive behaviour, it results in higher
total welfare. The transition to this new equilibrium, however, comes with both distribution and
dynamic effects. As pointed out by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), “[product market] deregulation
is fundamentally about reducing and redistributing rents, leading economic players to adjust in turn
to this new distribution”. There is indeed a growing concern that the economic threats and
opportunities created by integration are not equally shared across different groups.
Should globalisation be held responsible for the changing labour market
performance in industrial countries? Should globalisation be blamed for the
deteriorating fortunes of unskilled workers? Should growing competition
from low-wage countries and labour outsourcing be considered as threats for
jobs in relatively advanced countries? Should outsourcing of production be
seen as an explanatory factor for the weakening power of unions and for
falling wages? Do workers in host countries of foreign direct investment
benefit from the globalisation process? Are institutional and policy
interventions required to mitigate the (possibly adverse) effects of worldwide
product market integration in advanced countries?
These questions -which are of exceptional social relevance- have been raised frequently, not only
in academic and policy circles but also among the public. Since the Battle of Seattle in November
1999, the world has seen a wave of anti-globalisation protests surrounding the WTO, IMF and
World Bank meetings. These protests reveal that many people fear that globalisation may aggravate
labour market conditions. At the same time, proponents of globalisation have emphasised the gains
in efficiency, dynamism and economic welfare that open markets bring.
This dissertation focuses on labour market and product market performance in an
international context. To this end, our research relies on a rent-sharing framework to investigate
different aspects of increased product market integration and labour market deregulation. Starting
from the general equilibrium model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we discuss the specific
research questions addressed in this dissertation in section 2. Section 3 outlines briefly the related
existing literature, our empirical approach and summarises our scientific and policy conclusions. In
section 4, we present some paths of future research.
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2.     BROAD THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The testable hypotheses developed in this dissertation can broadly be inferred from the
general equilibrium macroeconomic model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). In this section, we
discuss first intuitively the model1 and then specify the research questions that we derive from it.
2.1.    The Model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
The Model. The model is built on two central assumptions: monopolistic competition in the
product market, determining the size of the rents that can be shared between the workers (union)
and the firm, and Efficient Bargaining in the labour market, determining the distribution of the
rents. Figure 1 contains a graphical representation of the short-run general equilibrium. Imperfect
competition in the product market is captured by the parameter  , which is the mark-up of the
relative price i
P
P
 (with the aggregate price index P  being exogenous) over the alternative wage
(depending on the unemployment rate u  and represented by the horizontal line).   depends
negatively on the price elasticity of demand which is itself determined by the number of products/
firms as well as by general government regulation. Imperfect competition in the labour market is
captured by the parameter  , which represents the bargaining power of the workers.
In the short run, the economy consists of m  firms and L  workers. Each firm i  produces a
differentiated product. Labour is the only input of the firm. For the sake of simplicity, real output is
equal to employment ( i iY N ). Each period, the firm bargains with 
L
m
 workers over nominal
wages and employment. Assuming risk-neutral workers, the contact curve CC  is vertical
(represented by the dashed line). For given bargaining power of the workers  , equilibrium is at
point A  where the marginal revenue product of labour  MRP  equals the alternative wage. The
associated employment level is iN . Corresponding output determines the relative price 
iP
P
 on the
demand curve DD . Under symmetric conditions, the relative price must be equal to 1 in
equilibrium.
                                                          
1 For technical details, we refer to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
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                      Figure 1   Short-Run General Equilibrium
                      Source: Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
Given a relative price equal to 1, total rents per unit of output are given by
µ
( ) .
1 µ
iP f u
P
 

 
 
 
 The workers get a proportion   of those rents. Hence, the real wage i
W
P
,
which plays no allocative role under Efficient Bargaining in the short run, is equal to 
 
 
1 µ
1 µ
 

.
This expression shows that bargained real wages depend on both product market imperfections ( )
and labour market imperfections ( ). The firm obtains a proportion (1 )   of the total rents per
unit of output, so profits per unit of output are equal to 
µ(1 )
.
(1 µ)
 

 This short-run distribution of
rents between the workers and the firm determines the number of firms/ products in the long run.
Theoretical Conclusions. From the model, the theoretical effects of product market
deregulation (a decrease in  ) and labour market deregulation (a decrease in  ) on the real wage
and unemployment can be summarised as follows. In the context of worldwide product market
integration, product market deregulation may come from e.g. the elimination of tariff barriers or
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barriers to entry and standardisation measures making it easier to sell domestic products abroad.
Labour market deregulation results from factors decreasing the bargaining power of the workers.
The direct effect of product market deregulation is to raise the price elasticity of demand for
a given number of firms. This will decrease the size of the rents and hence the rents going to the
workers. When deregulation takes place on a macroeconomic scale, however, there is an indirect
effect resulting from the fact that consumers pay now less for the goods they buy. Because workers
only get a proportion   of the rents, workers gain more as consumers than they lose as workers.
Consequently, the real wage 
 
 
1 µ
1 µ
 

 rises. In the long run, product market deregulation may also
affect the number of firms. The lower entry cost coming from product market deregulation makes
entry more attractive. As firms enter, the mark-up decreases again, leading to higher real wages and
to lower unemployment. Hence, workers gain in the short as well as in the long run.
Labour market deregulation, however, comes with a strong intertemporal trade-off. In the
short run, workers give up rents, resulting in lower real wages. Since real wages play no allocative
role in the short run, unemployment is unaffected. Hence, workers lose in the short run. In the long
run, however, the larger rents left to the firm make entry more attractive. The entry of firms leads
ultimately to a decrease in the unemployment rate in the long run. The real wage will recover.
2.2.   Research Questions
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate empirically several aspects of the model of
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) at the micro level. In this section, we discuss the research questions
which are related to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
 R1  How serious are product and labour market imperfections in advanced economies? Do
these imperfections vary among sectors? This question addresses the magnitude and the
heterogeneity of monopoly power in the product market ( ) and workers’ bargaining power in the
labour market ( ). In this dissertation, we will concentrate on the Belgian manufacturing industry.
 R2  Are labour market and product market imperfections related? Are these imperfections
likely to go hand in hand or -at the other extreme- are they mutually exclusive? This question
focuses on the possible relationship between price-cost mark-ups ( ) and workers’ bargaining
power ( ). Again, we will investigate the case of the Belgian manufacturing industry. In the
model, there is no direct relationship between labour market (de)regulation and product market
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(de)regulation. The mark-up   is not directly related to the bargaining power  . However,
thinking about reality, we can imagine several reasons for such a relationship to exist.
 i  A first reason follows from the long-run implications of the model of Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003). Given a fixed mark-up  , labour market deregulation (decreasing the bargaining
power of the workers  ) decreases the proportion of the rents going to the workers and increases
the proportion going to the firm in the short run. This short-run re-distribution of rents will then
affect the degree of competition in the product market ( ) by changing the number of firms in the
long run. Firms enter the market, competition increases and the mark-up decreases.
 ii  A second reason results from the fact that unions are most likely to be created in firms
where rents can be extracted. This is most likely to happen if there is imperfect competition in the
product market.
 iii  A third reason follows from the fact that firms with higher price-cost margins may
employ high-skilled workers who are harder to replace than low-skilled workers.
 R3  Has increased international trade affected the size of the rents, the workers’ bargaining
power and the reservation wage in the Belgian manufacturing industry? One might expect that
increased foreign competition lowers the size of the rents that can be shared between the workers
and the firm 
µ
1 µ
 
 
 
. The reason is that fierce foreign competition changes the price elasticity of
demand and induces a shift in the rents from domestic to foreign firms, shifting the demand curve
DD . According to the model, the workers’ bargaining power does not directly depend on product
market characteristics. As we have mentioned in our discussion of  R2 , there may however be a
relationship. In the context of the globalisation debate, a reduction of workers’ bargaining power (a
decrease in  ) could be driven by fiercer import competition, increased labour outsourcing or
increased foreign direct investment. Question  R3  also concentrates on the effect of globalisation
on the reservation wage (represented by the horizontal line in Figure 1). This captures one of the
biggest fears related to globalisation: the fact that increased competition might lower employment
opportunities considerably and raise unemployment.
 R4  Workers’ bargaining power might be eroded by increased foreign direct investment in
OECD countries like Belgium. Transition countries are favourite destinations for FDI. Does that
imply that workers in these host countries benefit from the globalisation process? Are workers’
wages in foreign-owned firms higher than in domestically-owned firms? In our dissertation, we
answer these questions, focusing on the Bulgarian manufacturing industry.
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3.     EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND MAIN RESULTS
This dissertation contributes to various topics in the empirical labour economics literature. It
contains three papers. In this section, we first point briefly to related existing literature, then we
discuss our empirical approach and finally conclude.
For Europe, it has been shown that labour market consequences of worldwide product
market integration do not derive primarily from increased mobility of labour but from interactions
between imperfectly competitive labour and product markets (Andersen and Skaksen, 2003;
OECD, 1999, 2000). To capture this situation, we relate labour market imperfections to product
market imperfections in the first paper, titled “JOINT ESTIMATION OF PRICE-COST MARGINS AND
UNION BARGAINING POWER FOR BELGIAN MANUFACTURING”.
Whereas we concentrate exclusively on imperfect competition in the domestic product
market in paper 1, we move to worldwide product market integration in paper 2, titled “HAS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFFECTED WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER ?”. We investigate the fear
that globalisation may lead to lower wages and reduced union power in OECD countries.
One of the factors affecting union power is foreign direct investment. Transition countries
have been favourite destinations for western companies. Does that mean that workers in these host
countries gain from this process? This brings us to the third paper, titled “OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE
AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA” where the focus is on deviations from perfect competition in
the labour market in a transition country.
3.1.    Existing Literature
Labour Market and Product Market Imperfections. One criticism applying to standard rent-
sharing studies is that they solely concentrate on imperfections in the labour market, assuming
perfect competition in the product market. Empirical research in the industrial relations literature
has devoted much effort to evaluate price-setting behaviour of firms in various environments (see
Brehnahan, 1989 and Schmalensee, 1989). A weakness of these studies is that they only focus on
product market imperfections, ignoring the possibility that inputs are not priced competitively. The
presence of rent sharing necessitates the integration of labour market variables in econometric tests
of product market power. So far, only few studies have bridged the gap between the two
econometric literatures and have considered imperfect competition in both output and input
markets (Bughin, 1996; Crépon et al., 2002; Neven et al., 2002; Schroeter, 1988). These studies
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have been able to answer our research question  R1  at the aggregate level or for one sector.
Question  R2 has remained unanswered.
Trade-Labour Literature. One strand of the trade-labour literature has focused on factor revenues
to evaluate the impact of international trade on labour market outcomes. A favourite framework of
trade economists to study this issue is the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory (HOS) in which the
Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem is an important building block. In this framework, changes in
product prices are linked to changes in factor prices. Labour economists have mainly used the
Factor Content of Trade (FCT) approach. In this approach, the amount of labour embodied in a
country’s exports and imports is calculated. To assess the impact of international trade on wages,
changes in labour flows are linked to estimates of labour demand elasticities. Both approaches,
however, find only a small impact of international trade on workers’ wages.
A growing body of the trade-labour literature has relied on rent-sharing models to explain
changes in wages by changes in rents in response to openness. In this setting, worldwide product
market integration induces a shift in the rents from domestic to foreign firms. The profit change in
the domestic firm translates in wage changes in the domestic market (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993;
Borjas and Ramey, 1995; Kramarz, 2003). Kramarz (2003) shows that international trade also
affects wages through changes in the workers’ and the firm’s outside option. Budd and Slaughter
(2004) and Budd et al. (2004) investigate indirectly the impact of increased international trade on
the worker’s bargaining power. They provide evidence of rent sharing extending across national
borders. Although existing literature has provided some answers to some of the questions involved
in  R3 , the direct effect of globalisation on the workers’ bargaining power in a rent-sharing
framework has not been analysed before.
Rent Sharing in Transition Countries. The question of how and why wages are above their
opportunity cost is an issue of central policy importance in an economy. Following Sumner Slichter
(1950), labour economists have investigated intensively imperfect competition in labour markets in
the US, Canada and Western Europe (for references, see paper 3). In contrast, testing for labour
market imperfections and rent sharing in post-communist Europe has remained a largely
unexplored field. Only very partial answers to our research question  R4  have been provided. The
few existing studies compare mainly rent-sharing behaviour before and during the transition
process (Basu et al., 1997a; Basu et al., 1997b; Grosfeld and Nivet, 1997). Commander and Dhar
(1998) and Köllö (1997) analyse differences in rent-sharing behaviour between firms with
increasing and decreasing real sales.
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3.2.    Empirical Approach
Paper 1. In paper 1, we analyse price-setting behaviour in both the product and the labour
market of Belgian manufacturing firms over the period 1988-1995. By embedding an Efficient
Bargaining model into Hall’s (1988) framework, our analysis takes into account both labour market
and product market imperfections. The presence of wage negotiations between employers and their
workers at the national, the sectoral and the firm level makes a rent-sharing framework very valid
to explain wages in the Belgian economy.
We test (1) the heterogeneity in the price-cost mark-up and the workers’ bargaining power
among 18 sectors within the manufacturing industry over the period 1988-1995 and (2) the
relationship between both parameters. We identify both parameters from a reduced-form equation.
Intuitively, we analyse how the distribution of the rents available for sharing between the workers
and the firm as well as the size of the surplus is related to the workers’ bargaining power. The main
contribution of this paper is to shed light on these relationships for Belgium.
Paper 2. In paper 1, we concentrate exclusively on imperfect competition in the domestic
product market. In paper 2, we link again product market performance to labour market
performance, be it in an international context. We investigate more specifically how globalisation
has affected workers’ wages in general and their bargaining power in particular in the Belgian
manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995. Since Belgium is one of the most open
economies in the world, we expect to find significant labour market effects from trade.
In our analysis, we test three channels through which international trade can influence
bargained wages in an Efficient Bargaining framework. First, we test whether increased
international trade has changed workers’ wages through movements in the workers’ outside option.
By doing so, we capture the fear that increased competition might lower employment opportunities
considerably. Given that imports of goods are potential substitutes for labour, higher import shares
may lower employment opportunities and decrease the reservation wage. Second, we test the
standard effect of product market competition on wages in a rent-sharing framework, i.e. the effect
of globalisation through changing the size of the rents that can be shared between the workers and
the firm. We use exogenous demand shocks that affect the firm’s price and hence its product
market conditions. The main contribution of the paper lies in the third channel through which
globalisation might influence wages: through changing the bargaining power of the workers. In
light of the globalisation debate, we test whether product market deregulation and labour market
deregulation move together. As mentioned in section 2.1., labour market deregulation has only a
redistributive effect in the short run. The decrease in the bargaining power of the workers simply
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS                                                                                                                   0.10
redistributes rents from the workers to the firm. In this paper, we solely focus on this short-run
effect.
Paper 3. In paper 3, we basically test whether the rent-sharing framework applies to a
transition country, in our case Bulgaria, during the period 1997-1998. We focus solely on imperfect
competition in the labour market, ignoring imperfect competition in the product market.
We assume that the firm and the workers only bargain over the wage level (Right-to-Manage
model). We contribute to the rent-sharing literature by concentrating on the heterogeneous
character of the rent-sharing coefficient. To be specific, we test whether the workers’ bargaining
power depends on (1) the ownership status of the firm (state-, private domestic- of foreign-owned)
and (2) the size of the firm. We expect to find a strong rent-sharing effect in state firms and a small
one in foreign firms. The idea is that foreign firms are concentrated in sectors with a high-value
added profile. Therefore, workers in these firms need to cream off only a small portion of the rents
to secure an acceptable wage. In addition, workers in foreign firms might reduce their wage
demands because of the footloose nature of foreign firms. During the 1990s, Bulgaria has
experienced a considerable inflow of inward foreign direct investment. In that context, we
investigate whether that particular aspect of globalisation has affected wage formation
significantly. Besides, we test the positive firm-size wage hypothesis and the multinational wage
premium in firms with a different ownership status.
3.3.    Conclusions
In this section, we first summarise the main scientific conclusions of our dissertation, starting
from the research questions raised in section 2.2. Then we briefly reflect on their policy
implications.
 R1  How serious are product and labour market imperfections in advanced economies? Do
these imperfections vary among sectors? The results in paper 1 show clear evidence of labour
market and product market imperfections in the Belgian manufacturing industry. The hypothesis of
perfect competition is strongly rejected. An important finding is that wages should not be
considered exogenous when price-setting behaviour in the product market is evaluated. At the
general manufacturing level as well as at the sectoral level, we provide strong evidence of price-
cost margins -and hence the degree of product market imperfection- being underestimated when
labour market imperfections are ignored.
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 R2  Are labour market and product market imperfections related? Are these imperfections
likely to go hand in hand or -at the other extreme- are they mutually exclusive? Studying the
heterogeneity in price-cost mark-up and union bargaining power parameters among sectors is the
main contribution of paper 1. Focusing on the cross-section dimension enables us to draw
conclusions about interdependencies between estimated price-cost mark-ups and estimated union
bargaining power. A new result concerns the remarkable positive relationship that we observe
among sectors between these parameters. The stronger the union, the higher the price-cost margin
at the sectoral level. In other words, the more powerful the union, the larger the proportion of the
rents going to the workers and the larger the size of the rents that can be shared. The first
relationship, pointing to the link between the workers’ bargaining power and the share of rents
going to the workers, shows how labour market (de)regulation changes the factor income
distribution in an Efficient Bargaining framework. This is the standard short-run effect. The second
relationship, showing the link between the workers’ bargaining power and the size of the rents that
can be shared, suggests that labour market and product market imperfections are likely to go hand
in hand.
As we have indicated in section 2.2., this observed positive correlation can be interpreted in
more than one way. One interpretation runs from labour market to product market imperfections
and follows from the long-run implications of the model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). The
intuition is that strong unions imply higher wage rents and a smaller proportion of rents left to the
firms. This change in factor income distribution leads to exit of firms, which decreases the degree
of product market competition and generates more unemployment. The workers’ reservation wage
will fall, price-cost mark-ups will rise. In some sense, our findings can be considered as an indirect
empirical validation of the model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in the long run.
The results can also be interpreted in terms of product market imperfections affecting labour
market imperfections. The idea is that workers are less likely to join unions unless they are able to
extract some surplus from the firms and this is most likely to happen where there is imperfect
competition in the product market. This is a standard interpretation in the trade union literature.
Another explanation going from product market imperfections to labour market imperfections is
that firms with higher price-cost margins may employ high-skilled workers who are harder to
replace than low-skilled workers and therefore more powerful.
 R3  Has increased international trade affected the size of the rents, the workers’ bargaining
power and the reservation wage in the Belgian manufacturing industry? In paper 2, we identify
three channels through which increased international trade has affected workers’ wages in the
Belgian manufacturing industry. In the first part of this paper, we show that globalisation
influences wages through changing the size of the firms’ rents and changing the workers’ outside
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option. Besides supporting the rent-sharing hypothesis, our results reveal that increased foreign
competition in the form of lower export prices reduces both wages and rents per worker. We find
that the higher the import share, the lower the workers’ outside option (and hence workers’ wages)
while the opposite is true for the export share. The mechanism at work is that imports of goods are
potential substitutes for labour. Hence, the higher the import share, the lower the employment
opportunities. To check the importance of the country of destination/ origin, we have split up
international trade flows. We consider OECD, CEE, Newly Industrialising countries (NICs) and
other NON-OECD countries. Our results reveal that imports from OECD countries and NICs exert
a significantly negative effect on the workers’ outside option whereas the opposite holds for
exports to CEE countries.
The main contribution of the paper lies in the second part, where we provide direct evidence
of increased international trade affecting the bargaining power of the workers. We have explored
the relationship between globalisation and workers’ bargaining power through a broad range of
measures such as trade, outsourcing, tariffs and inward foreign direct investment. Our results
suggest that in sectors with fierce import competition, the proportion of rents going to the workers
is squeezed. In contrast, in sectors that are shielded from competition by higher tariff levels,
workers are able to cream off a larger share of the rents. Consistent with the results of paper 3, we
find that foreign ownership reduces the workers’ bargaining power.
 R4  Do workers in host countries of foreign direct investment benefit from the globalisation
process? Are workers’ wages in foreign-owned firms higher than in domestically-owned firms?
The main conclusion of paper 3 is that ownership status is an important determinant of both the
wage level (for given productivity) and the degree of rent sharing in Bulgaria. The overall effect of
foreign ownership on workers’ wages is positive. This suggests that workers in host countries of
foreign direct investment benefit in terms of remuneration as a consequence of globalisation. The
results strongly confirm the existence of a multinational wage premium in Bulgaria. Rent sharing,
however, is far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. It is much more prevailing in
state-owned firms. In addition, we find weak evidence of a positive firm size-wage effect and a
positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing, often more pronounced in private
domestic firms.
We point to technological superiority and international rent sharing as two valid explanations
for the significant multinational wage premium in Bulgaria. The resulting high wage level in
foreign firms may explain that the proportion of the rents taken by the workers in these firms is
lower than in state firms. Two other explanations for the differences in rent-sharing behaviour
across ownership categories are the concentration of foreign ownership in firms with a high value-
added profile and the footloose nature of foreign firms. The high value-added profile implies that
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS                                                                                                                   0.13
workers in these firms need to capture only a small fraction of the rents to secure an acceptable
wage. The possible outsourcing of production decreases the bargaining power of the workers in
favour of the bargaining power of the firm.
The main contribution of this paper to the empirical rent-sharing literature is allowing the
rent-sharing parameter to vary across firms according to ownership type.
The general conclusion to be drawn from this dissertation is that labour market and product
market performance are intrinsically connected. Factors changing the degree of competition in one
market affect price-setting behaviour in the other. The most important contribution of this
dissertation is the strong empirical finding that labour market and product market imperfections are
positively correlated. In other words, product market deregulation and labour market deregulation
are found to move in the same direction. Increased competition in the product market involves
more competitive labour markets. A natural question arising from this conclusion is who loses and
who gains from deregulation and globalisation. Will globalisation indeed prove beneficial in the
long run? Who loses and who benefits from labour market deregulation?
The model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) is a macro model. Their general conclusion is
that product market deregulation, increasing competition in the product market, proves beneficial
for workers both in the short and the long run. Labour market deregulation affects workers
negatively in the short run but positively in the long run. Furthermore, since it contributes to
product and labour market deregulation, their model provides strong arguments in favour of
globalisation. However, reality may be different.
Globalisation does not affect all sectors equally. In sectors which have to cope most with
increasing international competition, there will be downward pressure on rents, prices and wages.
In these sectors firms may be forced to exit the market, which negatively affects jobs. Real wages
may fall. The favourable aggregate price effect that in the end leads to higher real wages in the
model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) may be too small when not all sectors are affected. The
partial equilibrium effect then dominates the general equilibrium effect. In sectors which are less
affected by globalisation, the decline in prices may more than compensate workers for the decrease
in rents.  Real wages increase. The general equilibrium effect on prices will then be dominant. As a
policy implication, we derive from this result that -complementary to globalisation- aggregate
product market deregulation should be at the forefront. Conducting such policy would strengthen
the favourable macroeconomic price effect and induce real wage increases and job creation at the
aggregate level. The potential role for product market deregulation to increase long-term
employment levels has recently been shown empirically by OECD (2002).
Sectors which are mostly affected by globalisation, are likely to employ low-skilled workers.
Labour market policies, directed to training and education, should be given priority. As emphasised
by OECD (2002), labour market policies and institutions appear to be equally important
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determinants of employment rates than product market deregulation. To conclude, regulatory
reforms in both the labour and the product market are needed to raise significantly employment
levels in many OECD countries.
4.     DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The literature on the mutual effects of product and labour market imperfections in general
and part of this dissertation in particular leave several paths for future research. This section aims at
outlining some of these directions.
4.1.   Objectives
As pointed out by OECD (2002), best-practice policies in the labour and the product markets
have been the subject of intense research but little focus has been on the cross-effects of these
policies. When considering the existing literature on these cross-effects (see e.g. Andersen and
Skaksen, 2003; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; OECD, 2002) and part of this dissertation, some
important unresolved questions arise.
First, the causality issue has to be addressed more extensively. An important research
question is whether causality between product and labour market imperfections runs in both
directions. Also, the precise causal mechanisms at work have to be clarified further.
Second, empirical evidence on the robustness of interactions between product and labour
market performance in countries with different institutional and structural characteristics is needed.
Third, the effect of product market integration on different segments in the labour market
and the consecutive policy implications deserve more attention. So far, existing evidence on the
impact of globalisation on wage inequality between high- and low-skilled workers has concentrated
mainly on the US (except Cuyvers et al., 2003; Lücke, 1998; Oscarsson, 2002). The dispersion in
the unemployment rates according to educational attainment in different OECD countries suggests
that the (possible adverse) effects of integration depend on country characteristics (OECD, 2002).
Fourth, the impact of worldwide product market integration on the union’s degree of risk
aversion and the intra-union bargaining weight has not been analysed before. Following two papers
of this dissertation, future research aims at filling part of the gap in the literature on the
interdependence between labour and product market imperfections.
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             4.2.   Design
Existing literature on the effect of unions on economic performance has so far concentrated
on the impact of unions on productivity, firm profitability and investment (see paper 1 for an
extensive survey). In paper 1, we focus on the relationship between the degree of labour market
imperfections and the size of the surplus available for sharing between the workers and the firm.
This research can be extended both theoretically and empirically. On the theoretical side, the
causality question has to be investigated rigorously. In paper 1, we rely on an extension of Hall’s
(1988) approach which boils down to estimating a reduced-form equation. As indicated above, the
results can be interpreted as labour market imperfections affecting product market imperfections, or
the other way around. It is difficult to disentangle the causal impact of labour and product market
policies from estimated coefficients of reduced-form regressions (OECD, 2002). Therefore, we aim
at relying on a structural approach in which the interdependence between product and labour
market competition is explicitly accounted for (see Neven et al., 2002 for a related issue). This
theoretical framework will allow us to investigate how the degree of labour market imperfections
affects the size as well as the distribution of the surplus. Based on the estimates of the structural
model, simulation exercises will enable us to assess the impact of strong unions on the size of the
surplus as well as on the part of that surplus going to the workers and the firm respectively. This
will shed light on the discussion whether the negative effects of unions through rent-seeking
behaviour dominate their potential positive effects through collective voice/ institutional response
mechanisms.
Future research also aims at analysing the interactions between product and labour market
performance in an international context. Furthermore, more attention should be paid to different
skill-segments of the labour market. In paper 2, we investigate three channels through which
international trade has affected workers’ wages in the Belgian manufacturing industry. We aim at
extending this research in several directions.
So far, we have concentrated on Belgium, a typical European unionised country
characterised by a well-developed social security system and a relatively rigid labour market which
prevents relative wage adjustments. These characteristics explain largely the fact that the negative
effects of globalisation and the lower relative demand for unskilled workers have translated in
higher relative unemployment rates for unskilled workers. In 1998, the ratio of the unemployment
of low-qualified versus high-qualified workers was highest in Belgium compared to other European
countries (OECD, 2000). A first extension will investigate more rigorously how globalisation has
affected labour market outcomes of different skill-segments in the Belgian labour market.
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Second, to shed light on the role of different labour market institutions and policies (e.g.
rigid versus flexible labour markets, degree of unionisation, differences in the generosity of the
social security system, active labour market policies), we will investigate the labour market
consequences of increased integration for a number of countries and sectors (panel study). It would
be interesting to compare the results for Belgium to e.g. the ones for the UK, characterised by a
flexible labour market and Denmark, characterised by a low unemployment rate (also for low-
skilled workers).
As most papers in the rent-sharing literature (except Bughin, 1991; Carruth and Oswald,
1985 and Svejnar, 1986), we assume in paper 2 risk-neutral unions. Under risk neutrality, unions
give equal weight to wages and employment in their preferences. They do not care about the
distribution of revenues among their members but act as pure rent-maximisers. Their effect can be
interpreted as a pure redistribution of rents from the firm to its workers. A third straightforward
extension is relaxing the risk-neutrality assumption. A first testable hypothesis is whether unions
have become more risk-averse as a consequence of globalisation. Put differently, do unions care
more about the employment consequences of their wage policies? A second testable hypothesis is
whether globalisation has affected the trade-off between wages and employment. In other words,
has globalisation influenced the intra-union bargaining weight, i.e. the degree of wage orientation?
This will shed light on whether increased international trade has reduced wage demands in
exchange for employment security. To our knowledge, the direct effect of increased international
trade on the constant relative risk aversion parameter and the intra-union bargaining weight has not
been analysed before.
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This paper extends Hall’s (1988) methodology to analyse imperfections in both the
product and the labour market for firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over
the period 1988-1995. We investigate the heterogeneity in price-cost mark-up and
workers’ bargaining power parameters among 18 sectors within the manufacturing
industry as well as the relationship between both parameters. Using a sample of
more than 7 000 firms, our GMM results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the
labour market leads to an underestimation in the price-cost margin evaluated at
perfect competition in the labour market. These findings are confirmed in the
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1.     INTRODUCTION
Intense research in industrial organisation has led to the design of more and more refined
methods to assess price-setting behaviour of firms in various environments (see Bresnahan, 1989
and Schmalensee, 1989 for surveys). However, the approach has generally remained restrictive, in
the sense that it has ignored the possibility that inputs, and particularly labour, are not priced
competitively. The fact that unions bargain over wages and hence over a share of the firm’s non-
competitive rents, necessitates the integration of labour market variables when investigating profit
margins. Labour economists on the other hand have devoted effort to test for imperfect competition
in the labour market. Most papers deal with the determination of wages and employment in the
presence of trade unions. The broad body of papers examines the effect of industry or firm
performance on wages within a collective bargaining framework1 and strongly supports the rent-
sharing hypothesis. But a similar criticism applies to these studies, i.e. they solely focus on
imperfections in the labour market, assuming perfect competition in the product market.2 Only a
few studies (Bughin, 1996; Crépon et al., 2002; Neven et al., 2002; Schroeter, 1988) have
considered the possibility of imperfections in both product and factor markets, thereby taking into
account that wages are no longer exogenous in econometric tests of product market power.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the degree of labour market
imperfections and the price-cost margin3 of firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the
period 1988-1995. We analyse how the distribution of the surplus available for sharing between the
workers and the firm as well as the size of that surplus are related to union bargaining power.
Methodologically, we follow Crépon et al. (2002). Their methodology is a natural extension
of Hall’s (1988) approach, which in turn originated from Solow’s (1957) well-known article on
estimating total factor productivity as a measure of technical change. Besides deviating from
perfect competition in the product market, we allow for the possibility that wages are bargained off
the labour demand curve, according to an Efficient Bargaining model. Relaxing the condition that
labour is priced competitively has important implications for the derivation of the Solow residual.
More precisely, it can be shown that the Solow residual can be decomposed into four components:
(1) a mark-up of price over marginal cost component, (2) a scale factor, (3) a factor reflecting
                                                          
1 See e.g. Blanchflower et al. (1996), Dobbelaere (2004), Goos and Konings (2001), Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Teulings and
Hartog (1998).
2 The necessary conditions for a union to be able to appropriate any rents in a perfectly competitive product market without driving the
firm out of existence are (1) that the union acts as a monopolist in the supply of labour and (2) that there is a fixed number of firms in the
perfectly competitive industry (Booth, 1995).
3 Throughout the paper, the price-cost margin refers to the ‘hypothetical’ price-cost margin, i.e. the price-cost margin evaluated at
perfect competition in the labour market (for technical details, see section 2).
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union bargaining power and (4) the rate of technical change. This extended approach has the
advantage that no measurement of the user cost of capital is needed to estimate the firms’ price-cost
mark-up. Neither is a measurement of the alternative wage required to estimate the bargaining
power of the union. In addition to testing simultaneously for imperfections in the product and the
labour market, this approach provides an alternative test, based on the labour share, of the Right-
To-Manage versus the Efficient Bargaining model.
We take advantage of a rich firm-level dataset covering the entire Belgian manufacturing
industry over the period 1988-1995. Our analysis allows us to make various contributions to the
literature. First, whereas the analysis of Crépon et al. (2002) is limited to the manufacturing
industry as a whole, our large sample enables us to examine the important issue of heterogeneity in
both price-cost mark-up and union bargaining power parameters. More specifically, we (1) study
the heterogeneity among sectors and (2) investigate the relationship between union bargaining
power and price-cost mark-ups. To our knowledge, the interaction between product market and
labour market imperfections at the sectoral level has not been investigated before. Second, in
contrast to most of the literature following Hall (1988), we estimate market power using a firm-
level dataset. In addition to increasing the reliability and the efficiency of the estimates and to
taking into account firm-heterogeneity within sectors, the use of firm-level data allows us to
construct good instruments. We apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalised Method of
Moments (GMM) technique. Our main findings are the following. First, our results confirm the
conclusion of Crépon et al. (2002) that ignoring imperfect competition in the labour market leads to
an underestimation of the price-cost margin at the manufacturing industry level. Our sectoral
analysis shows that this conclusion also holds at the sectoral level. Second, focusing on the cross-
section dimension enables us to reach conclusions in terms of interdependencies between the
estimated price-cost margins and the estimated union bargaining power. We find that sectors with
higher union bargaining power typically show higher price-cost margins. The positive correlation
between the two estimated parameters can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is that
labour market imperfections affect product market imperfections in the long run. The reason is that
strong unions reduce the share of the rents left to the firm, thereby driving firms out of the market
and reducing the degree of product market competition. According to this interpretation, more
powerful unions do not only increase the fraction of product rents going to labour but also the size
of total rents available for sharing between the workers and the firm. Another interpretation runs
from product market to labour market characteristics, capturing a standard effect in the trade union
literature. According to this interpretation, unions are most likely to be created in firms where rents
can be extracted. This is most likely to happen if there is imperfect competition in the product
market.
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In the remainder, we first describe our theoretical framework (section 2). Section 3 surveys
the existing literature on the effect of unions on economic performance. In section 4, we outline our
empirical model. Section 5 presents the dataset and some summary statistics. Section 6 discusses
the estimation method and confronts the theoretical hypotheses with Belgian firm-level data.
Section 7 summarises and interprets the results.
2.     THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK
2.1.    Imperfection in the Output Market, Perfect Competition in the Labour Market
We start from a standard production function it it it it itQ F N M KΘ= ( , , )  where i  is a firm index,
t  a time index, N  is labour, M  is material input and K  is capital. Θ  is an index of total factor
productivity which is allowed to vary across firms and over time. This shift variable is modelled as
the sum of a deterministic component and a random component, i.e. i t itit
a a uΘ Ae ,+ +=  where ia  is a
firm-specific time-invariant component, ta  represents productivity shocks common to all firms in a
given year and itu  is a random component with mean zero capturing transitory and idiosyncratic
differences in productivity.
Letting it it it itn m kq , , ,  and itθ  be the logarithms of it it it itQ N M K, , ,  and itΘ , we can write the
logarithmic differentiation of the production function as:
= + +∆ ∆ + ∆ ∆ ∆Q, N Q, M Q, Kit it it it it it it itε ε εq n m k θ (1)
where, using the Tornquist approximation, the time log-derivatives x∆  ( kx q n m θ, , , ,= ) are
replaced by the year to year log-changes ( 1t tx x −− ) and the production function log-derivatives, i.e.
the elasticities it it
Q, J
itε q j= ∂ ∂  ( j kn m, ,= ), by their averages over adjacent years
[ ]1 112 i t i t it itQ, Jitε q j q j, ,− −= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ .
Under perfect competition, it is well known since Solow that itq∆  can be decomposed as
follows:
= α + α + α +∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Nit Mit Kitit it it it itq n m k θ (2)
JOINT ESTIMATION OF PRICE-COST MARGINS AND UNION BARGAINING POWER                                        1.5
where Jit itJit
it it
P J
J N M K
P Q
( , , )α = =  is the share of inputs in total revenue. Consistent with the
Tornquist approximation, these shares are computed as the averages over adjacent years.
Under imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition in the input
markets, Eq. (2) becomes (Hall, 1988):
( )µ= α + α + α +∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆it Nit Mit Kitit it it it itq n m k θ (3)
where =µ itit
Qit
P
C
 is the mark-up of price over marginal cost evaluated at the competitive wage level.
Assuming constant returns to scale,  i.e. ( )it Nit Mit Kit 1µ α + α + α = , and rearranging terms,
another way to write Eq. (3) is:
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
1
1
1
( )
( )
( )
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
it Nit it it Mit it it it
it it it it it
q n m k
n k m k θ
q k θ
∆ − α ∆ − α ∆ − − α − α ∆
= µ − α ∆ − ∆ + α ∆ − ∆ + ∆
= β ∆ − ∆ + −β ∆
(4)
where µ 1β
µ
it Qit it
it
it it
P C
P
= =- -  is the price-cost margin.
Under increasing or decreasing returns to scale,
( )1 or 1
Qit it
it it Mit it it it
it it Nit Mit Kit it
Qit it Qit itC C Q C
w N P M r K
Q Q
= µ α + α + α =+ + + γ + γ
where γ can be higher than 0 (increasing returns to scale) or lower than 0 (decreasing returns to
scale) and 1+γ  is the local scale elasticity measure.
Eq. (4) can therefore easily be generalised as:
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
1
1
1
∆ − α ∆ − α ∆ − − α − α ∆
= µ − α ∆ − ∆ + α ∆ − ∆ + γ ∆ + ∆
γ= β ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + −β ∆µ
( )
( )
( )
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
it Nit it it Mit it it it it it
it
it it it it it it
it
q n m k
n k m k k θ
q k k θ
(5)
This equation shows that the Solow Residual can be decomposed into (1) a price-cost mark-up
component, (2) a scale factor and (3) a technological term or true total factor productivity growth
( = +∆ ∆ ∆it t ita uθ ).
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2.2.    Imperfection in both the Output and the Labour Market
Relaxing the assumption that labour is priced competitively has important implications for
the derivation of the Solow residual. To see this, assume that the union and the firm are involved in
an Efficient Bargaining procedure, with both wages ( )w  and employment ( )N  as the subject of
agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). Both parties maximise their respective utility during the
bargaining process. The union is risk neutral and its objective function is specified in a utilitarian
form: ( ) ( ) aU w N Nw N N w, -= + , where N  is union membership ( )0 N N< ≤  and aw w≤  is the
alternative wage (i.e. a weighted average of the alternative market wage and the unemployment
benefit). The firm’s utility equals its profits π , with ( ) ( )w N R N w N F,π = − − , where PQR =
stands for total revenue ( )0NR" < , P  for the output price, Q  for output and F  for all other costs
associated with production. For simplicity, we assume that labour is the only variable input for the
firm. Hence, F  represents fixed costs. It can be shown that this assumption on the fixed nature of
inputs other than labour does not affect the bargaining outcome provided that union preferences do
not depend on those inputs (Bughin, 1996).  Moreover, we normalise for the present by assuming
that Q N= .
The bounds of the bargaining range are given by the minimum acceptable utility levels for
both parties. The threat point for the union is the alternative wage aw . If no revenue accrues to the
firm when negotiation breaks down, the firm’s fall-back utility equals F− . The outcome of the
bargaining is the asymmetric generalised Nash solution to:
( ){ } { }1
w N
a aNNw N N w w R wN
φ −φ= + − −Ω −
,
max        (6)
where [ ]0 1,∈φ  represents the union’s bargaining power.
Maximisation of Eq. (6) with respect to the wage rate ( )w  gives the following equation:
1 a
R
w w
N
= +− φ φ( ) (7)
Maximising Eq. (6) with respect to employment ( )N  leads to the following first-order
condition:
1
N
N N
R R NR wN
w R w R
N N
−= + ⇔ −φ = +φ− φ
         (8)
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From Eq. (8), it follows that unions extract a rent from bargaining, expressed as a premium
over the marginal revenue of labour ( )NR .
By solving simultaneously both first-order conditions, we obtain an expression for the
contract curve, which results from the tangency between iso-profit curves and union indifference
curves: =N aR w . This equation shows that the employment level depends on the alternative wage
( )aw  but not on the negotiated wage ( )w  (Andersen and Sorensen, 2004; Blanchard and Giavazzi,
2003; Brown and Ashenfelter, 1986). It also follows that the contract curve outcome is to the right
of the labour demand curve. The first-order condition related to optimal employment [Eq. (8)]
shows the extent to which the bargaining outcome is off the labour demand curve.
In section 2.1, we defined β  as the price-cost margin evaluated at the competitive wage
level, i.e. Q
P C
P
−β = . Using the contract curve outcome, we can also write β  in this setting as:
.a N
R N w R R N
R N R
− −β = =  Hence, Eq. (8) can be rewritten as:
                                                                        N
R
w R
N
= +φ β                                                     (9)
Eq. (9) shows that the union premium is part of the price-cost margin (β ), set by a profit-
maximising firm facing an exogenously determined wage equal to NR ( aw=  in our case).4 Hence,
wage rents under Efficient Bargaining depend on the imperfect market structure in both the output
market (as reflected by the firm’s price-cost margin β ) and the labour market (as reflected by the
union’s bargaining power φ ). In other words, the positive union wage premium depends on the size
of the surplus available for sharing between the workers and the firm as well as on the fraction of
the surplus going to the workers. Both these factors are in turn related to the collective bargaining
structure, the market structure and the technology of the firm.
                                                          
4 Since in the Efficient Bargaining model, marginal revenue ( )
Q
R equals marginal cost ( )
Q
C  evaluated at the competitive levels of
output and wages, the mark-up has to be interpreted as a mark-up of prices over marginal costs evaluated at the competitive wage level,
i.e. 
Q a
P
C Q w
µ =
( , )
 with 
a
w  the competitive wage and Q  the competitive output level (see also Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).
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Dropping the normalisation assumption ( )=Q N  and defining the mark-up parameter µ  as
the inverse of the elasticity of revenue with respect to output, i.e. 
1
Q
Q
R
R
−
=µ     where QR  is the
marginal revenue, we can express the marginal revenue of labour as: NN
PQ
R = µ  with NQ  the
physical marginal product of labour. Using this expression for NR  in Eq. (8), the efficient
bargaining labour share is written as:
1
,
( )
Q N
N
wN
PQ
= = + εα φ − φ µ (10)
Under the generalised Nash solution, the equilibrium labour share ( )Nα  is hence a linear
function of the elasticity of output with respect to labour ( ),Q Nε . The efficient bargaining labour
share equals unity if 1φ = , i.e. if the union has all the power to capture the firm’s product rents.
Rewriting Eq. (10) as: 1
1
, ( )Q N N N=
φε µα + µ α −− φ , an extra term can be added to Eq. (5):
( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
( )
( )
( )
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
it Nit it it Mit it it
it
it it it Nit it it it
it
it it
it it it it Nit it it it it
it it
q n m k
n k m k
k n k θ
q k k n k θ
∆ − α ∆ − α ∆ − − α − α ∆
= µ − α ∆ − ∆ + α ∆ − ∆ +
φγ ∆ + µ α − ∆ − ∆ + ∆− φ
γ φ= β ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + α − ∆ − ∆ + − β ∆µ − φ
(11)
From Eq. (11), it follows that the Solow residual can now be decomposed into four
components: (1) a mark-up of price over marginal cost component, (2) a scale factor, (3) a factor
reflecting union bargaining power and (4) the rate of technical change. Remember that the mark-up
has to be interpreted as a mark-up of prices over marginal costs evaluated at the competitive wage
level.
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3.     EXISTING LITERATURE
The estimation of equations (5) and (11) allows us to shed light on the relationship between
the degree of labour market imperfections and the price-cost margins of firms, evaluated at perfect
competition in the labour market. This enables us to conclude whether labour market and product
market characteristics are correlated and -more specifically- whether imperfections in both markets
are likely to go hand in hand. Before elaborating on that issue, we survey the existing theoretical
and empirical literature on the effect of labour market imperfections on product market
performance in this section. First, we discuss the union-productivity effect. Second, the impact of
unions on firm profitability is considered. Finally, we focus on the effect of unions on dynamic
efficiency, such as R&D investment and innovative activity. The resulting hypotheses will be our
point of reference for some of the interpretations of our empirical results in section 7.
3.1.    Impact of Unions on Productivity
Productivity changes occur through technological changes, changes in technical efficiency
and changes in scale efficiency. Theoretically, unions can raise productivity through various
channels. First, firms may respond to the increased labour costs by increasing the capital intensity
and employing better-quality labour, hence increasing labour productivity. Second, productivity
improvements can result from the fact that unions can cause a ‘shock effect’, inducing managers to
change production methods and to adopt more efficient personnel policies (Slichter et al., 1960).
Third, unions can reduce staff turnover (Addison and Barnett, 1982; Freeman, 1976). Fourth,
unions can stress seniority rules (Rees, 1989). Fifth, unions can improve worker morale and
motivation (Leibenstein, 1966). Sixth, unions can improve communication between workers and
management (Dworkin and Ahlburg, 1985). In the literature, the first channel is called the
monopoly union effect. Note that the gain in productivity resulting from this effect is socially
harmful because it is caused by inefficient allocation of resources. The other channels are called the
union voice/ institutional response effects. The gain in productivity resulting from these effects is
socially desirable because it is induced by improved efficiency (DeFina, 1983; Freeman and
Medoff, 1979). Negative productivity effects can arise from strike activity and non-cooperative
behaviour (Caves, 1980; Flaherty, 1987). Second, unions may decrease productivity by
discouraging investment in physical and intangible assets (Grout, 1984). Third, unions may force
firms to adopt inefficient work practices (Pencavel, 1977).
Using various datasets for a number of sectors and countries and different econometric
techniques, the empirical literature has produced mixed results. Following Brown and Medoff
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(1978) [US], evidence in favour of positive union-productivity effects has been derived in several
studies.5 Other studies however provide evidence of a negative union-productivity effect.6 Recent
empirical evidence for the UK shows no differences in productivity of union compared to non-
union workplaces (Pencavel, 2002).
A separate part of the empirical literature has focused on the effect of unions on productivity
growth.7 Using US data, Kendrick and Grossman (1980) find a negative union-productivity growth
effect from 1948 to 1966 but a positive effect from 1967 to 1976. Several studies provide evidence
of a negative effect of unions on productivity growth (see Hirsch and Link, 1984 and Mansfield,
1980 for the US; and Maki, 1983 for Canada). A positive impact of unions on productivity growth
has been found by Gregg et al. (1993) [UK] and Phipps and Sheen (1994) [Australia].
The empirical studies mentioned above follow the traditional production function approach,
i.e. they investigate the effect of unions on productivity assuming that there is technical efficiency
in the production process. Only a few studies have assessed the union-productivity effect by
estimating a stochastic production frontier, hence allowing for technical inefficiency. Among them,
Byrnes et al. (1988) and Cavalluzzo and Baldwin (1993) find a positive union-productivity effect
using US data whereas Doucouliagos and Laroche (2002) show a negative union-productivity
effect for France.8
3.2.    Impact of Unions on Profitability
Theoretically, the rent-seeking view of unions focuses on the increased labour costs and the
associated impact on labour allocations (Lewis, 1963). If there is no offsetting productivity effect,
unions will depress profitability.
Whereas empirically, no robust conclusion can be reached concerning the union-productivity
effect, the empirical studies on the effect of unions on profitability conclude that unions decrease
profitability on average (see Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Becker and Olson, 1992 and Kleiner, 2001
for good surveys for the US; Benson, 1994 and Tachibanaki and Noda, 2000 for Japan; Machin and
Stewart, 1996; Menezes-Filho,1997; Metcalf, 1993 and Stewart, 1990 for the UK). This conclusion
is invariant to the profit measure used, to the use of sectors or firms as the unit of observation and
to the time period under investigation. The studies differ, however, in their conclusions about the
                                                          
5 See Allen (1984, 1986, 1988), Clark (1980a, 1980b), Freeman and Medoff (1983) and Schuster (1983) for the US; Coutrot (1996) for
France; Huebler and Jirjahn (2001) for Germany; Maki (1983) for Canada; and Benson (1994), Morishima (1991) and Muramatsu
(1984) for Japan.
6 See Bemmels (1987), Grady and Hall (1985), Hirsch and Addison (1986) for the US; Schnabel (1991) for Germany; Brunello (1992)
and Tachibanaki and Noda (2000) for Japan; Davis and Caves (1987), Edwards (1987), Metcalf (1993), Moreton (1999) and Pencavel
(1977) for the UK; and Crockett et al. (1992), Phipps and Sheen (1994) and Wooden (1990) for Australia.
7 Unions may have a positive effect on productivity while inducing lower productivity growth. This could arise, for example, when
unions increase efficiency but at the same time have a negative impact on technical change by retarding investment.
8 For France, the negative effect is reversed, however, for firms that adopt many Human Resources Management practices (HRM).
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magnitude of the negative union-profitability effect (Hirsch, 1997).9 Recent evidence for the US,
however, shows a positive relationship between unionisation and profitability (Batt and Welbourne,
2002). Using UK data, Machin and Stewart (1996) and Menezes-Filho (1997) show that the
negative union-profitability effect has weakened considerably over the 1980s.10 Recent empirical
work for the UK finds no overall relationship between union presence and profitability by the end
of the 1990s (Addison and Belfield, 2000; Bryson and Wilkinson, 2002 and McNabb and
Whitfield, 2000).11
3.3.    Impact of Unions on Innovative Investment Activity
Theoretically, unions can influence investment both positively and negatively. In the
traditional model, higher union wages induce firms to move up and along their labour demand
curve by decreasing employment, hiring high-quality workers and increasing the capital-to-labour
ratio. Investment in (in)tangible capital can either decrease or increase depending on the magnitude
of positive substitution versus negative scale effects.12 The first new generation of theories focusing
on the impact of unionisation on investment highlights union rent-seeking behaviour which
depresses R&D spending and investment. In this setting, unions appropriate some of the quasi-rents
earned on long-lived capital. Hence, union wage increases act as a tax on capital that lowers the net
rate of return on investment (hold-up problem). In response, firms reduce investment in innovative
and physical capital (Baldwin, 1983; Grout, 1984; Hirsch and Link, 1987; Hirsch and Prasad, 1995
and Malcomson, 1997). The second new generation of theories has qualified the underinvestment
outcome by considering oligopolistic competition between firms in the final goods market (Tauman
and Weiss, 1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1994; 1998; 2001). In this setting, R&D is undertaken for
strategic reasons by firms that are competing with each other. Tauman and Weis (1987) consider a
duopoly where only one firm is unionised. In their model the unionised firm, facing a higher wage
level, can have more incentives to invest. Using an efficient bargaining model, Ulph and Ulph
(1998, 2001) show that the relationship between union strength and R&D is inverse U-shaped if the
union cares a lot about employment.
The earliest empirical evidence supporting the union tax model has been provided by
Connolly et al. (1986) for the US. Hirsch (1991) distinguishes direct and indirect effects of unions
on investment. The direct effect arises from the union tax on returns to capital. The indirect effect
                                                          
9 Almost all the studies treat union density as exogenous. The few studies that take into account that unionisation and profitability should
in fact be determined simultaneously, find larger estimates of the impact of unions on profitability (Hirsch, 1991; Voos and Michel,
1986). This is because unions are most likely to organise and survive in firms that are most profitable.
10 The authors conclude that the negative union-profitability effect only survives if unions are strong and if there is weak competition in
the product market.
11 Metcalf (2003) also argues that the union-profitability effect is highly dependent on the degree of competition in the product market.
In case of monopolistic competition, unions still have a negative effect on profitability.
12 Note that the traditional on-the-demand curve approach is, however, inadequate for two reasons. First, both the union and the firm
prefer settlements off the labour demand curve. Second, the union wage increase is considered as an independent increase in the cost of
labour relative to capital (Hirsch, 1997).
JOINT ESTIMATION OF PRICE-COST MARGINS AND UNION BARGAINING POWER                                        1.12
stems from the increased financing costs owing to depressed profits. For the US, he finds a
negative effect of unions on capital investment which is doubled when the profit effect is taken into
account. These findings are confirmed for R&D investment although the indirect effect is only
modest in that case. Similar conclusions are provided by Allen (1988), Bronars and Deere (1993),
Bronars et al. (1994) for the US; Betts and Odgers (1997) for Canada; Addison et al. (1993) for
Germany and Denny and Nickell (1992) for the UK. In contrast, Benson (1994) provides evidence
in favour of the traditional model, i.e. unionisation seems to increase capital investment in Japan.
Schedlitzki (2002) concludes that there is no relationship between unionisation and investment in
capital and R&D in Germany. Using British data, Ulph and Ulph (1988 ) find that unionisation has
a positive effect on R&D investment in low-tech industries but a negative effect in high-tech
industries. Addison and Wagner (1994) provide evidence of a positive impact of unions on R&D
investment in British low-tech industries. They argue, however, that the positive effect is due to
endogeneity of unionisation. Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) find a negative effect of unions on R&D
spending in the UK but this effect basically disappears when they control for technological
opportunities in the industry and cohort effects. Moreover, using an ex-post efficient bargaining
model13 they provide evidence of a quadratic relationship between R&D expenditure and union
density, i.e. R&D rises with union density up to a threshold and then falls. This empirical finding
supports the second new generation of theories investigating the effect of unions on investment.
4.     EMPIRICAL MODEL
Rewriting:                       1( )it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit itq n m k∆ − α ∆ − α ∆ − − α − α ∆
as itSR  and imposing that 1
1β = β = − µit ,µ = µit , γ = γit  and φ = φit , we are able to estimate four
different specifications.
Model 1 : constant returns to scale and no bargaining ( 0γ = , 0φ = )
      ( ) 1it it it itSR q k θ= β ∆ − ∆ + − β ∆( )                                                                            (12)
Model 2 : increasing or decreasing returns to scale and no bargaining ( 0φ = )
      ( ) 1it it it it itSR q k k θγ= β ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + − βµ
  ∆   ( )                                                               (13)
                                                          
13 An ex-post efficient bargaining model refers to the case where the firm and the union bargain over wages and employment in the
second stage conditional on the R&D decision which is taken by the firm in the first stage.
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Model 3 : constant returns to scale and bargaining ( 0γ = )
      ( ) 1 1
1it it it Nit it it it
SR q k n k θφ= β ∆ − ∆ + α ∆ − ∆ + −β− φ − ∆( )( ) ( )                                              (14)
Model 4 : increasing or decreasing returns to scale and bargaining
                ( ) 1 1
1it it it it Nit it it it
SR q k k n k θγ φ= β ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + α − ∆ − ∆ + −βµ − φ
  ∆   ( )( ) ( )                              (15)
where = +∆ ∆ ∆ .it t itθ a u  In the estimations, ta∆  is captured by year dummies and itu∆  represents
the stochastic element of productivity growth.
5.     DATA
We use an unbalanced panel of the entire population of Belgian firms in the manufacturing
industry over the period 1988-1995. All variables are taken from annual company accounts which
are collected by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). We use real gross sales as a proxy for
production ( Q ). Labour ( N ) refers to the average number of employees in each firm for each year
and material input ( M ) refers to the quantity of materials employed. The capital stock ( K ) is
proxied by tangible fixed assets at historic cost minus depreciation. Nominal variables are deflated
by the three-digit producer price index which we have drawn from the National Statistical Office
(NIS).
In the initial dataset, the number of firms is approximately 19 000 per year. For the
estimates, we only include firms for which we have at least three consecutive observations for all
variables, ending up with 7 086 firms. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and first and
third quartiles of the included data for our main variables. The average growth rate of real firm
output for the overall sample is 2.9% per year over the period 1988-1995 whereas the
corresponding average manufacturing industry real output growth rate amounts to 4.2%. Capital
has decreased at an average annual growth rate of 2.4%, materials have increased at an average
annual growth rate of 3% and labour is stable over the period. The Solow residual or the
conventional measure of total factor productivity has increased at an average annual growth rate of
1.2%. As expected for firm-level data, the dispersion of all these variables is considerably large.
For example, TFP growth is smaller than -2.9% for the first quartile of firms and higher than 5.3%
for the fourth quartile.
JOINT ESTIMATION OF PRICE-COST MARGINS AND UNION BARGAINING POWER                                        1.14
Table 1   Summary Statistics
VARIABLES 1988-1995
         Mean      St. Dev.   Q1 Q3
Real firm output growth rate ∆q  0.029 0.173 -0.060 0.123
Real industry output growth rate  ind∆q  0.042 0.164 -0.028 0.107
Labour growth rate ∆n  0.005 0.154 -0.029 0.041
Capital growth rate ∆k -0.024 0.214 -0.156 0.097
Materials growth rate ∆m  0.030 0.198 -0.075 0.139
Labour share αN  in nominal output  0.272 0.153  0.158 0.361
Materials share αM  in nominal output  0.629 0.175  0.516 0.753
Solow residual SR (TFP)  0.012 0.093 -0.029 0.053
∆(q - k)  0.053 0.227 -0.092 0.210
N
(α - 1) ∆(n - k) -0.020 0.170 -0.124 0.077
Note: (1)  For all variables, the number of observations is 35518.
          (2)  
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
SR =∆q - α ∆n - α ∆m - (1- α - α ) ∆k .
6.     ESTIMATION METHOD AND RESULTS
6.1.    Estimation Technique
Since transitory productivity shocks ( itu ) might affect the level of factor inputs to the extent
that the shock becomes part of the firm’s information set before input choices are determined,
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates would be inconsistent and biased. Moreover, the
production price is endogenous to our models since the product market is imperfectly competitive
and the production price depends on strategic quantity choices made by firms. Hence, we treat all
current dated firm-specific variables as potentially endogenous.
To take into account the endogeneity problems, we estimate the models using the
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique for panel data as advocated by Arellano and
Bond (1991). This estimation method is a more robust and efficient extension of the first-difference
Instrumental Variable method suggested for dynamic fixed effects models by Anderson and Hsiao
(1982). The reason is that it utilises the moment conditions around the error term to provide
additional instruments.
Under the assumption that current random shocks are uncorrelated with past values of firm-
level regressors, we use lagged values of ∆n, ∆m and ∆k  from (t-2) and before as instruments.14,15
                                                          
14 Since all variables are expressed as growth rates, permanent shocks are not considered.
15 Assuming that the idiosyncratic component of the productivity shock (
it
u ) is white noise, taking first (logarithmic) differences
introduces errors that have a moving average structure of order one. For this reason, legitimate instruments are dated (t-2) or earlier.
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Crépon et al. (2002) and Klette and Griliches (1996) have adopted a similar approach. The validity
of the use of 2-period lagged instruments depends critically on the errors in the level equation being
serially uncorrelated. Absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference error term is
hence needed. We therefore present tests of this null hypothesis using a statistic developed in
Arellano and Bond (1991) which has a standard normal distribution. The exogeneity of the
instruments with respect to the error term is further tested by the Sargan test statistic which is
distributed as chi-squared. The GMM estimator is also robust to heteroskedasticity.16 In addition to
using IV estimation techniques, we also include time dummies to capture possible unobservable
aggregate shocks and productivity shocks common to all firms in a given year ( ta ). By taking the
first (logarithmic) difference of the production function, we control for individual firm effects ( ia ).
As a consequence, our parameter estimates are consistent even if ia  were correlated with
regressors.
Estimation is carried out using the Dynamic Panel Data program developed by Arellano and
Bond (1988), which works with the GAUSS programming language.
6.2.    General Results
First, we ignore potential heterogeneity in the price-cost mark-up and the bargaining power
parameters among sectors and estimate equations (12)-(15) for the manufacturing industry as a
whole over the period 1988-1995. The two-step estimates are reported in Table 2. The first part of
Table 2 gives the estimated values of the coefficients for the regressors entering the models. Part 2
presents the structural parameters computed from the reduced form parameters and the third part
provides specification tests.
The specification tests do not show evidence against our estimates. Absence of second-order
serial correlation cannot be rejected, which justifies our use of twice lagged instruments. The
Sargan test does not reject their joint validity. As to the estimated coefficients, our main findings
can be summarised as follows. Focusing on the degree of market power, all estimated models show
that the price to marginal cost ratio is significantly larger than one, hence supporting the hypothesis
of imperfect competition in the output market. This result confirms the findings of Bughin (1996)
and Konings et al. (2001) who provide evidence of non-competitive pricing strategies in the
Belgian manufacturing industry. Our estimates of the price-cost mark-up range from 20 to 49
percent. The results of Model 1 are in line with those of Martins et al. (1996) who find that the
average mark-up for Belgian manufacturing over the period 1980-1992 is about 18 percent.17 They
                                                          
16 In the paper, we report the second-step (optimal) GMM estimates. Our first-step estimates affect the precision of the estimates but
confirm our main conclusions about the signs and significance of the parameters.
17 These authors apply Roeger’s (1995) method, however, which uses the ‘Solow residual to estimate price-cost mark-ups.
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also accord with the estimates of Konings et al. (2001) who point to a mark-up ratio of 1.27 for
large firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1994-1996.
As far as the nature of returns to scale is concerned, Model 2 and Model 4 support the
hypothesis of increasing returns to scale: the coefficient on ∆k  is significantly larger than zero in
both models (point estimates of 0.165 and 0.099 respectively). The estimated scale elasticity is
1.228 (Model 2) and 1.147 (Model 4).18
We now turn to discussing the potential relationship between labour market imperfections
and product market imperfections, as implied by the estimates of Model 3 and Model 4. First of all,
we notice that the new variable which accounts for union bargaining power, is strongly significant
when entering the models. The estimates of Model 3 point to a significant union bargaining power
of 0.285 on a scale going from 0 to 1. In Model 4 the estimated bargaining power parameter is
0.244. These results reject the hypothesis that workers have no influence over employment, which
is consistent with the idea that wages are bargained off the conventional labour demand curve.
Hence, our findings accord with stylised facts about Belgian industrial relations19 and confirm
those of Bughin (1993) who rejects the Right-To-Manage model in favour of the Efficient
Bargaining model for Belgium. Our estimates are somewhat higher than the value of union power
(0.1) obtained by Goos and Konings (2001) for Belgium during the period 1987-1994. However,
their empirical analysis boils down to estimating a Right-To-Manage model in which the elasticity
of wages with respect to profits per employee measures the bargaining strength of the workers. In
contrast, our analysis rejects the fact that union power does not affect the labour share.
The price-cost mark-up parameter is significantly higher than the estimates obtained from
Model 1 and Model 2. Model 3 implies a significant price to marginal cost ratio of 1.350 compared
to an estimate of 1.196 when labour market imperfections are ignored. In Model 4, the price-cost
ratio increases to 1.488 compared with 1.381 when ignoring union bargaining power. Our findings
are hence qualitatively consistent with those of Crépon et al. (2002). Using a panel of 1026 French
manufacturing firms over the period 1986-1992, price-cost mark-ups are found to be about 40
percent and union bargaining power is estimated at about 0.60. Ignoring imperfect competition in
the labour market brings the price-cost mark-up estimate down to 10 percent.
                                                          
18 Note that the finding of increasing returns to scale is not driven by the inclusion of many small firms in our sample. Restricting the
analysis to firms with more than 50 employees or firms with more than 100 employees still supports the hypothesis of increasing returns
to scale.
19 Belgian collective agreements do not only deal with wages but also with employment issues like hours of work and part-time labour
policies (Bughin, 1996).
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Table 2   General Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
REDUCED  FORM  PARAMETERS
Constant 0.0002(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.009**
(0.004)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
0.164***
(0.030)
0.276***
(0.049)
0.259***
(0.046)
0.328***
(0.050)
Capital
∆k
0.165***
(0.032)
0.099***
(0.037)
Share-weighted
Labour  per  Capital
N(α - 1) ∆(n - k)
0.398***
(0.066)
0.322***
(0.070)
STRUCTURAL  PARAMETERS
Mark-up
µ
1.196***
(0.043)
1.381***
(0.093)
1.350***
(0.084)
1.488***
(0.111)
Scale Elasticity
1+ γ 1
1.228***
(0.044) 1
1.147***
(0.055)
Workers’ Barg. Power
φ
0.285***
(0.034)
0.244***
(0.040)
SPECIFICATION  TESTS
Sargan IV Test  ~ 2dfχ 47.019 50.926 34.330 31.206
df 41 43 43 42
p-value 0.240 0.190 0.825 0.889
SOC  ~ 0 1N ( , ) 0.209 0.159 -0.051 -0.200
# Obs. 28132 28132 28132 28132
# Firms 7086 7086 7086 7086
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Sample period: 1988-1995.
(2) Dependent variable: Solow Residual,  (1 ) .= ∆ − α ∆ − α ∆ − − α − α ∆
it Nit it Mit it Nit Mit it
SR q n m k
(3) The equations are estimated in levels as the specifications are in differenced logs, i.e. growth rates.
(4) Sargan IV Test: two-step estimates Sargan test of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically distributed as 2dfχ .
The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid.
(5) SOC: test for 2nd-order serial correlation (SOC) in the first-difference error term. This test statistic is asymptotically distributed as
0 1, .( )N  The null hypothesis is that there is no second order serial correlation in the first-difference error term.
(6) Instruments used are: ∆n, ∆m and ∆k,  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
(7) Time dummies are included as regressors and instruments in all equations.
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In the specifications mentioned above, firm-level data are deflated by a common industry
price index at the three-digit level of sectoral disaggregation. Output price differences between
firms are hence not taken into account, they show up in the error term. This may give rise to
downwardly biased and inconsistent estimates of price-cost mark-up and scale coefficients if output
price differences between firms within an industry are endogenous and correlated with the
explanatory variables in the model (changes in factor inputs and factor shares).20 This problem
might arise when firms compete in an environment with differentiated products. To address this
issue, we have adopted the solution suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996) which amounts to
adding the growth in industry output as an additional regressor. Theoretically, this solution relies
on the assumption that the market power of firms originates from product differentiation.
Intuitively, in the case of product differentiation, the demand for an individual firm’s products is a
function of its relative price within the industry. Relative price differences can then be expressed in
terms of relative output growth differences in the industry. In contrast to Klette and Griliches
(1996) and Crépon et al. (2002), we find that the growth of industry output is not statistically
significant in the empirical specifications.21 Moreover, its inclusion has no effect on the estimated
values of the other coefficients. Our results hence suggest that the main source of the market power
of Belgian manufacturing firms is not in product differentiation but rather corresponds to other
forms of imperfect competition.
6.3.    Sectoral Analysis
To take into account heterogeneity among sectors, we disaggregate the Belgian
manufacturing industry into 20 two-digit sectors and estimate the four models for each sector. Due
to data limitations and econometric problems, we had to restrict the analysis to 18 sectors. For all
reported results, the test statistics cannot reject absence of second-order serial correlation in the
differenced error term. Moreover, on the basis of the Sargan test we can never reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Table 3 and Table 4 report the results for Model 1 and
Model 2 respectively. With the exception of the milk and dairy products sector (sector 11), the ratio
of price over marginal cost is significantly larger than one at the 1% level for all sectors. The
estimated mark-up ratio of Model 1 ranges from 0.992 to 1.471. This range seems plausible and is
also in line with the findings of Martins et al. (1996) and Konings et al. (2001).
We can group sectors according to the magnitude of the estimated price-cost mark-ups.
Relatively high mark-ups (22-47 percent) appear in sectors such as ferrous and non-ferrous ores
                                                          
20 However, we argue that this downward bias is less severe in our estimations since we use a price index defined at the three-digit level
of sectoral disaggregation as deflator (instead of an industry-wide deflator). In other words, we allow for a relatively high degree of price
variability within the manufacturing industry as a whole as well as within the manufacturing sectors defined at the two-digit level of
sectoral disaggregation.
21 These results are not reported but available upon request.
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and metals, non-metallic mineral products, agricultural and industrial machinery, office and data
processing machines, precision and optical instruments, other transport equipment, beverages and
rubber and plastic products. On the other hand, the estimated mark-up ratio is relatively low (0.992-
1.156) in the sectors producing metal products except machinery and transport equipment, meat
preparations and preserves, milk and dairy products, textiles and clothing, and other manufacturing
products.
When taking into account the influence of returns to scale, the mark-up ratio ranges from
0.991 to 1.808. The scale elasticity varies from 1 to 1.734, pointing to constant and increasing
returns to scale. The higher the scale elasticity, the larger the increase in and the level of the price
over marginal cost ratio compared to Model 1. The ranking of sectors according to the estimated
price over marginal cost ratio remains largely the same.
Although high price-cost mark-ups may be indicative of a lack of competition in the sector,
they cannot be considered as persistent rents resulting from market power. In innovative sectors,
for example, high mark-ups may be the result of temporary innovation rents. Sunk costs may also
necessitate mark-up pricing.
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Table 3   Sector Analysis: Model 1
Code Name # Obs.(# Firms)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
Mark-up
µ
Sec 1 13 Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals,other than radioactive
331
(74)
0.217***
(0.004)
1.277***
(0.007)
Sec 2 15 Non-metallic mineral products 2359 (562)
0.183***
(0.031)
1.224***
(0.046)
Sec 3 17 Chemical products 1452(319)
0.170***
(0.024)
1.205***
(0.035)
Sec 4 19 Metal products except machinery andtransport equipment
3649
(1014)
0.135***
(0.051)
1.156***
(0.068)
Sec 5 21 Agricultural and industrial machinery 1504(399)
0.185***
(0.028)
1.227***
(0.042)
Sec 6 23 Office and data processing machines,precision and optical instruments
448
 (130)
0.198***
(0.030)
1.247***
(0.047)
Sec 7 25 Electrical goods 992(267)
0.165***
(0.024)
1.198***
(0.034)
Sec 8 27 Motor vehicles 426 (111)
0.148***
(0.021)
1.174***
(0.029)
Sec 9 29 Other transport equipment 230(64)
0.320***
(0.011)
1.471***
(0.024)
Sec 10 31 Meat preparations and preserves, otherproducts from slaughtered animals
929
(214)
0.061***
(0.013)
1.065***
(0.015)
Sec 11 33 Milk and dairy products 264(66)
-0.008**
(0.004)
0.992***
(0.004)
Sec 12 35 Other food products 3320(834)
0.168***
(0.048)
1.202***
(0.069)
Sec 13 37 Beverages 397(88)
0.227***
(0.006)
1.294***
(0.010)
Sec 14 39 Tobacco products na na
Sec 15 41 Textiles and clothing 3200(783)
0.125***
(0.040)
1.143***
(0.052)
Sec 16 43 Leathers, leather and skin goods,footwear na na
Sec 17 45 Timber, wooden products and furniture 2641(668)
0.147***
(0.030)
1.172***
(0.041)
Sec 18 47 Paper and printing products 3585(926)
0.167***
(0.027)
1.200***
(0.039)
Sec 19 49 Rubber and plastic  products 1337(322)
0.239***
(0.021)
1.314***
(0.036)
Sec 20 51 Other manufacturing products 570 (163)
0.125***
(0.014)
1.143***
(0.018)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,∆  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
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Table 4   Sector Analysis: Model 2
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
Capital
∆k
Mark-up
µ
Scale Elasticity
1+ γ
Sec 1 331
(74)
0.240***
(0.004)
0.041***
(0.006)
1.316***
(0.007)
1.054***
(0.008)
Sec 2 2359 (562)
0.329***
(0.043)
0.227***
(0.041)
1.490***
(0.096)
1.338***
(0.061)
Sec 3 1452(319)
0.276***
(0.043)
0.116***
(0.041)
1.381***
(0.082)
1.160***
(0.057)
Sec 4 3649(1014)
0.319***
(0.062)
0.203***
(0.045)
1.468***
(0.134)
1.298***
(0.066)
Sec 5 1504(399)
0.388***
(0.034)
0.350***
(0.042)
1.634***
(0.091)
1.572***
(0.069)
Sec 6 448 (130)
0.330***
(0.053)
0.223***
(0.067)
1.493***
(0.118)
1.333***
(0.100)
Sec 7 992(267)
0.285***
(0.031)
0.152***
(0.029)
1.399***
(0.061)
1.213***
(0.041)
Sec 8 426 (111)
0.173***
(0.026)
0.026
(0.031)
1.209***
(0.038)
1***
(0.037)
Sec 9 230(64)
0.447***
(0.018)
0.406***
(0.032)
1.808***
(0.059)
1.734***
(0.058)
Sec 10 929(214)
0.060***
(0.022)
-0.0003
(0.024)
1.064***
(0.027)
1***
(0.026)
Sec 11 264(66)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.991***
(0.004)
1***
(0.004)
Sec 12 3320(834)
0.386***
(0.083)
0.256***
(0.080)
1.629***
(0.220)
1.417***
(0.130)
Sec 13 397(88)
0.235***
(0.009)
0.016
(0.011)
1.307***
(0.015)
1***
(0.014)
Sec 14 na na na na
Sec 15 3200(783)
0.184***
(0.045)
0.127***
(0.040)
1.225***
(0.068)
1.156***
(0.049)
Sec 16 na na na na
Sec 17 2641(668)
0.354***
(0.053)
0.212***
(0.045)
1.548***
(0.127)
1.328***
(0.070)
Sec 18 3585(926)
0.322***
(0.045)
0.172***
(0.042)
1.475***
(0.098)
1.254***
(0.062)
Sec 19 1337(322)
0.369***
(0.034)
0.192***
(0.045)
1.585***
(0.085)
1.304***
(0.071)
Sec 20 570 (163)
0.209***
(0.020)
0.115***
(0.016)
1.264***
(0.032)
1.145***
(0.020)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,∆  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
Focusing on the relationship between labour market imperfections and product market
imperfections leads to following insights (see Table 5 and Table 6). In Model 3, the estimated
mark-up ratio ranges from 1.017 to 2.088 and the bargaining power parameter varies from 0.042 to
0.394. Our estimates of union bargaining power accord with those of Vandenbussche et al. (2001),
who estimate bargaining power coefficients for NACE three-digit sectors over de period 1987-
1994. Model 4 points to a range of 1-2.268 for the estimated mark-up ratio and 0.051-0.400 for
union bargaining power.
For each sector, we find evidence of price-cost mark-ups being underestimated when
imperfection in the labour market is ignored, hence, validating the findings of Bughin (1996). The
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higher the bargaining power of the workers in a sector, the higher the level of and the increase in
the estimated price over marginal cost ratio. This allows us again to split up sectors according to
the magnitude of both the mark-up ratio and union bargaining power. Concentrating on Model 3,
the correlation between the estimated mark-up ratio and the union bargaining power parameter is
0.872. Sectors such as metal products except machinery and transport equipment, office and data
processing machines, precision and optical instruments, electrical goods, other transport equipment
and rubber and plastic products are characterised by a relatively high mark-up ratio (range of
1.502-2.088) and relatively high union bargaining power (range of 0.260-0.394). The sector office
and data processing machines, precision and optical instruments can be labelled as the sector with
both the highest price-cost mark-up and the highest union bargaining power parameter. Sectors
such as non-metallic mineral products, chemical products, motor vehicles, other food products,
beverages, paper and printing products and other manufacturing products can be classified as
sectors with moderate price-cost mark-ups (range of 1.282-1.493) and moderate union bargaining
power (range of 0.094-0.237). Sectors producing meat preparations and preserves and milk and
dairy products display a relatively low price over marginal cost ratio (range of 1.017-1.125) and
relatively low union bargaining power (range of 0.042-0.050). The lowest mark-up ratio as well as
the lowest union bargaining power parameter is found in the milk and dairy products sector. Model
4 produces similar results. The correlation between the estimated mark-up ratio and the union
bargaining power parameter is 0.714.22
                                                          
22 The highest estimated price-cost mark-up ratio equals 2.268 (sec 9). As mentioned before, sunk costs may explain part of this high
estimate.
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Table 5   Sector Analysis: Model 3
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Output  per  Capital
∆(q - k)
Share-weighted
Labour  per  Capital
N(α - 1) ∆(n - k)
Mark-up
µ
Workers’ Barg.
Power
φ
Sec 1 331
(74)
0.265***
(0.009)
0.104***
(0.016)
1.361***
(0.017)
0.094***
(0.013)
Sec 2 2359 (562)
0.305***
(0.034)
0.259***
(0.043)
1.439***
(0.070)
0.206***
(0.027)
Sec 3 1452(319)
0.315***
(0.033)
0.221***
(0.045)
1.460***
(0.070)
0.181***
(0.030)
Sec 4 3649(1014)
0.342***
(0.054)
0.359***
(0.059)
1.520***
(0.125)
0.264***
(0.032)
Sec 5 1504(399)
0.312***
(0.024)
0.411***
(0.044)
1.453***
(0.051)
0.291***
(0.022)
Sec 6 448 (130)
0.521***
(0.043)
0.651***
(0.054)
2.088***
(0.187)
0.394***
(0.020)
Sec 7 992(267)
0.334***
(0.019)
0.363***
(0.033)
1.502***
(0.043)
0.266***
(0.018)
Sec 8 426 (111)
0.243***
(0.021)
0.187***
(0.033)
1.321***
(0.037)
0.158***
(0.023)
Sec 9 230(64)
0.502***
(0.019)
0.464***
(0.071)
2.008***
(0.077)
0.317***
(0.008)
Sec 10 929(214)
0.088***
(0.020)
0.035**
(0.018)
1.096***
(0.024)
0.034**
(0.017)
Sec 11 264(66)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.044***
(0.005)
1.017***
(0.005)
0.042***
(0.005)
Sec 12 3320(834)
0.307***
(0.051)
0.284***
(0.062)
1.443***
(0.106)
0.221***
(0.038)
Sec 13 397(88)
0.289***
(0.008)
0.154***
(0.009)
1.406***
(0.016)
0.133***
(0.007)
Sec 14 na na na na
Sec 15 3200(783)
0.260***
(0.045)
0.310***
(0.059)
1.351***
(0.082)
0.237***
(0.034)
Sec 16 na na na na
Sec 17 2641(668)
0.330***
(0.043)
0.264***
(0.049)
1.493***
(0.096)
0.209***
(0.031)
Sec 18 3585(926)
0.306***
(0.038)
0.263***
(0.057)
1.441***
(0.079)
0.208***
(0.036)
Sec 19 1337(322)
0.396***
(0.027)
0.351***
(0.048)
1.656***
(0.074)
0.260***
(0.026)
Sec 20 570 (163)
0.220***
(0.027)
0.206***
(0.030)
1.282***
(0.044)
0.171***
(0.021)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,∆  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
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Table 6   Sector Analysis: Model 4
# Obs.
(# Firms)
Output  per
Capital
∆(q - k)
Capital
∆k
Share-weighted
Labour  per  Capital
N(α - 1) ∆(n - k)
Mark-up
µ
 Scale
Elasticity
1+ γ
Workers’
Barg. Power
φ
Sec 1 331(74)
0.268***
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.012)
0.117***
(0.020)
1.366***
(0.019)
1***
(0.016)
0.105***
(0.016)
Sec 2 2359(562)
0.356***
(0.039)
0.152***
(0.055)
0.156***
(0.060)
1.553***
(0.094)
1.236***
(0.085)
0.135***
(0.045)
Sec 3 1452 (319)
0.325***
(0.043)
0.017
(0.044)
0.213***
(0.050)
1.481***
(0.094)
1***
(0.065)
0.176***
(0.034)
Sec 4 3649(1014)
0.387***
(0.058)
0.106**
(0.051)
0.275***
(0.069)
1.631***
(0.154)
1.173***
(0.083)
0.216***
(0.042)
Sec 5 1504(399)
0.386***
(0.029)
0.185***
(0.051)
0.272***
(0.062)
1.629***
(0.077)
1.301***
(0.083)
0.214***
(0.038)
Sec 6 448(130)
0.521***
(0.047)
0.008
(0.046)
0.668***
(0.058)
2.088***
(0.204)
1***
(0.096)
0.400***
(0.021)
Sec 7 992(267)
0.382***
(0.025)
0.101***
(0.033)
0.313***
(0.045)
1.618***
(0.065)
1.163***
(0.053)
0.238***
(0.026)
Sec 8 426(111)
0.235***
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.029)
0.186***
(0.034)
1.307***
(0.043)
1***
(0.038)
0.157***
(0.024)
Sec 9 230(64)
0.559***
(0.015)
0.311***
(0.034)
0.301***
(0.030)
2.268***
(0.077)
1.705***
(0.077)
0.231***
(0.018)
Sec 10 929(214)
0.068***
(0.025)
-0.042
(0.029)
0.052**
(0.024)
1.073***
(0.029)
1***
(0.031)
0.049**
(0.022)
Sec 11 264(66)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.028***
(0.007)
0.054***
(0.006)
1***
(0.004)
0.972***
(0.007)
0.051***
(0.005)
Sec 12 3320(834)
0.359***
(0.073)
0.096
(0.095)
0.220***
(0.080)
1.560***
(0.178)
1***
(0.148)
0.180***
(0.060)
Sec 13 397 (88)
0.254***
(0.011)
-0.093***
(0.016)
0.213***
(0.012)
1.340***
(0.020)
0.875***
(0.021)
0.176***
(0.008)
Sec 14 na na na na na na
Sec 15 3200
 (783)
0.284***
(0.048)
0.057
(0.040)
0.285***
(0.064)
1.397***
(0.094)
1***
(0.056)
0.222***
(0.039)
Sec 16 na na na na na na
Sec 17 2641 (668)
0.386***
(0.050)
0.130***
(0.052)
0.154***
(0.065)
1.629***
(0.133)
1.212***
(0.085)
0.133***
(0.050)
Sec 18 3585 (926)
0.340***
(0.044)
0.107**
(0.047)
0.142**
(0.070)
1.515***
(0.101)
1.162***
(0.071)
0.124***
(0.050)
Sec 19 1337(322)
0.407***
(0.031)
0.042
(0.048)
0.319***
(0.059)
1.686***
(0.088)
1***
(0.081)
0.242***
(0.034)
Sec 20 570(163)
0.226***
(0.031)
0.005
(0.026)
0.206***
(0.032)
1.292***
(0.052)
1***
(0.034)
0.171***
(0.022)
  Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.
  Instruments: ∆n, m and ∆k,∆  all dated (t-2) and earlier.
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7.     CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION
This paper analyses price-setting behaviour in both the product and the labour market of
Belgian manufacturing firms over the period 1988-1995. By embedding an Efficient Bargaining
model into Hall’s (1988) framework, we are able to estimate price-cost mark-up and union
bargaining power parameters simultaneously. Applying the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) technique for panel data, our results strongly reject perfect competition in both the output
and the labour market. Assuming constant returns to scale, price-cost mark-ups are estimated at 35
percent and the union bargaining power parameter is found to be about 0.29. Ignoring labour
market imperfections brings the estimated price-cost mark-up down to 20 percent. In this respect,
our results qualitatively accord with the findings of Crépon et al. (2002).
To examine the important issue of heterogeneity in the price-cost mark-up and in union
bargaining power, we have split up the sample into 18 sectors. For each sector separately, we find
that neglecting imperfection in the labour market causes a significant underestimation in the price-
cost mark-up. By focusing on the cross-section dimension, we are able to draw conclusions about
the interdependencies between the two parameters. A new result in this paper concerns the
remarkable positive relationship that we observe among sectors between estimated union
bargaining power and estimated price-cost margins, evaluated at perfect competition in the labour
market. In other words, labour market and product market imperfections are likely to go hand in
hand. This observed positive correlation can be interpreted in two ways. We see it as a topic for
further research to assess the relevance of each interpretation.
One interpretation runs from labour market to product market imperfections and follows
from the long-run implications of the model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). The intuition is that
strong unions imply higher wage rents and a smaller proportion of rents left to the firms. This
change in factor income distribution leads to exit of firms, which decreases the degree of product
market competition and generates more unemployment. The workers’ reservation wage will fall,
resulting in higher price-cost mark-ups. In some sense, our findings can be considered as an
indirect empirical validation of the model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) in the long run. The
more powerful the union, the larger the size of the surplus that can be shared and the larger the part
of the surplus going to the workers. Our framework does not allow us, however, to evaluate the
effect of strong unions on the size of the surplus accruing to the firm. Theoretically, our findings
are hence consistent with the hypothesis that unions may depress profits as well as with the
hypothesis that unions do not affect profitability or even increase profitability.23
                                                          
23 Estimating a structural model, which endogenises wages, for the European airline industry over the period 1976-1994, Neven et al.
(2002) find that unions exert a small but positive effect on prices and on the true price-cost mark-up. The small impact is due to the
quantitatively small effect of rent sharing on marginal costs, suggesting that rent sharing is mostly about redistribution.   
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 The results can also be interpreted in terms of product market imperfections affecting labour
market imperfections. The idea is that workers are less likely to join unions unless they are able to
extract some surplus from the firms and this is most likely to happen where there is imperfect
competition in the product market. This is a standard interpretation in the trade union literature.
Another explanation going from product market imperfections to labour market imperfections is
that firms with higher price-cost margins may employ high-skilled workers who are harder to
replace than low-skilled workers and therefore more powerful.24 In that case, monopoly power in
the product market would also be associated with higher union bargaining power.
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In this paper, we investigate whether international trade has affected workers’ wages
in general and their bargaining power in particular in the Belgian manufacturing
industry over the period 1987-1995. Using a sample of more than 12 000 firms, we
provide evidence of three channels through which international trade has an impact
on workers’ wages in a bargaining framework. First, international trade has an effect
on the workers’ outside option. Our results show that in sectors actively importing
goods, workers’ wages have decreased while the opposite is true for sectors actively
exporting goods. Second, international trade affects the size of the firms’ profits.
Our results reveal that increased foreign competition in the form of lower export
prices reduces both wages per worker and profits per worker. Third, international
trade has a direct effect on the workers’ bargaining power. In sectors characterised
by high tariffs, workers are able to cream off a larger share of the rents whereas the
opposite holds for sectors with strong import competition.
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1.     INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation
During the past decades, the labour market consequences of international integration have
been at the centre of lively debate. Anti-globalisation protests surrounding the WTO, IMF and
World Bank meetings reveal that many people fear that they may lose their job or may be
confronted with lower wages because of the threat of fiercer international competition.
In this paper, we rely on a rent-sharing framework to investigate the impact of international
trade on labour market outcomes in Belgium. We argue that there are at least two valid reasons for
doing so. First, the Belgian economy is characterised by the presence of wage negotiations between
firms and their workers at the national, the sectoral and the firm level.1 Hence, this makes a rent-
sharing framework very valid to explain wages in the Belgian economy. Second, Belgium is one of
the most open economies in the world. More specifically, the export/GDP ratio equals 85% in 2002
compared to 10% in the US.2 Krugman (1995) among others argues that globalisation cannot
explain US labour market developments because the US economy is just not open enough for trade
to matter a lot. Turning this argument around, we expect to find significant labour market effects
from trade in Belgium.3 As a first indication supporting this hypothesis, Table 1 contains reduced
form equations of bargained wages and profits per worker in the Belgian manufacturing industry
over the period 1987-1995. Explanatory variables are exogenous sector-specific prices of imported
goods and exported goods expressed in US dollars, sector-specific effective exchange rates4 and
year dummies. As expected, the sector-specific price of exports has a positive and statistically
significant effect on real wages per worker and real profits per worker. This means that increased
foreign competition in the form of lower sector-specific export prices reduces both wages per
worker and profits per worker. A rather unexpected result is that the price of imports affects both
wages per worker and profits per worker significantly negatively. As expected, the sector-specific
exchange rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on real wages per worker and on real
profits per worker. The results in Table 1 suggest that international trade has a significant effect on
both wages and profits per worker.
                                                          
1 The most important level is the sectoral level, although in recent years there has been a sharp rise in the number of collective
agreements concluded at the enterprise level (European Foundation, 2003).
2 The data are obtained from the OECD International Trade Statistics and the OECD Main Economic Indicators (see
http://www.oecd.org). Explanations for the high openness ratio in Belgium are the close proximity to its trading partners, low transport
costs and a supportive financial structure (Johnson and Stafford, 1999).
3 One may legitimately wonder whether these effects are to be found on unemployment or on wages. In Belgium, the unemployment rate
is high. Among other things, high minimum wages and bargaining agreements covering all type of workers tend to generate wage
rigidity. The public opinion seems to believe that globalisation is responsible for the high unemployment. However, evidence is virtually
nonexistent. Compared to other European countries, Belgium is characterised by a medium level of wage rigidity (see e.g. Berthold et
al., 1999; Layard et al., 1991; Vinals and Jimeno, 1997).
4 An increase in the exchange rate means a depreciation of the Belgian franc.
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  Table 1   OLS Estimates of the Reduced Forms for Wages and Profits per Worker, 1987-1995.
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Firm-average
Real Wage per Worker
Firm-average
Real Profits per Worker
Constant 0.052
***
(0.006)
-0.026
(0.018)
Import Price -0.037
***
(0.005)
-0.026**
(0.011)
Export Price 0.039
***
(0.005)
0.028***
(0.010)
Exchange Rate 0.007
***
(0.002)
0.013**
(0.007)
Year dummies Yes Yes
# Obs. 73354 73383
2R 0.01 0.001
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variables are the firm-average real wage per worker and the firm-average real profits per worker. Real wages
are constructed as nominal wages divided by the consumer price index with 1990 as reference year and real profits as nominal
profits divided by the sector-specific producer price index. All variables are expressed as natural logarithms and are first-differenced.
Theoretically, there exist three channels through which globalisation can influence wages in
a collective bargaining framework. International trade can affect the bargaining outcome through
movements in the firm’s financial conditions, the firm’s and the workers’ threat points and the
workers’ bargaining power (see Section 2.2.). To shed light on the mechanisms underlying the
results in Table 1, we focus on the following issues. In the first part of the paper, we concentrate on
the effect of international trade on bargained wages through changes in the firms’ rents and
changes in the workers’ outside option. To our knowledge, these issues have not been taken up for
the Belgian economy. Goos and Konings (2001) and Veugelers (1989) examine the rent-sharing
hypothesis using Belgian firm-level data and find a positive profit-wage relationship. However,
these authors do not relate their rent-sharing framework to a story of globalisation. Whereas our
first part analyses among other things the effect of globalisation through the size of the rents, we
focus explicitly on the distribution of the rents in the second part of this paper. Dobbelaere (2003),
Vandenbussche et al. (2001) and Veugelers (1989) for Belgium and Svejnar (1986) for the US
point out that there is a lot of cross-industry variation in the relative bargaining power coefficient.
Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989) further examine the determinants of this cross-industry
variation. Although a well-developed theory of the determinants of relative bargaining power is
lacking, these authors link the sectoral bargaining power parameters to variables relating to the
economic bargaining environment such as the sectoral unemployment rates and several variables
capturing output market concentration. However, they do not relate the workers’ bargaining power
to globalisation. We contribute to the literature by studying whether the globalisation process has
led to a shift in bargaining power from labour to capital. More specifically, we use a two-stage
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approach in which we first estimate the workers’ (relative) bargaining power for each sector
following Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989). Our unique dataset encompassing the entire
population of Belgian firms in the manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995 enables us to
split up our data into several sectors.5 In the second stage, we relate the workers’ (relative)
bargaining power of each sector and each year to a broad range of globalisation measures such as
trade, outsourcing, tariffs and measures related to foreign direct investment.
We find that international trade has an effect on workers’ wages through changes in the
workers’ outside option, the firms’ profits and the workers’ bargaining power. Our results show
that in sectors actively importing goods, workers’ outside options (and hence workers’ wages) have
decreased while the opposite is true for sectors actively exporting goods. Increased foreign
competition in the form of lower export prices reduces profits per worker and hence workers’
wages. Although technological change, in the form of high R&D expenditures, seems to exert an
important effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power, we find that globalisation also matters.
A robust finding is that in sectors characterised by high tariffs, workers are able to cream off a
larger share of the rents whereas the opposite holds for sectors with strong import competition.
1.2. Existing Trade-Labour Literature
In this section, we survey very briefly the literature on the impact of international trade on
the labour market.6
One strand of this literature has taken its outset in the integration of emerging economies.
Compared to OECD countries, these countries have a relatively large supply of unskilled workers
with low wages. Accordingly, it has been a concern whether the position of unskilled versus skilled
workers in OECD countries would deteriorate. This could show up either in lower relative wages
and/or higher unemployment for these unskilled workers.
A favourite framework of trade economists to study the impact of international trade on the
labour market is the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory (HOS) in which the Stolper-Samuelson
(SS) theorem is an important building block. This theory is based on perfect competition in the
product and the labour market and is used to explain trade between countries with different factor
endowments. Therefore, international trade is mainly of the inter-industry type. According to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the relative (real) wages of unskilled workers in OECD countries
decline if the integration process is associated with a decline in relative prices of commodities
                                                          
5 Our dataset has the advantage of being more exhaustive than the Amadeus firm-level dataset of Bureau van Dijck. The latter database
only contains firms satisfying at least one of the following criteria: number of employees larger than 100, total assets and operating
revenues exceeding 16 million and 8 million USD, respectively.
6 It is not our intention to give an exhaustive overview but to outline the main developments in the trade-labour literature. For literature
surveys, see among others, Brock (2003), Burtless (1995), Cline (1997), Deardorff and Hakura (1994), Gaston and Nelson (2000) and
Greenaway and Nelson (2001).
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using a lot of unskilled labour. However, a voluminous literature linking changes in product prices
to changes in factor prices (see Haskel, 1999 and Slaughter, 2000 for a survey of these studies) has
found that international trade can account for only a very small fraction of the deterioration of the
position of unskilled workers. Instead, technological progress seems to be the main reason for
observed relative wage changes. Allowing for intra-industry trade, which has become more
important during the past decades (Coppel and Durand, 1999), the New Trade Theory (Helpman
and Krugman, 1985) provides a framework for studying the impact of international trade in
imperfectly competitive product markets. Compared to the HOS-theory, the effect of international
trade on the relative wages and employment of skilled versus unskilled workers is less clear-cut. In
general, the New Trade Theory predicts that intra-industry trade has a rather small effect on the
income distribution and may lead to welfare gains for all agents (Manasse and Turrini, 2000). It is
even possible that a reverse Stolper Samuelson effect arises, i.e. that scarce production factors in
developed countries (unskilled workers) gain from trade (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985;
Krugman, 1981). The impact on the relative demand of skilled versus unskilled workers is vague as
this depends on how international trade results in an expansion or contraction of certain sectors (see
e.g. Gasiorek et al., 1991).
Labour economists have mainly used the so-called Factor Content of Trade (FCT) approach.
This approach uses input-output analysis to evaluate the effect of international trade on the labour
market. For given wages, the amount of labour (possibly split-up between skilled and unskilled
workers) embodied in a country’s exports and imports is calculated. The net employment effect is
calculated as the difference between labour embodied in export flows versus labour embodied in
import flows. To assess the impact of international trade on wages, the changes in labour flows are
linked to estimates of labour demand elasticities. Except for Wood (1995),7 most authors also find
a small to moderate impact of international trade on workers’ wages.8
The studies mentioned above focus on factor revenues and do not address the capture or
distribution of rents in response to international trade. A growing body of the trade-labour literature
has relied on rent-sharing models to explain changes in wages by changes in rents in response to
openness. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada, Borjas and Ramey (1995) for the US and
Kramarz (2003) for France show how increased international competition triggers a shift in the
rents from domestic to foreign firms. This leads to a change in profits of the domestic firm, which
translates in wage changes in the domestic market. Fontagné and Mirza (2001) focus on trade
                                                          
7 Wood (1995) argues that standard FCT-studies underestimate the impact of international trade on the labour market. Important reasons
are the presence of non-competing imports and the fact that international trade not only directly affects the labour market but also exerts
an indirect effect on wages and employment. The idea is that international trade leads to defensive innovation, inducing productivity
changes by focusing on labour-saving, cost-reducing innovations in advanced countries. Firm-level studies investigating this indirect
effect are Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2001) for the US and Bernard and Wagner (1997) for Gemany. Studies at the sectoral level
addressing this issue are Cortes and Jean (2001) for France, Germany and the US; and Lawrence (2000) for the US.
8 See Borjas et al. (1992, 1997) for the US; Cortes et al. (1999) for France; De Grauwe et al. (1979) for Belgium; Messerlin (1995) for
France and Schumacher (1984, 1989) for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.
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volumes to address the international rent-sharing hypothesis in developed and developing
countries. Their empirical results show that an increase in exports as well as domestic market
shares induces higher wages in a number of industries in the OECD. In developing countries, such
as the Mediterranean countries9 and those in Latin America, similar rent-sharing effects are
observed. However, these effects are not present in Asia. Besides taking into account the effect of
globalisation through changes in the firm’s rents, Kramarz (2003) provides evidence of
international trade affecting bargained wages through changes in the workers’ and the firm’s threat
points. Work related to the impact of increased globalisation on workers’ bargaining power has
been done by Budd and Slaughter (2004) and Budd et al. (2004). Their paper focuses on Canada
and investigates whether profits are shared across international borders. More specifically,
Canadian wages are regressed on Canadian and US profits, both interacted with several variables
related to international linkages such as multinational ownership, union type and tariffs and
transportation costs.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the theoretical
framework and discuss three channels through which international trade can affect wages in a
collective bargaining framework. Section 3 presents the regression results of the first stage. Section
4 focuses on the determinants of the workers’ bargaining power and hence deals with the
regression results of the second stage. The paper ends with a summary of the main results.
2.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The methodology in this paper borrows from the rent-sharing literature. Several papers deal
with this issue and investigate the link between a firm's ability to pay and the workers' wages.
Within this framework, workers no longer obtain the competitive wage but are able to capture a
fraction of the firm's profits per worker in the form of higher wages.10
In this section, we first describe the efficient bargaining framework. Then, we briefly discuss
three channels through which international trade can affect wages during the bargaining process.
                                                          
9 Encompassing Cyprus, Egypt, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.
10 In the literature, three models predict a positive wages-profit correlation with firm profitability determining the level of pay: the
modified competitive model, the optimal labour contract model and the rent-sharing bargaining model (Blanchflower et al., 1996). In
accordance with the wage determination system in Belgium, our analysis relies on the rent-sharing bargaining model.
HAS INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFFECTED WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER ?                                                2.7
2.1.    Efficient Bargaining Framework
The union and the firm are involved in an efficient bargaining procedure with both real
wages  w  and employment  N  as the subject of agreement (McDonald and Solow, 1981). The
motivation for relying on the Efficient Bargaining model is twofold. First, it accords with stylised
facts about Belgian industrial relations. Belgian collective agreements do not only deal with wages
but also with employment issues like hours of work and part-time labour policies (Bughin, 1996).
Microeconomic evidence in favour of Efficient Bargaining for Belgium has been provided by e.g.
Bughin (1993) and Dobbelaere (2003). Second, it captures the possibility that firms are not
operating on their demand for labour. In other words, it allows for the fact that powerful unions
may obtain a higher wage without suffering a decrease in employment, at least in the short run
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).
The union is risk neutral.11 Its objective function is specified in a utilitarian form:
   ,    aU w N Nw N N w , where N  is the employment level, N  is union membership
 0 N N  , w  is the real wage and aw w  is the alternative wage expressed in real terms.
The firm’s utility equals its real profits  , with      ,w N R N w N F , where  ΘQR
stands for total real revenue  0"NR  , Q  for real output, Θ  for a revenue shifter which depends on
product market conditions (product demand) and F  for all other costs associated with production.
For simplicity, we assume that labour is the only variable input for the firm. Hence, F  represents
fixed costs. It can be shown that this assumption on the fixed nature of inputs other than labour
does not affect the bargaining outcome provided that union preferences do not depend on those
inputs (Bughin, 1996).   
The threat point for the union is assumed to equal the alternative wage aw .
12 If no revenue
accrues to the firm when negotiation breaks down, the firm’s fall-back utility equals F . The
outcome of the bargaining is the asymmetric generalised Nash solution to:
    1
,
max


    
w N
a aNNw N N w w R wN (1)
where  0 1,  represents the union’s bargaining power.
                                                          
11 See Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989) among others for the derivation in the case of a risk-averse union.
12 According to the axiomatic approach, the threat point or disagreement payoff equals the inside option in the short run, i.e. income
from strike funds for the union and profits while production is shut down for the firm. If the disagreement continues in the longer run,
however, the threat point equals the outside option as the union and the firm will probably search for another bargaining partner (Booth,
HAS INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFFECTED WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER ?                                                2.8
Maximisation of Eq. (1) with respect to the wage rate  w gives the following equation:13
1

 

 
 
  
a
R wN
w w
N
(2)
Maximising Eq. (1) with respect to employment  N  leads to the following first-order
condition:
1

 

 

 

 
  
 
  

N
N
N
R
R wN
w R
N
R N
w R
N
(3)
By solving simultaneously both first-order conditions, we obtain an expression for the
contract curve, which results from the tangency between iso-profit curves and union indifference
curves: N aR w . This equation shows that the employment level depends on the alternative wage
 aw  but not on the negotiated wage  w  (Brown and Ashenfelter, 1986).
2.2. Channels through which International Trade affects Wages in a Bargaining
Framework
Theoretically, there are three channels through which product market integration
(globalisation) can affect wages during the bargaining process (see Eq. (2)).
First, international trade can induce movements in the firm’s profitability through the
revenue shifter Θ , affecting the size of the rents (or the ‘pie’) that can be shared between the
workers and the firm.14 Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada and Kramarz (2003) for France use
foreign competition shocks as an exogenous source of variation in product market conditions to
identify the effect of the firm’s profitability on negotiated wages. The results of Abowd and
Lemieux (1993) reveal that foreign competition in the form of lower import or export prices
                                                                                                                                                                               
1995). Hence, it is not necessary for the union’s threat point to be equal to the alternative wage (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991 and
McDonald and Suen, 1992 for a discussion).
13 Note that rents per worker  R wN
N

 do not depend on the revenue shifter Θ  when the elasticity of output with respect to
employment is constant, i.e. when ( )Q N  is Cobb-Douglas (McDonald and Solow, 1981).
14 As mentioned above, the workers’ bargaining power   cannot be identified from variations in the revenue shifter Θ  if the production
function is Cobb-Douglas.
HAS INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFFECTED WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER ?                                                2.9
decreases both wages per worker and quasi-rents per worker. Moreover, the effect on quasi-rents is
larger than on wages which implies that workers are not able to capture all the changes in quasi-
rents induced by changes in import and export prices. Kramarz (2003) uses US export prices to
determine the effect on (quasi-) rents and hence wages. He finds that higher export prices of US
firms to OECD countries increase French quasi-rents, meaning that French firms benefit from the
higher prices. US export prices to Eastern European countries and oil-producing countries decrease
French quasi-rents. The author considers the former result as a potential proof of increased import
competition while the latter can be consistent with an increase in oil prices, affecting profits in
France negatively.
Second, international trade can affect the bargaining outcome through movements in the
firm’s and the workers’ threat points. Biscourp and Kramarz (2002) and Kramarz (2003) show how
intermediate imports may act as substitutes for part of the labour input. Firms that use intermediate
inputs in the production process have to announce the amount of imports well in advance. In other
words, these intermediate imports can be seen as investments that influence the firm’s threat point
and provide the workers with hold-up opportunities (Malcomson, 1997). More specifically,
Kramarz (2003) shows that there is a positive relation between the firm’s intermediate imports and
the workers’ wages. At the same time, imports of finished goods by the firm itself or by its
competitors decrease the workers’ outside options (Kramarz, 2003). During wage negotiations, the
workers have possible access to other jobs in case bargaining breaks down. The availability of
these temporary jobs is inversely related to the amount of imported finished goods in an industry
(see Kramarz, 2003 for a discussion). The empirical results of Kramarz (2003) for France reveal
that increased import competition not only affects wages through changes in quasi-rents but also
through the workers’ threat point, affecting their wages negatively.
The third channel through which international trade can affect wages in a collective
bargaining framework is through the workers’ bargaining power parameter  . There are two
solution concepts within the bargaining framework: the axiomatic approach and the strategic
approach. The static axiomatic (normative) approach concentrates on the outcome of the bargaining
process satisfying certain principles that might be achieved by an objective arbitrator in case of
disagreement between the parties (Booth, 1995).15 The dynamic game-theoretic (strategic)
approach involves modelling the bargaining process in order to determine the actual outcome. It
can be shown that in a simple ‘alternating offers model’ with no uncertainty, the game-theoretic
solution equals the axiomatic or generalised Nash bargaining solution (see Binmore et al., 1986 and
Sutton, 1986 for an extensive comparison of both approaches). More specifically, the outcome of a
bargain can be compared to the division of a continuous supply of a cake between two parties (see
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Layard et al., 1991 for an interpretation). Binmore et al. (1986) show that when two assumptions
are fulfilled, the cake would be equally split. These assumptions are: both parties have the same
discount rate and neither party gets any extra income from other sources while disagreement is
going on.
The real advantage of the game-theoretic approach is that an economic interpretation can be
given to the bargaining power parameter   (see Booth, 1995). In the interpretations given below,
globalisation enters the story through its effect on the general economic climate and the
unemployment level in particular.16 First, in models where parties discount the future and hence,
where delay of a settlement diminishes the present value of the result, the workers’ bargaining
power will be higher if workers have a lower discount rate than the employers.17 Reasoning in this
way, Lindén (1995) defines   as a measure of labour market tightness, i.e. the ratio of the hiring
rate from the unemployed to the sum of the hiring rate and the rate of filling vacancies in an
equilibrium search model. The more impatient the employer or the tighter the labour market, the
higher the bargaining strength of the union and vice versa. Therefore, measures related to
globalisation could have an impact on the tightness of the labour market and hence on the union’s
bargaining power. Higher import competition (export competition) could decrease (increase) the
workers’ bargaining power as the labour market becomes less (more) tight. Second,   can be
interpreted as the ratio of the parties’ perceived risk that the other party will leave the bargaining
table (Binmore et al., 1986, McDonald and Suen, 1992 and Teulings and Hartog, 1998). More
specifically, the bargaining power of the union and the firm is related to the costs or benefits of
both parties in delaying an agreement (Layard et al., 1991 and Smith, 1996).18 If a bargaining
partner receives extra income in case of a disagreement, this partner is more willing to tolerate
disagreement and hence bargains for a larger share of the ‘pie’. In some studies (see e.g. Doiron,
1992), these costs are interpreted as strike costs in case the negotiating parties use strikes as a
dispute resolution mechanism. Among other things, higher inventories, more liquid assets and
lower capital intensity are shown to reduce a firm’s strike costs and hence to increase its bargaining
power (see e.g. Clark, 1991; 1993 and Doiron, 1992). For workers, these strike costs could be
related to the availability of strike funds or temporary jobs elsewhere. Other family members’
income could also form an alternative in case of disagreement during wage negotiations and it is
even the case that these members are more motivated to apply for more temporary employment in
case of disagreement. The probability of obtaining this alternative employment is inversely related
to the rate of unemployment in the economy. Therefore, higher unemployment lowers the unions’
                                                                                                                                                                               
15 These axioms are invariance, Pareto efficiency, independence or irrelevant alternatives and anonymity or symmetry.
16 Note that the unemployment level affects the workers’ outside option as well as the workers’ bargaining power in this setting.
17 Gibbons (1992, p. 68) refers to the parties’ discount rate as the time-value of money, i.e. a dollar received at the beginning of one
period that can be put in the bank to earn interest.
18 As discussed by Smith (1996), these costs or benefits can have an effect on the workers’ bargaining power through changes in their
relative time preference.
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bargaining power. Other factors, such as globalisation, are therefore also able to affect the union’s
bargaining power as these might have an impact on the rate of unemployment.
An informal theory regarding the determinants of the union’s bargaining power is given by
McDonald and Suen (1992). The authors argue that the bargaining power of the workers is related
to the amount of support workers are prepared to give to a wage claim. One factor influencing this
support is union leadership but it is difficult to find an empirical proxy for this determinant.
Another factor is the workers’ feeling about the fairness of the claim. If workers feel that the wage
claim is unreasonable, they are less eager to support it. In other words, restricting wages is felt to
be important in periods of unfavourable economic conditions as large wage increases are
considered to be dangerous to economic activity in general and jobs in particular. One direct
indicator of the economic climate is the level of unemployment. It is also in this context that
increased globalisation can have an impact on the economic situation as e.g. higher import
competition (export competition) can increase (decrease) unemployment and hence influence
workers’ bargaining power. As pointed out by McDonald and Suen (1992), the impact of
unemployment on workers’ bargaining power is not about the reduction in alternative job prospects
or about the decline in the demand for labour but is instead related to the will of workers to press
for a wage claim.19
As one of the first, Rodrik (1997) has pointed out that increased globalisation has lowered
the workers’ bargaining power. More specifically, he argues that the closer substitutes domestic
and foreign workers are, due to e.g. international trade, outsourcing and foreign direct investment
(FDI), the lower the enterprise surplus ending up with workers. As a consequence, unions might
have become weaker. Indirect empirical evidence for weaker unions is given by the study of
Slaughter (2001) who investigates the hypothesis that trade liberalisation has contributed to
increased labour demand elasticities. Using sectoral-level data, his empirical results are mixed and
show that mainly time effects determine changes in labour demand elasticities. However, a number
of trade-related variables (such as outsourcing, net exports, etc.) are found to have the predicted
effect on the labour demand elasticity of especially non-production workers.20 As pointed out by
Slaughter (2001) and Rodrik (1997), finding increased labour demand elasticities in the case of
increased foreign competition could be consistent with a story of a shift from labour towards
capital bargaining power over rent distribution in firms enjoying extra-normal profits.
As mentioned in the introduction, Budd and Slaughter (2004) and Budd et al. (2004) analyse
the impact of increased globalisation on workers’ bargaining power in another context. They
investigate whether rent sharing extends across national borders, conditioned by corporate or
                                                          
19 McDonald and Suen (1992) argue that union density may be an indicator of the justness of union wage claims.
20 Among others, Bruno et al. (2001) [several OECD countries], Fajnzylber and Maloney (2001) [Chile, Colombia and Mexico],
Greenaway et al. (1999) [UK], Jean (2000) [France], Krishna et al. (2001) [Turkey], Levinsohn (1993) [Turkey] and Paes de Barros et
al. (1999) [Brazil] have also investigated this issue.
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labour organisational ties and/or by trade unions. Their empirical results provide strong evidence of
international dimensions of rent sharing.
In this paper, we further investigate whether globalisation has indeed an effect on the
workers' bargaining power as first pointed out by Rodrik (1997). We use a broad range of
globalisation measures such as trade, outsourcing, tariffs and measures related to foreign direct
investment. While this is the focus of this paper, we also pay some attention to the first and the
second mechanism of how international trade can affect wages in a collective bargaining
framework. More specifically, we also analyse whether Belgian manufacturing wages are affected
by international trade through changes in the firm’s profits and changes in the workers’ outside
option. In the next section, we proceed with the stage-one regressions where we estimate the
workers’ relative bargaining power parameters. Subsequently, we relate these parameters to several
globalisation measures.
3.   STAGE-ONE REGRESSIONS:
         ESTIMATING WORKERS’ (RELATIVE) BARGAINING POWER
To identify the effect of international trade on the workers’ bargaining power, our estimation
strategy consists of two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the workers’ relative bargaining
power 
1

 
 
 
 
 for 15 sectors in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995. In
the second stage, we regress the estimated workers’ relative bargaining power coefficients on
several measures of trade, foreign direct investment, technology and control variables. These stage-
two regressions try to identify the factors explaining the workers’ relative bargaining power.
3.1.    Specification and Data Description
The econometric specification that acts as the basis for the stage-one regressions is derived
from Eq. (2) and is given by:
0
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w w                 	 

(4)
with 
1
 
   
 the workers’ relative bargaining power. Index jti  stands for firm i  in sector j  at
time t .
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To estimate Eq. (4), we use an unbalanced panel of the entire population of Belgian firms in
the manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995. All variables are taken from annual
company accounts which are collected by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the average real annual wage in firm i . The workers’ outside
option ( aw  in Eq. (2)) is proxied by the sector-average real annual wage per worker (
0
jtw ) and the
sectoral unemployment rate ( jtU ). The latter variable is obtained from the Rijksdienst voor
Arbeidsvoorziening (RVA). To capture the firm’s financial conditions, we use accounting profits,
which are taken directly from the company accounts database. In the analysis, we exclude loss-
making firms.21 All annual wages are expressed as real wages, i.e. nominal wages divided by the
consumer price index with 1990 as reference year. The consumer price index has been drawn from
the Belgostat source of the NBB.22 Profits are also expressed in real terms, i.e. nominal profits
divided by the sector-specific producer price index. The producer price index is obtained from the
Ministry of Economic Affairs.23 Average wages and profits are constructed by dividing annual
labour costs and profits by the average number of employees in each firm for each year
respectively. ijt  represents a white noise error term. We also include time dummies to capture
possible unobservable aggregate shocks common to all firms in a given year ( t ). By taking the
first difference of Eq. (4), we control for individual firm effects ( i ). As a consequence, our
parameter estimates are consistent even if i  were correlated with regressors. Table 2 includes
some summary statistics of the key explanatory variables for the period 1987-1995.
Table 2   First-Stage Regression: Summary Statistics.
VARIABLES 1987-1995
# Obs. Sample Mean Sample St. Dev.
Firm-average Real Wage per Worker
(x 100 000 BEF) 109208 9.859 6.952
Firm-average Real Profits per
Worker (x 100 000 BEF) 108153 4.242 20.247
Sector Unemployment Rate (%) 122174 15.345 6.012
Sector-average Real Wage per
Worker (x 100 000 BEF) 123421 8.722 0.963
Source: National Bank of Belgium (NBB).
                                                          
21 The reason is that for the sub-sample of loss-making firms, rent sharing is not an issue. By contrast, the wages-profit elasticity is found
to be negative. Analysing wage setting behaviour of loss-making firms is beyond the scope of this paper.
22 These data can be downloaded from http://www.nbb.be/belgostat/.
23 These data can be downloaded from http://ecodata.mineco.fgov.be.
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3.2. Estimation Strategy
Two Approaches to Balancing Time-series and Cross-section Pooling
To exploit fully the data’s panel aspect, we report estimation results of Eq. (4) for two
approaches to balancing time-series and cross-sectional pooling. The first approach pools all 15
sectors over all the years. This yields one manufacturing-wide rent-sharing parameter 
1
 
   
 over
the period 1987-1995. However, since the Belgian economy is characterised by a high degree of
industry-level bargaining between employer associations and unions that are strongly organised per
sector, a cross-section study of bargaining power is appropriate. Therefore, to allow some variation
within manufacturing and over time, the second approach provides estimates of 
1
 
   
 for each
sector separately year by year. 24 The latter estimates will be used in the second-stage regression
when we try to explain the determinants of the workers’ relative bargaining power.
Econometric Problems
Ordinary least squares estimates of Eq. (4) will be biased for basically two reasons. First, our
dependent variable, wages per worker, is negatively related to profits per worker by construction.
Second, the estimates of 
1
 
   
 will be biased if rents per worker are measured with error.
Measurement error can be present since both our wage and profit variable are divided by
employment (Van Reenen, 1996, among others for a discussion). In other words, performing an
OLS regression on Eq. (4) would lead to an endogeneity bias. Therefore, we try to find appropriate
instruments.
                                                          
24 In Belgium, collective agreements are concluded in joint committees and subcommittees. There are about 95 joint committees and 72
joint subcommittees. In principle, each firm belongs to only one joint committee. In practice, however, firms belong to different joint
committees. For example, joint committees can be different for blue collar and white collar workers. To be specific, collective
agreements applying to white collar workers are negotiated in one coordinating joint committee (joint committee n° 218) which groups
white collar workers of a large number of industrial and service sectors. For this reason we can not split up the manufacturing industry in
different sectors according to joint committees. (FPS Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue, 2003) Instead, we group sectors
according to the NACE classification. From 2005-2006 onwards, however, NACE-codes will be linked to joint committees. This will
allow us to split up the manufacturing industry according to collective bargaining agreements and to add the Belgian institutional
framework to the analysis.
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Instrumentation Strategy
The econometric problems described above show that instrumentation is a necessary strategy
to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the rent-sharing parameter. Valid instruments must
reflect changes in product market conditions inducing movements in rents per worker but they must
be uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation.
Our instrumentation strategy consists of two steps. In a first step, we use lagged levels of
profits as instruments to estimate the rent-sharing parameters for the two approaches described
above. For the sake of comparison, we also report the OLS results. Our second step aims at
introducing one of the channels through which international trade might affect bargained wages,
i.e. through movements in the firm’s rents. More specifically, we use instruments representing
exogenous demand shocks that enter the wage equation only through the profits per worker
variable.
First, inspired by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada and Abowd and Allain (1996) and
Kramarz (2003) for France, we use sector-specific export and import prices as a source of
exogenous variation in the firm’s product market conditions. The fact that Belgium is a small open
economy justifies treating changes in sector-specific international prices as exogenous demand
shocks since these prices are determined on the world market and are hence out of reach for
Belgian firms. More specifically, we construct sector-specific unit value indices for Belgian
imports and exports based on the OECD International Trade by Commodities database.25 Following
Kramarz (2003) but in contrast to Abowd and Lemieux (1993), we use sector-specific prices
expressed in US dollars. Since exchange rates fluctuate quite a lot, their effect on the Belgian
economy is difficult to determine and hence we have avoided converting the international prices in
terms of Belgian francs.
Second, in line with Bertrand (1999) and Budd and Slaughter (2004), sector-specific
exchange rates are also used as valid instruments. The reason is that in case there is imperfect
competition in certain sectors, using export prices would no longer be a valid strategy (see also
Revenga, 1992, for a discussion). Following Kramarz (2003), we could however have used US
export prices since these variables are exogenous to the Belgian economy. However, due to a lack
of reliable data for our period under study in the OECD Trade by Commodities database, we were
not able to do this.26 Moreover, using only US export prices makes it difficult to distinguish
between the impact of import versus export competition on the firms’ rents. Following Budd and
                                                          
25 The base year is 1990. Using this database to construct unit values as a proxy for import and export prices is frequently done in the
literature (see e.g. Brenton and Pinna, 2002, among others).
26 Kramarz (2003) however uses the same OECD dataset but uses a different time period.
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Slaughter (2004), we have computed trade-weighted multilateral Belgian exchange rates for each
sector and each year where we also weigh bilateral exchange rates with import shares.27
Since international prices and exchange rates are defined at the sectoral level, they cannot be
used as instruments when estimating sector-specific rent-sharing parameters, as there is no cross-
sectional variation in that case. Therefore, we only report the results at the most aggregated level,
i.e. pooled over sectors and over years. Using sector-specific export and import prices on the one
hand and sector-specific exchange rates on the other as instruments in our regression equations also
serves as a consistency check for our estimations where we use the lags of the profit variable as
instruments.
3.3. Empirical Results
In this section, we report the empirical results of the two approaches.
First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years
In this section, we provide manufacturing-wide estimates of the rent-sharing parameter over
the whole period. The first part of Table 3 presents the Ordinary Least Squares estimates of Eq. (4).
Controlling for year-, sector- and firm-level effects, the estimated wages-profits elasticity amounts
to 0.095 and is strongly significant. It is somewhat higher than the one obtained by Goos and
Konings (2001) who find an elasticity of 0.06. This point estimate also clearly shows that
symmetric Nash bargaining, in which case we would have a coefficient of the relative bargaining
power equal to one, can easily be rejected.
                                                          
27 We have only taken the trade flows of those countries for which their share in Belgian imports exceeds 2 percent.
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 Table 3   Wage Equation.
                    First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years.
ESTIMATION
METHOD OLS TSLS
a TSLSb TSLSc TSLSd
Constant 0.022
***
(0.005)
0.037***
(0.008)
0.040***
(0.007)
0.040***
(0.006)
0.026***
(0.005)
Profits per
Worker
0.095***
(0.005)
0.087**
(0.035)
0.220**
(0.088)
0.220***
(0.058)
0.090*
(0.051)
Sectoral Unempl. -0.042
*
(0.024)
-0.055**
(0.028)
-0.005
(0.023)
-0.005
(0.021)
-0.016
(0.021)
Sectoral av. Wage 0.132(0.098)
0.170*
(0.090)
0.150
(0.121)
0.150
(0.121)
0.159
(0.120)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Test
(p-value)
0.0025
Hansen-Sargan
IV Test
(p-value)
0.139 0.880 0.946 0.290
Nullity of the
Instruments
(F-statistic)
56.25 4.28 4.02 4.15
# Obs. 73353 26078 73351 73351 73351
2R 0.077 0.126 . . 0.077
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the firm-average real wage per worker. All variables are expressed as natural logarithms.
The instruments are in levels. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test: test of endogeneity of real profits per worker.
Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: test of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically
distributed as 2df .  Nullity of the Instruments (F-statistic): tests the nullity of the instruments for real profits per worker.
A full stop in the 2R box indicates that the calculated 2R was negative and hence is not reported.
a: instruments: profits per worker t-3 , profits per worker t-4.
b: instruments: export prices WORLD, t-2, t-3, import prices WOLRD, t-2, t-3.
c: instruments: export prices OECD, t-3, export prices CEE, t-3, export prices NICs, t-3, export prices other NON-OECD, t-3,
                         import prices OECD, t-3, import prices CEE, t-3, import prices NICs, t-3, import prices other NON-OECD, t-3.
d: instruments: exchange rates t, t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5.
However, as discussed above, OLS estimates are likely to be affected by endogeneity biases.
We test the endogeneity of profits per worker in two ways. First, we use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. From Table 3, this test indicates that the OLS specification is rejected. Second, as suggested
by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), we perform an augmented regression test. More specifically,
we regress the endogenous variable (profits per worker) on the set of instruments and the
exogenous variables in the wage equation. We recuperate the residual of this regression and
augment the wage equation with this residual. The exogeneity test amounts to testing whether the
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coefficient of the residual equals zero in the wage equation. In line with the Durbin-Hausman-Wu
test, this augmented regression test indicates that OLS is not consistent.28
In the second column of Table 3, we use the 3-period and the 4-period lagged value of
profits per worker as instruments. The exogeneity of the instruments with respect to the error term
is tested by the Hansen-Sargan test statistic, which is distributed as chi-squared. The specification
test does not show evidence against our estimates: the Hausman-Sargan test does not reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are valid. To check the usefulness of the instruments, we report the
F-statistic that tests the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression. This test statistic
indicates that the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression is rejected. Taking into
account endogeneity, we find a wages-profit elasticity of almost 0.09.
To check the robustness of the results, we now present three consistency checks, which also
take into account the first and the second channel through which international trade can affect
wages in a bargaining framework. The first two consistency checks are in line with the hypothesis
that international trade has an effect on bargained wages through shifts in the size of rents (see last
three columns of Table 3). The third consistency check investigates whether Belgian manufacturing
wages are influenced by international trade through changes in the workers’ outside option (see
Table 4).
 The third and the fourth column of Table 3 report the estimates of the rent-sharing parameter
using sector-specific international prices as instruments. These sector-specific export and import
prices represent exogenous demand shocks that increase product market competition in Belgium
(for a proof see Appendix A). From these columns, it follows that the estimated wages-profits
elasticity is considerably higher using sector-specific international prices as instruments than the
ones using lagged profit values as instruments. In the third column, we use sector-specific
international prices at the world level as instruments, in the fourth column we split up sector-
specific international prices to various destinations/origins: OECD countries, CEE countries, NICs
and other NON-OECD countries.29 The point estimate of the rent-sharing parameter is in both cases
0.22. The specification tests do not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. The F-
statistics reject the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression. The fifth column of Table
3 reports the results using sector-specific exchange rates from period t  until period 5( )t   as
instruments. The point estimate of the average manufacturing-wide wages-profits elasticity is 0.09.
                                                          
28 Results not reported but available upon request.
29 The 4 destinations/origins which sum up to the WORLD are: (1) OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the US and the UK, (2) CEE countries: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania,
Poland and Hungary, (3) Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs): Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea and
(4) other NON-OECD countries: WORLD - OECD  - CEE - NICs. Like other OECD countries, international trade of Belgium consists
mainly of trade with other OECD countries. In 2002, the export/GDP (import/GDP) ratio is 69.06% (62.14%) when considering trade
with other OECD countries while 1.76% (2.05%) when considering trade with NICs (http://www.oecd.org).
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Again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are correct. The F-
statistic indicates that the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression is rejected.
Our third consistency check is reported in Table 4. To control for the second channel through
which international trade might affect bargained wages, i.e. through changes in the workers’
outside option, we substitute the share of imports and the share of exports in total production at the
sectoral level for the workers’ outside option. The idea is that imports of goods are potential
substitutes for labour. Hence, the higher the ratio of imports over production in a sector, the lower
the employment opportunities and the lower the workers’ outside option. The opposite reasoning
holds for the ratio of exports over production. The OLS estimates are reported in the first column of
Table 4. As expected, the higher the share of imports in total production in a sector, the lower the
workers’ wages and vice versa for the share of exports. As import and export quantities in a small
open economy may not be fully exogenous since they depend on domestic demand and supply
conditions, we test their exogeneity using the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test. This
augmented regression test rejects the exogeneity of import and export quantities.30 Therefore, we
apply the same instrumentation idea as for profits per worker, i.e. sector-specific international
prices defined at the world level as well as split up to various destinations/origins are used as
instruments.31 The second column of Table 4 shows the IV results with import and export as well
as profits per worker instrumented by sector-specific international prices at the world level.32 The
point estimates of the share of imports and the share of exports are considerably larger compared to
the OLS estimates but the direction of the effects is the same. The Hansen-Sargan IV test does not
show evidence against our estimates. In column 3 of Table 4, the countries of destination/origin of
exports and imports are distinguished. The results reveal that the destination/origin of exports and
imports matters, even though the effects are not always precisely estimated. Workers’ outside
option and hence workers’ wages are significantly negatively affected by imports of goods from
OECD countries and NICs whereas workers benefit from exports to CEE countries. Contrasting
OECD countries with the other groups of countries, we see that the coefficients on the share of
imports from OECD countries and the share of exports to OECD countries are much larger than the
ones of the other groups of countries. A possible explanation is that international trade of Belgium
mainly consists of trade with other OECD countries (http://www.oecd.org).
                                                          
30 Results not reported but available upon request.
31 For all specifications, the F-statistics -testing the usefulness of the instruments for the profit per worker variable and for import and
export quantities- reject the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression. For the sake of brevity, these test statistics are not
reported but are available upon request.
32 Note that we do not use all the sector-specific prices as instruments but only those that passed the exogeneity test. That explains why
the instrument set used in Table 3 differs from the one in Table 4.
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Table 4   Wage Equation.
                First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years - Outside Option Channel.
ESTIMATION
METHOD OLS TSLS
a TSLSb
Constant 0.035
***
(0.007)
0.068***
(0.015)
0.034***
(0.011)
Profits per Worker 0.066
***
(0.005)
0.147**
(0.073)
0.180***
(0.057)
Import(WORLD)/Production -0.083
***
(0.028)
-0.646***
(0.197)
Import(OECD)/Production -0.291
***
(0.089)
Import(CEE)/Production -0.009(0.011)
Import(NICs)/Production -0.031
**
(0.013)
Import(other NON-OECD)/Production 0.020
**
(0.010)
Export(WORLD)/Production 0.038
*
(0.023)
0.478***
(0.133)
Export(OECD)/Production 0.082(0.081)
Export(CEE)/Production 0.016
**
(0.008)
Export(NICs)/Production -0.007(0.016)
Export(other NON-OECD)/Production -0.023(0.023)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Hansen-Sargan IV Test
(p-value) 0.401 0.091
# Obs. 41615 41615 41615
2R 0.046 . .
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the firm-average real wage per worker.
 All variables are expressed as natural logarithms. The instruments are in levels.
Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: test of correlation among instruments and residuals,
asymptotically distributed as 2df .  A full stop in the 
2R box indicates that the calculated 2R was negative
and hence is not reported.
a: Imports/Production, Exports/Production and Profits per Worker instrumented.
       Instruments: export prices WORLD, t, t-1, import prices WORLD, t, t-1.
   b: Imports/Production, Exports/Production and Profits per Worker instrumented. Instruments:
       export prices OECD, t, t-3, t-4, export prices CEE, t, t-3, t-4, export prices NICs, t, t-3, t-4, export prices other NON-OECD, t, t-3, t-4,
    import prices OECD, t, t-3, t-4, import prices CEE, t, t-3, t-4, import prices NICs, t, t-3, t-4, import prices other NON-OECD, t, t-3, t-4.
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Second Approach: Per Sector, per Year
So far, we have restricted all sectors to share the same rent-sharing parameter. To investigate
whether rent-sharing behaviour differs across sectors, we performed F-tests. These tests reject the
poolability across sectors. The same result is obtained by Dobbelaere (2003). Therefore, to address
the important issue of heterogeneity in workers’ (relative) bargaining power across sectors, we now
split up the manufacturing industry into 15 sectors. An overview of the different sectors is given in
Table B.1 of Appendix B. The sectoral classification is based on the availability of the sectoral
classification of the variables used in the second stage and the availability of the number of firms
within each of these sectors.
For each sector-year, we regress firm-level wages per worker on firm-level profits per
worker. In Table 5, we present both the OLS and the TSLS rent-sharing estimates for each sector
separately year by year. Focusing on the OLS estimates, we find that 85% of the estimated wages-
profits elasticities are statistically significant at the 1% level. As far as the TSLS estimates are
concerned, the results show that 65% of the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level,
8% at the 5% level and 24% are not significant. For almost all specifications, we find that the TSLS
point estimates exceed the OLS point estimates. It is also clear that the wages-profits elasticities
vary considerably over time and over sector. For 10 out of the 15 sectors, our results show that the
estimated rent-sharing parameter is higher in 1995 than in 1991. Focusing on the TSLS estimates,
the mean of the estimated wages-profits elasticities amounts to 0.11 and the standard deviation to
0.06. All sector-specific elasticities vary between 0.01 and 0.09.
Table 5   Wage Equation.
                Second Approach: Per Sector, by Year.
Sector Year # Obs. Wage-profits Elasticity(OLS) # Obs.
Wage-profits Elasticity
(TSLSa)
Sec1 1991 1894              0.107***  (0.010) 844             0.151***  (0.018)
1992 2018              0.092***  (0.009) 865             0.154***  (0.020)
1993 2072              0.099***  (0.010) 903             0.131***  (0.018)
1994 2093              0.115***  (0.010) 965             0.148***  (0.016)
1995  2107              0.108***  (0.008) 1055             0.182***  (0.016)
Sec2 1991 695              0.088***  (0.013) 407             0.128***  (0.020)
1992 661              0.076***  (0.013) 378             0.118***  (0.023)
1993 652              0.069***  (0.013) 353             0.136***  (0.025)
1994 676              0.090***  (0.015) 348             0.119***  (0.027)
1995 620              0.103***  (0.016) 329             0.145***  (0.030)
Sec3 1991 786              0.073***  (0.012) 390             0.118***  (0.023)
1992 762              0.073***  (0.011) 379             0.115***  (0.022)
1993 727              0.072***  (0.012) 356             0.109***  (0.025)
1994 720              0.073***  (0.014) 339             0.116***  (0.024)
1995 679              0.083***  (0.012) 304             0.111***  (0.026)
Sec4 1991 1254              0.053***  (0.013) 641             0.081***  (0.021)
1992 1341              0.027***  (0.012) 641             0.125***  (0.022)
1993 1360              0.043***  (0.013) 653             0.112***  (0.023)
1994 1364              0.073***  (0.012) 639             0.103***  (0.023)
1995 1331              0.066***  (0.014) 641             0.076***  (0.021)
Sec5 1991 210              0.075***  (0.025) 116             0.035     (0.049)
1992 200              0.076***  (0.027) 113             0.073     (0.056)
1993 213              0.064**    (0.034) 107             0.043     (0.031)
1994 212              0.021       (0.025) 105             0.063**   (0.031)
1995 207              0.049**    (0.024) 111             0.127***  (0.036)
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Sec6 1991 1501              0.041***  (0.013) 601             0.063     (0.023)
1992 1620              0.031***  (0.012) 616             0.051**    (0.027)
1993 1734              0.050***  (0.012) 648             0.075***  (0.029)
1994 1803              0.050***  (0.011) 660             0.099***  (0.024)
1995 1849              0.035***  (0.011) 764             0.111***  (0.023)
Sec7 1991 423              0.125***  (0.021) 236             0.192***  (0.035)
1992 447              0.130***  (0.022) 252             0.292***  (0.051)
1993 429              0.121***  (0.022) 215             0.262***  (0.051)
1994 450              0.111***  (0.019) 227             0.203***  (0.039)
1995 448              0.137***  (0.022) 238             0.201***  (0.034)
Sec8 1991 479              0.064***  (0.016) 258             0.055**    (0.030)
1992 473              0.033*      (0.020) 248             0.056     (0.040)
1993 486              0.072***  (0.019) 242             0.061*      (0.035)
1994 505              0.051***  (0.014) 240             0.084***  (0.029)
1995 463              0.102***  (0.019) 241             0.135***  (0.034)
Sec9 1991 732              0.082***  (0.014) 392             0.164***  (0.030)
1992 758              0.062***  (0.014) 407             0.163***  (0.029)
1993 746              0.101***  (0.015) 385             0.090***  (0.025)
1994 465              0.091***  (0.012) 418             0.070***  (0.026)
1995 801              0.081***  (0.014) 443             0.091***  (0.026)
Sec10 1991 73              0.004     (0.044) 39             0.062     (0.074)
1992 74              0.004     (0.058) 31             0.085     (0.075)
1993 63              0.112*     (0.062) 23             0.244*    (0.141)
1994 97              0.161***  (0.043) 36             0.112     (0.157)
1995 91              0.171***  (0.041) 26             0.199     (0.165)
Sec11 1991 2115              0.043***  (0.009) 1013             0.087***  (0.016)
1992 2099              0.035***  (0.009) 989             0.084***  (0.018)
1993 1995              0.095***  (0.025) 977             0.079***  (0.024)
1994 2053              0.480***  (0.031) 977             0.136     (0.101)
1995 2129              0.496***  (0.028) 1014             0.038     (0.072)
Sec12 1991 643              0.060***  (0.015) 354             0.068***  (0.028)
1992 655              0.038***  (0.013) 339             0.063**    (0.031)
1993 639              0.093**    (0.041) 302             0.166***  (0.044)
1994 586              0.570***  (0.053) 257             0.110     (0.174)
1995 608              0.554***  (0.048) 259             0.124     (0.267)
Sec13 1991 782              0.069***  (0.017) 308             0.158***  (0.031)
1992 823              0.092***  (0.017) 314             0.136***  (0.031)
1993 826              0.083***  (0.017) 314             0.127***  (0.039)
1994 755              0.485***  (0.037) 274             0.191     (0.105)
1995 740              0.504***  (0.037) 276             0.206***  (0.090)
Sec14 1991 271              0.006     (0.018) 126             0.014     (0.052)
1992 297              0.048**   (0.024) 128             0.022     (0.022)
1993 286              0.019     (0.020) 127             0.095*     (0.054)
1994 266              0.575***  (0.046) 115             0.029     (0.310)
1995 262              0.624***  (0.053) 123             0.057     (0.184)
Sec15 1991 360              0.092***  (0.017) 146             0.145***  (0.034)
1992 399              0.077***  (0.019) 163             0.125***  (0.036)
1993 398              0.061***  (0.018) 154             0.085***  (0.028)
1994 374              0.092***  (0.023) 121             0.076**    (0.037)
1995 380              0.093***  (0.021) 136             0.099***  (0.041)
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the firm-average real wage per worker. All variables are expressed as natural logarithms.
a: instruments: profits per worker t-3 , profits per worker t-4.
4.    STAGE-TWO REGRESSIONS:
          DETERMINING THE WORKERS’ (RELATIVE) BARGAINING POWER
4.1     Specification and Data Description
The empirical methodology for the stage-two regressions borrows from Slaughter (2001)
who investigates the impact of international trade on labour demand elasticities. As pointed out by
Svejnar (1986), no literature exists on an appropriate functional form of the determinants of the
workers’ relative bargaining power. In other words, we could not estimate one or more structural
equations based on a theoretical model. Therefore, we estimate a reduced-form equation of
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estimated workers’ relative bargaining power parameters 

1
 
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 on several explanatory variables
derived from an implicit structural model.
More specifically, we use the following reduced-form regression:
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 a set of estimated TSLS rent-sharing parameters obtained from the first-stage
regressions with subscripts j  and t  denoting sector and year respectively. 1kjtX   refers to a vector
of explanatory variables that vary by sector-year, with K  the total number of explanatory
variables. jλ  refers to a sector-specific dummy for sector j , tλ  to a time dummy for year t  and
jtξ  represent the error term. The sector dummies capture variables that are sector-specific and
time-invariant such as differences in job type and the type of product in a certain sector, differences
in union density, etc. (see e.g. Doiron, 1992; McDonald and Suen, 1992 and Smith, 1996 for a
further discussion on these issues). The time dummies control for factors that change workers’
relative bargaining power over time such as government measures33, the national unemployment
rate, taxes, interest rates, etc. (see e.g. Doiron, 1992 and Svejnar, 1986 for a discussion).
Table 6 provides summary statistics for our explanatory variables. These variables are at
the sectoral level and are constructed such that they match the sectoral classification of the second
approach of the first-stage analysis. Table B.1 in Appendix B gives an overview of the sectoral
classification used to determine the workers’ relative bargaining power per sector each year. More
specifically, we have five variables related to international trade, three variables related to foreign
direct investment, three technology variables and five control variables. Some of these variables
have been used in earlier studies of the determinants of workers’ bargaining power (see e.g.
Svejnar, 1986 and Veugelers, 1989). However, the use of international trade and foreign direct
investment variables to explain directly workers’ bargaining power is new. As argued before, we
further analyse this issue and introduce a richer specification such that we are able to investigate
                                                          
33 In 1993 the Belgian Federal Government launched “Het Globaal Plan voor de Werkgelegenheid, het Concurrentievermogen en de
Sociale Zekerheid “ (Global plan on Employment, Competitiveness and Social Security). Principally, it deals with following measures:
introduction of an adjusted consumer price index used for automatic wage indexation, wage freeze for the period 1995-1996 and
structural reduction of social security contributions on low wages (CRB, 2003). For brevity, we do not report the regression coefficients
for these time dummies in the regression results. Our results indicate that the coefficient for the 1994 time dummy is never statistically
significant while the one for the 1995 time dummy is significantly negative in a number of cases, especially when both time and sector
dummies are taken up in the regression equation.
HAS INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFFECTED WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER ?                                                2.24
whether globalisation has an effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power. In what follows, we
describe the explanatory variables of Eq. (5) together with their hypothesised effect on the workers’
relative bargaining power. This effect is also shown in the last column of Table 6.
Table 6   Second-Stage Regression: Summary Statistics.
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE # Obs.
Sample
Mean
Sample
St. Dev.
Sample
Minimum
Sample
Maximum
Hypothesised
Effect on
Bargaining
Power (B)
Trade Variables
Import(WORLD)/Production 75 1.05 1.20 0.17 5.76 B < 0
Import(OECD)/Production 75 0.81 0.60 0.17 2.83         B < 0
Import(CEE)/Production 75 0.007 0.009 0.0003 0.05         B < 0
Import(NICs)/Production 75 0.03 0.09 0.009 0.46         B < 0
Import(other NON-OECD)/Production 75 0.22 0.66 0.001 3.04         B < 0
Export(WORLD)/Production 75 0.47 0.61 0.02 2.26 B > 0
Export(OECD)/Production 75 0.85 0.66 0.21 2.80         B > 0
Export(CEE)/Production 75 0.009 0.008 0.0009 0.03         B > 0
Export(NICs)/Production 75 0.05 0.15 0.0004 0.74         B > 0
Export(other NON-OECD)/Production 75 0.19 0.55 0.004 2.54         B > 0
Outsourcing Narrowa 30 0.17 0.12 0.002 0.48         B < 0
Outsourcing Broada 30 0.36 0.10 0.14 0.60         B < 0
Tariffsa 30 7.42 3.17 4.1 17.47         B > 0
Inward Foreign Direct Investment Variables
Relative Number of
Foreign-owned Firms 75 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.28         B < 0
Relative Employment of
Foreign-owned Firms 75 0.40 0.22 0.05 0.77         B < 0
Relative Value-added of
Foreign-owned Firms 75 0.44 0.23 0.05 0.84         B < 0
Technology Variables
R&D/output 75 0.01 0.01 0.0008 0.07        B > 0  or       B < 0
Patents/output 75 0.03 0.04 0 0.17        B > 0  or       B < 0
% Change in TFP 75 0.05 0.12 -0.39 0.53        B > 0  or       B < 0
Control Variables
Unemployment Rate 75 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.34        B < 0
Short-term Unempl. Rate 75 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.20        B < 0
C5- Concentration Ratio 75 0.34 0.17 0.12 0.77        B > 0  or       B < 0
Capacity Utilisationb 70 0.77 0.03 0.70 0.86        B > 0
Skill Intensity 75 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.36        B > 0
 Source: Own computation based on data described in Appendix C.
 a: These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995.
 b: Sector 49 of the NACE-70 was dropped because of data limitations.
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 Trade variable 1: the ratio of imports to production. The imports consist of all
merchandise trade (intermediate and final goods). We expect that the higher this measure is
in a certain sector, the lower the workers’ bargaining power will be because increased
import competition leads to less favourable labour market conditions such that workers
might end up with a smaller share of the rents.
 Trade variable 2: the ratio of exports to production. Exports also consist of all
merchandise trade (intermediate and final goods). In the case of export expansion, the
opposite result holds: workers are expected to be able to extract a larger share of the rents
in sectors with a strong export performance. In our regression analysis, we again split up
our export and import variable to various destinations/origins: OECD countries, CEE
countries, NICs and other NON-OECD countries.
 Trade variable 3: narrow outsourcing divided by production. Our outsourcing variable is
obtained from the Belgian input-output tables and is defined as intermediate imports (see
Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). Narrow outsourcing refers to intermediate imports in a given
sector coming from the same sector (corresponding to the diagonal elements of the import-
use matrix). We expect this outsourcing variable to have a negative effect on the workers’
bargaining power. Like in many other OECD countries, a lot of outsourcing takes place in
Belgium, mostly of standardised products. As pointed out by a survey of the Federal
Planning Bureau (2000), lower labour costs in the host country are the main motive for
outsourcing. A priori, we however expect that outsourcing is accompanied by less
favourable labour market conditions for Belgian workers. Consequently, workers’ relative
bargaining power is expected to be lower.
 Trade variable 4: broad outsourcing divided by production. In contrast to narrow
outsourcing, this measure also includes intermediate imports coming from other sectors.
The expected effect of this variable on the workers’ (relative) bargaining power is the same
as for the narrow outsourcing variable.
 Trade variable 5 refers to tariffs. As discussed in Budd and Slaughter (2004), tariffs shield
domestic markets from foreign competition. As a consequence, we expect a positive link
between tariffs and the workers’ relative bargaining power.
 Foreign direct investment variable 1: the number of foreign-owned firms relative to the
total number of firms. We have experimented with several variables related to inward
foreign direct investment.34 As pointed out by Boeri et al. (2001), the effect of FDI on the
workers’ bargaining power in Europe depends on the motives for FDI. If product market
capture or market expansion is the main motive, workers might end up in a stronger
bargaining position. If FDI is however motivated by labour market considerations,
                                                          
34 Because of data availability, we are not able to test for the effect of outward foreign direct investment on the workers’ relative
bargaining power. As pointed out by Slaughter (2001), this measure can be used as an alternative proxy for outsourcing.
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workers’ bargaining power might be diminished as firms can claim to shift production
abroad. Since the Belgian domestic market is rather small, it is less likely that product
market considerations will be the main motivation for inward FDI flows. Consequently, the
effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power is expected to be negative. In a related
context, Budd and Slaughter (2004) and Dobbelaere (2004) investigate whether rent
sharing is dependent on the firm’s ownership structure. The empirical results of the former
study reveal that rent sharing is not higher in multinational enterprises. The authors argue
that this result stems from additional complexities of multinational ownership. An
alternative explanation is given by the footloose nature of multinationals firms. As
mentioned above, the idea is that multinationals can shift their production partly or entirely
to another country in case the present circumstances are unfavourable (Caves, 1996).35
Focusing on Bulgaria, Dobbelaere (2004) finds that rent sharing is far less pronounced in
foreign firms compared to state-owned firms. The author points to the high value-added
profile of foreign firms and their footloose nature as potential explanations.
The footloose nature of multinational companies is further documented by Bernard
and Jensen (2002) for the US, Fabbri et al. (2002) for the UK and Gorg and Strobl (2003)
for Ireland. These authors basically find that multinational companies are more likely to
shut down operations compared to domestic firms or non-multinationals. Therefore, the
footloose nature of foreign-owned firms is able to create a general atmosphere of
uncertainty in which workers are less likely to press for higher wages in the form of
obtaining a part of the firms’ profits. In this context, Schreve and Slaughter (2002)
investigate whether foreign direct investment has an effect on the workers’ feeling of
insecurity. On the one hand, multinational presence can increase the workers’ economic
insecurity by raising the volatility of wages and employment. On the other hand, the
authors argue that workers in foreign-owned firms might get compensated more because
they are facing a higher risk of plant shut down. Therefore, the impact of foreign direct
investment on the workers’ economic insecurity is unclear. When the authors test their
hypothesis, foreign direct investment is found to increase the workers’ perception of
economic insecurity measured as a person’s stress/anxiety about one’s economic
misfortune.
While direct evidence of the footloose nature of multinationals in the Belgian
economy is lacking, De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) find that inward foreign direct
investment discourages entry and stimulates exit of Belgian domestic entrepreneurs.
However, this crowding-out effect might be moderated or even reversed in the long term
because of learning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreign and
                                                          
35 For Belgium, the loss of union power due to increased firm mobility is exemplified by the Renault case. In 1997, the Renault plant in
Vilvoorde (Belgium) was closed at the same time as the plant in Valladolid (Spain) was expanded. Union reactions to the relocation
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domestic firms. Therefore, these results might add to the workers’ feeling of insecurity and
hence influence their bargaining power.
 Foreign direct investment variable 2 (and 3) refers to the employment (value added) of
foreign-owned firms relative to the total employment (value added). The expected effect on
the workers’ bargaining power is the same as that for the first foreign direct investment
variable.
 Technology variable 1: investment in Research and Development (R&D) divided by
production, used as a measure for innovative input. It is often argued that technological
change, instead of international trade, lies at the basis of changes in the labour market (see
e.g. Berman et al., 1994 and Krugman and Lawrence, 1996). The effect of technological
change on the workers’ bargaining power is ex-ante unclear. As discussed in Betcherman
(1991), technological change can have an effect on the distribution of the ‘pie’ between
employers and employees by affecting the nature of the production process.36,37 First,
Betcherman (1991) argues that workers will have more bargaining power in case labour
costs do not constitute a large part of the firm’s total costs. The reason is that when labour
costs are less important, an increase in the price of labour will not induce a large increase
in the production price and hence will not exert a strongly negative effect on the firm’s
product demand. The author states that the impact of technological change on the
importance of labour costs is a priori unclear and depends on the type of technological
change. Second, he points out that the workers’ essentiality in the production process, is
another channel through which the impact of technological change on the workers’
bargaining power can be explained. When employees are essential to production, they have
strong bargaining power during wage negotiations. The essentiality of workers in the
production process depends on how critical their skills and their knowledge are and how
costly a strike would be for the firm. Technological change can affect the workers’
essentiality although the direction of the effect is again not clear. On the one hand,
technological change can be labour-demanding in the sense that the introduction of new
production processes and technologies necessitates more labour input. On the other hand,
technological change can also be labour-saving when investment in new technology
requires less labour input. The latter mechanism could be very important in Europe in
general and Belgium in particular where high labour costs prevail (Abraham and Verret,
1996). The empirical results of Betcherman (1991) reveal that the bargaining strength of
blue-collar workers is lower in firms which introduced process computerisation. Skilled
workers also lose bargaining power but general occupations strengthen their bargaining
                                                                                                                                                                               
were fierce, partly because the closure was unanticipated and partly because of the globalisation aspect (Kuhlmann, 1998).
36 This author however proxies the workers’ bargaining power by the union/non-union wage differential. Moreover, he uses a story of
shifts in labour demand elasticities to explain the effect of technological change on the workers’ bargaining power.
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position in case of process computerisation. The potential difference of technology effects
for unskilled versus skilled workers is an issue that we will address later.
 Technology variable 2: patents divided by production, a measure related to innovative
output. The expected effect of this variable on the workers’ relative bargaining power
equals the one of the first technology variable.
 Technology variable 3: the percentage change in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), used as
a measure of technological change. Again, we expect a priori the same effect on the
workers’ relative bargaining power like for technology variables 1 and 2.
 Control variable 1: the sectoral unemployment rate. This variable has also been used by
other authors investigating the determinants of workers’ bargaining power (see among
others, McDonald and Suen, 1992; Svejnar, 1986 and Veugelers, 1989). As already
discussed in Section 2.2, we expect a negative coefficient for this variable. We also
experiment with the sectoral short-term unemployment rate as an alternative. During wage
negotiations workers might be more concerned with short-term unemployment than with
total unemployment. The reason is that short-term unemployed people are more readily
employable, and therefore better alternatives for existing workers. Short-term unemployed
people refer to those who became unemployed less than one year ago.
 Control variable 2: the C5-concentration ratio, representing the sales of the top 5 firms in
the sector divided by total sales.38 A higher C5-concentration ratio is consistent with less
fierce product market competition. As discussed in Veugelers (1989), higher output market
concentration enables non-competitive pricing behaviour. Therefore, producers are less
sensitive to wage increases since they can shift cost increases to domestic consumers. In
other words, a higher C5-concentration ratio is expected to exert a positive impact on the
workers’ bargaining power. However, Veugelers (1989) also argues that more market
power in the product market could also be transferred to power positions in the input
market such that the workers’ bargaining power would be eroded. Therefore, the effect of
the C5-concentration ratio on the workers’ bargaining power can go in both directions and
depends on which of the two mechanisms prevails.
 Control variable 3: the sectoral capacity utilisation ratio. This variable captures the general
state of the economy. A higher capacity utilisation ratio reflects a better economic situation
and hence should allow workers to press for higher wages. We therefore expect a positive
coefficient for this variable.
 Control variable 4: the skill intensity. This variable refers to the ratio of skilled versus total
employment in a sector. Skilled workers are defined as those who obtained higher
                                                                                                                                                                               
37 A related study by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) develops the argument that the nature of the production process in terms of
complementarities and substitutability of workers in production affects the workers’ bargaining power.
38 We also re-ran our regressions using the Herfindahl index. Our regression results are similar and hence we do not report them.
However, these results are available upon request.
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education. Following the results of Kramarz (2003) and Abowd and Kramarz (1993), we
expect that the workers’ bargaining power is increasing in education.
4.2     Estimation strategy
As indicated earlier, our estimation strategy closely follows the empirical methodology of
Slaughter (2001) who investigates the effect of international trade on labour demand elasticities.39
While other authors investigating the determinants of the union’s (relative) bargaining power have
estimated one single equation (see Doiron, 1992, Svejnar, 1986 and Veugelers, 1989, among
others), we prefer to estimate Eq. (5) using each of the explanatory variables separately. As pointed
out above, the reason is that there is no formal theory explaining the workers’ relative bargaining
power. In what follows, we discuss four important issues regarding our estimation strategy.
The first issue deals with the exogeneity of the regressors. Variables related to outsourcing
and technology are endogenously determined inputs. As documented in other work (see e.g.
Abowd and Lemieux, 1993) and as mentioned above, import and export quantities in a small open
economy are -in contrast to export and import prices- not fully exogenous. Regarding the trade
variables, we expect our tariff measure to be the most exogenous variable (see also Haskel and
Slaughter, 2003 for a discussion). To tackle the endogeneity problem, we adopt several solutions
such as (1) introducing lags of the trade and technology variables and (2) using Instrumental
Variables (IV) where these variables are instrumented with their lags. The two estimation
techniques produced similar results. We decided to report the estimates using the IV approach.40
The second issue handles the fact that the dependent variable in Eq. (5) is a parameter which
is estimated in the first stage. Therefore, the error term in this equation is heteroskedastic with zero
mean and variance equal to the variance of the error term from the true regression plus the variance
of the estimated relative bargaining power of the workers 

1

 
 
  
 
. Following Anderson (1993) and
Slaughter (2001), we correct for this form of heteroskedasticity by weighing less heavily those
observations for which the estimated variance of the relative bargaining power is larger. More
specifically, we perform an Instrumental Variables (IV) regression on Eq. (5) from which we take
the squared residuals. Subsequently, we regress these squared residuals on the estimated variance
                                                          
39 Paes de Barros et al. (1999) also rely on the two-stage strategy to estimate the effect of international trade on labour demand
elasticities.
40 The regression results using the lags of the explanatory variables can be obtained from the authors upon request. Next to trade flows,
we also included percentage changes in import and export prices. As argued earlier in this paper, these might be considered exogenous in
a small open economy (see Section 3.2). More specifically, we expect that an increase (decrease) in import prices and export prices is
associated with lower (higher) foreign competition. Hence, we expect a positive regression coefficient of these variables. Early OLS and
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of the relative bargaining power coefficients, together with these estimated variances squared and
cubed. Finally, we use the inverse of the predicted values of this regression as weights in a
weighted Instrumental Variables regression of Eq. (5).41
The third issue is related to the fact that there is no real theoretical model predicting which
variables to use in a regression equation explaining the workers’ relative bargaining power. As
pointed above, we first perform univariate regressions. This avoids potential multicollinearity
problems between the explanatory variables. As a robustness check, we also estimate Eq. (5) using
various significant explanatory variables from the univariate regressions. Moreover, we have also
experimented with several combinations of sector and time fixed effects and have tried four
different combinations like in Slaughter (2001) who performs regressions with no sector and time
dummies, only sector dummies, only time dummies and a combination of both.
The last issue deals with the fact that -as widely documented in the trade-wages literature-
globalisation and technological change have a different impact on skilled versus unskilled workers.
Our dataset did not allow us to estimate separate coefficients for the bargaining power of skilled
versus unskilled workers. To shed some light on the issue of skill heterogeneity at the sectoral
level, we split our sample according to the sectoral skill intensity. More specifically, we computed
an average skill intensity for each sector and our cutting point occurs at the median.42
4.3 Empirical results
Table 7 reports the regression results of Eq. (5), using one single explanatory variable each
time. The trade (except outsourcing and tariffs), technology and inward FDI variables are
instrumented with their 1-period lagged values. To test for serial correlation, we performed the
Woolridge test (Woolridge, 2002). Since the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be
rejected, the use of 1-period lagged values as instruments is justified.43
                                                                                                                                                                               
IV regression results revealed that these variables were not statistically significant. Hence, we do not report these results but they can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
41 In the literature, there are two correction procedures for the use of estimated regressands in two-step equations. One method is
proposed by Anderson (1993) and subsequently used by Slaughter (2001). Their correction is applicable if the second-stage regressand is
a parameter which is estimated in the first stage. The other method is suggested by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and adopted by Haskel
and Slaughter (2001, 2003). Their correction is valid if the second-stage regressand is a variable which is estimated in the first stage.
Given our empirical set-up, we follow completely the first method. The basic idea is that the errors in the stage-two regressions may be
heteroskedastic due to the imprecision in the first-stage estimates. Since the source of heteroskedasticity is known, the estimated
variance in the first-stage regressions can be used to create a weight for the weighted Instrumental Variables regression in the second
stage.
42 The skill-intensive sectors are: Printing and Allied Industries (Sector 6), Chemical Industry and Man-made Fibres (Sector 7), Rubber
and Plastic (Sector 8), Non-Electrical Machinery (Sector 12), Office and Computing Machinery, Electrical Machinery and Professional
Goods (Sector 13), Other Transport Equipment (Sector 14) and Other Manufacturing (Sector 15).
43 The use of 2-period lagged values as instruments produces broadly the same results.
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Table 7   Second-Stage Univariate Regression Instrumental Variables Results:
                Determinants of the Workers’ Relative Bargaining Power.
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
Hypothesised
Effect on
Bargaining
Power (B)
Time
Fixed
Effects
Sector &
Time Fixed
Effects
# Obs.
Trade Variables
Import(WORLD)/Production B < 0 -0.001(0.003)
-0.01
(0.03) 75
Import(OECD)/Production B < 0 0.004(0.007)
0.24
(0.83) 75
Import(CEE)/Production B < 0 1.30(0.72)
2.52
(2.07) 75
Import(NICs)/Production B < 0 -0.05(0.03)
-0.71*
(0.39) 75
Import(other NON-OECD)/Prod. B < 0 -0.003(0.005)
-0.07***
(0.01) 75
Export(WORLD)/Production B > 0 0.02
**
(0.01)
0.65
(2.38) 75
Export(OECD)/Production         B > 0 0.01
**
(0.007)
0.82
(1.82) 75
Export(CEE)/Production         B > 0 2.52
***
(0.62)
0.04
(2.19) 75
Export(NICs)/Production         B > 0 -0.01(0.02)
-0.48**
(0.19) 75
Export(other NON-OECD)/Prod.         B > 0 -0.003(0.006)
-0.09***
(0.02) 75
Outsourcing Narrowa         B < 0 0.04(0.08)
0.04
(0.18) 30
Outsourcing Broada         B < 0 -0.003(0.10)
0.02
(0.16) 30
Tariffsa         B > 0 0.50
***
(0.10)
1.21
(1.72) 30
Inward Foreign Direct Investment Variables
Relative Number of
Foreign-owned Firms         B < 0
0.21
(0.09)
-2.65***
(0.69) 75
Relative Employment of
Foreign-owned Firms         B < 0
0.02
(0.02)
-0.39
(0.59) 75
Relative Value-added of
Foreign-owned Firms         B < 0
0.02
(0.02)
3.02
(16.28) 75
Technology Variables
R&D/output        B > 0  or       B < 0
1.48***
(0.32)
-2.07
(11.91) 75
Patents/output        B > 0  or       B < 0
0.04
(0.14)
0.01
(0.18) 75
% Change in TFP        B > 0  or       B < 0
-0.04
(0.30)
-0.03
(0.08) 75
Control Variables
Unemployment Rate        B < 0 0.14
*
(0.07)
-0.001
(0.22) 75
Short-term Unempl. Rate        B < 0 0.07(0.14)
-0.11
(0.15) 75
C5- Concentration Ratio        B > 0  or       B < 0
0.004
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.01) 75
Capacity Utilisationb        B > 0 -0.27
**
(0.13)
-0.01
(0.20) 70
Skill Intensity        B > 0 0.09(0.09)
-0.04
(0.09) 75
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 a: These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995.
 b: Sector 49 of the NACE-70 was dropped because of data limitations.
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In general, the regression results of Table 7 reveal that -except for the control variables and
some of the trade variables split up to various destinations/origins- the expected sign of the
regression coefficients is obtained. In a number of cases, these regression coefficients are not
always statistically significant as their significance depends on the inclusion of sector fixed effects.
Basic Results. As mentioned above, we have estimated Eq. (5) with no sector and time fixed
effects, only sector fixed effects, only time fixed effects and sector as well as time fixed effects.
The weighted IV results reveal that the sign and the significance of the estimated effect of the
variables in the specifications without fixed effects accord with those in the specifications with
only time fixed effects. Both specifications focus on the inter- as well as on the intra-sectoral
variation of the variables. Similarly, the sign and the significance of the estimated effect of the
variables in the specifications with sector fixed effects equal those of the specifications with both
time and sector fixed effects. When sector fixed effects are included, we use the time-series
information of the variables. In other words, the focus is on the intra-sectoral variation of the
variables, i.e. on how the workers’ relative bargaining power moves over time. For the sake of
brevity, we only report in Table 7 the results of the specifications with time fixed effects and both
time and sector fixed effects.
As far as the international trade variables are concerned, we find some evidence of
international trade having an impact on the workers’ relative bargaining power.
In our estimations with only time fixed effects, statistically significant positive effects are
found for the variables related to trade with the rest of the world, the OECD countries and the CEE
countries. Sectors characterised by strong export performance to these countries enable workers to
cream off a larger share of the rents. The same is true in sectors where higher tariffs apply which
shield them from international competition.
In the regressions with both time and sector fixed effects, the variables related to imports
coming from the NICs and the other NON-OECD countries are statistically significant. This
implies that in sectors confronted with stronger import competition, the share of rents going to
workers is squeezed. The tariff variable loses its statistical significance but still has the expected
sign. Surprisingly, our regression results reveal that higher exports to the NICs and the other NON-
OECD countries induce a negative effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power.
When controlling for both time and sector fixed effects, our results show that workers have a
lower relative bargaining power in those sectors with a lot of foreign-owned firms relative to the
total number of firms. Before, we have put forward several explanations for this result.
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In the specifications with only time fixed effects, a strong statistically significant result
emerges from our variable of innovative input (R&D divided by output). In those sectors with more
technological change in the form of high R&D expenditures, workers are more eager to press for
higher wages as these workers might be essential in production and/or labour costs might become
less important because of technological change. No statistically significant effects are found for the
TFP- and patent variables.
We do not obtain the expected sign for the regression coefficients of our control variables.
The regression coefficient for the unemployment (capacity utilisation) variable in the specification
with only time fixed effects has a statistically significant positive (negative) sign. This positive
coefficient for the unemployment variable accords in some sense with the empirical results of other
empirical work for Belgium, e.g. Abraham and De Bruyne (2000) find that higher unemployment
has not led to wage moderation44 and Veugelers (1989) points to a positive, although not
significant, effect of unemployment on workers’ bargaining power in the Belgian industry. We also
take up short-term instead of total unemployment in a sector. In all the specifications, short-term
unemployment does not appear to have any statistically significant effect on the workers’ relative
bargaining power.
Combination of Independent Variables. As a robustness check, we estimate Eq. (5) using a
combination of the independent variables. The choice of the included regressors is based on the
significance of these variables in the univariate regressions. We combine trade-variables split up to
various destinations/origins with an FDI variable (the number of foreign-owned firms relative to
the total number of firms), a technology variable (R&D divided by production) and three control
variables (short-term unemployment, C5 ratio and skill intensity). We also take up time and sector
fixed effects.
Including all these variables in a regression might cause one of them to lose its statistical
significance due to multicollinearity problems. The reason is that the link between trade and FDI on
the one hand and technology on the other hand occurs in two directions. Technological change
spurs globalisation as technological progress diminishes the economic distance between countries.
Also, increased international trade and inward FDI often trigger technological change (see
Abraham and Brock, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2001; Doms and Jensen, 1998; Globerman
et al., 1994; Lawrence, 2000 and Wood, 1995, among others). Likewise, multicollinearity might
arise between the trade and FDI variables as they are often substitutes or complements (see
Blomström et al., 1988; Lipsey and Weiss, 1981, among others).
                                                          
44 This finding is consistent with results of other European studies pointing to a weak effect of unemployment on wages (see e.g.
Eichengreen, 1993 and Layard et al., 1991).
HAS INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFFECTED WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER ?                                                2.34
Table 8 reveals that the statistical significance of the trade variables depends on the
destination/origin of exports and imports. Focusing on the results with trade with the rest of the
world shows that the FDI variable loses its statistical significance while the export variable is
significant at 5% (see first column of Table 8). Even stronger statistically significant trade-effects
arise if trade with the OECD countries is considered (see second column). In this specification,
strong import competition seems to squeeze the share of rents going to the workers while the
opposite is true for strong export performance. When trade with the CEE countries is taken into
account, we find that the trade variables lose their statistical significance while the FDI variable is
significant at 1% (see third column). The fourth column of Table 8 reveals that no significant
effects are found when we consider trade with the NICs. The results including trade with the other
NON-OECD countries equal the ones including trade with the CEE countries, i.e. the trade
variables lose their statistical significance in favour of the FDI variable (see last column). In all
specifications, no statistically significant effects show up for the technology and control variables.
Table 8   Second-Stage Multivariate Regression Instrumental Variables Results:
                Determinants of the Workers’ Relative Bargaining Power.
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
Hypothesised
Effect on
Bargaining
Power (B)
Sector & Time
 Fixed Effects
Import(WORLD)/Production B < 0 -0.001(0.07)
Import(OECD)/Production B < 0 -0.34
*
(0.19)
Import(CEE)/Production B < 0 -1.18(1.46)
Import(NICs)/Production B < 0 -3.51(10.41)
Import(other NON-OECD)/Prod. B < 0 -0.006(0.70)
Export(WORLD)/Production B > 0 0.40
**
(0.19)
Export(OECD)/Production         B > 0 0.55
**
(0.25)
Export(CEE)/Production         B > 0 -0.04(2.71)
Export(NICs)/Production         B > 0 1.38(4.90)
Export(other NON-OECD)/Prod.         B > 0 -0.05(0.85)
Relative Number of
Foreign-owned Firms         B < 0
-4.81
(3.53)
-6.99
(6.62)
-3.16***
(1.29)
-4.45
(3.41)
-3.76**
(1.70)
R&D/output         B > 0  or        B < 0
-1.71
(17.1)
-4.47
(26.9)
(11 91)
3.94
(11.8)
10.70
(33.5)
2.54
(12.03)
Short-term Unempl. Rate         B < 0 0.001(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)
(0 15)
0.11
(0.20)
0.34
(0.69)
0.12
(0.29)
C5- Concentration Ratio         B > 0  or        B < 0
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.022
(0.02)
-0.006
(0.04)
-0.017
(0.02)
Skill Intensity         B > 0
-0.32
(0.57)
(0 09)
-0.12
(0.34)
0.20
(0.52)
0.14
(0.95)
0 .29
(0.49)
   ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Skill Effect. Table 9 reports the univariate regression results using a split sample according
to the sectoral skill intensity. For both groups, we estimate the specifications with only time fixed
effects and both time and sector fixed effects. Unfortunately, comparing the estimated trade-effects
of the unskilled-intensive sectors with those of the skill-intensive sectors does not allow us to draw
clear-cut conclusions.
From the first two columns of Table 9, it follows that increased import competition lowers
the workers’ relative bargaining power in the unskilled-intensive sectors. This effect is most
pronounced when we consider trade with the rest of the world and the OECD countries. Regarding
our export variable, workers in these sectors benefit most in terms of bargaining power when
considering trade with the rest of the world, the OECD and the other NON-OECD countries. These
workers are also able to cream off a larger share of the rents when tariffs are higher. They lose
however, in terms of bargaining power, when confronted with a relatively high number of foreign-
owned firms and when the share of patents is high.
The results of the skill-intensive sectors follow more closely the general results (reported in
Table 7). In line with the general results, workers in sectors confronted with a lot of imports from
other NON-OECD countries lose in terms of bargaining power while they benefit when the sector
exports a lot to the rest of the world and the CEE countries. Similar to the general results, exports
to the NICs and the other NON-OECD countries seem to affect the workers’ relative bargaining
power negatively. Regarding the inward foreign direct investment variables, the two specifications
blur a clear picture. Consistent with the general results, we find again a strongly positive
technology effect of R&D/production.
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Table 9   Second-Stage Univariate Regression Instrumental Variables Results:
    Determinants of the Workers’ Relative Bargaining Power in (Un)skilled-Intensive Sectors.
Unskilled-Intensive Sectors Skill-Intensive Sectors
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
Time
Fixed
Effects
Time &
Sector
Fixed
Effects
# Obs.
Time
Fixed
Effects
Time &
Sector
Fixed
Effects
# Obs.
Trade Variables
Import(WORLD)/Production -0.02
*
(0.01)
0.15
(0.09) 40
0.001
(0.004)
-0.07*
(0.04) 35
Import(OECD)/Production -0.03
**
(0.01)
0.15
(0.09) 40
0.01
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.16) 35
Import(CEE)/Production 0.36(0.50)
-1.72
(1.18) 40
12.14**
(4.31)
7.63
(4.84) 35
Import(NICs)/Production 0.02(0.19)
0.45
(0.57) 40
-0.06
(0.04)
-2.28
(2.50) 35
Import(other NON-OECD)/Prod. 0.06(0.02)
-0.58
(0.75) 40
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.09***
(0.02) 35
Export(WORLD)/Production 0.008(0.01)
0.35*
(0.18) 40
0.14***
(0.02)
39.36
(80.79) 35
Export(OECD)/Production 0.006(0.02)
0.47**
(0.23) 40
0.02
(0.009)
0.99
(3.40) 35
Export(CEE)/Production 0.38(0.68)
0.23
(0.94) 40
4.12***
(0.85)
-9.29
(5.17) 35
Export(NICs)/Production 0.92(0.73)
7.15
(9.80) 40
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.66**
(0.24) 35
Export(other NON-OECD)/Prod. 0.39
**
(0.17)
0.41
(1.61) 40
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.13**
(0.02) 35
Outsourcing Narrowa -0.06(0.14)
-0.14
(0.16) 16
0.14
(0.11)
0.28***
(0.11) 14
Outsourcing Broada 0.03(0.16)
0.30
(0.38) 16
0.02
(0.13)
0.05
(0.15) 14
Tariffsa 0.69
**
(0.14)
2.04
(10.09) 16
0.34
(0.74)
-12.29
(15.43) 14
Inward Foreign Direct Investment Variables
Relative Number of
Foreign-owned Firms
-0.005
(0.10)
-2.30**
(0.59) 40
0.49***
(0.11)
-8.50**
(2.78) 35
Relative Employment of
Foreign-owned Firms
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.60
(0.91) 40
0.06
(0.03)
-0.34
(0.76) 35
Relative Value-added of
Foreign-owned Firms
-0.01
(0.03)
-3.85
(7.81) 40
0.05
(0.03)
-0.42
(1.30) 35
Technology Variables
R&D/output 1.55(2.06)
-1.86
(11.82) 40
1.89***
(0.36)
6.40
(14.21) 35
Patents/output -0.64
**
(0.15)
0.38
(0.54) 40
0.36*
(0.20)
0.43
(0.23) 35
% Change in TFP -0.05(0.13)
-0.06
(0.16) 40
-0.07
(0.21)
-0.12
(0.09) 35
  ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 a: These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995.
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5.    CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that international trade has affected workers’
wages in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995 by using a rent-sharing
framework. As a starting point, the results of reduced form equations of bargained wages and
profits per worker have supported this hypothesis. Our analysis has uncovered three important
mechanisms underlying these results. In the first part of the paper, we have shown that international
trade affects wages through changes in the firms’ rents and changes in the workers’ outside option.
Similar to other papers considering rent sharing in the Belgian economy, we find a positive relation
between workers’ wages and the firms’ profits. Moreover, our regression results reveal that
increased foreign competition in the form of lower export prices reduces both wages per worker
and profits per worker. Concerning the effect of international trade on workers’ wages through
changes in the workers’ outside option, we find that the higher the ratio of imports over production
at the sectoral level the lower the workers’ outside option (and hence workers’ wages), while the
opposite is true for the ratio of exports over production. The underlying idea is that imports of
goods are potential substitutes for labour. When international trade flows are split up according to
the countries of destination/origin, our results reveal that imports from OECD countries and NICs
have a significantly negative effect on the workers’ outside option whereas exports to CEE
countries affect the workers’ outside option significantly positively.
In the second part of the paper, we have provided evidence of globalisation affecting
workers’ bargaining power directly. We have explored the link between globalisation and the
workers’ relative bargaining power by introducing measures related to import and export
competition, outsourcing, tariffs and inward foreign direct investment. Import and export
competition and tariffs seem to have in general the expected effect on the workers’ bargaining
power. Regarding inward foreign direct investment, we have found that more foreign-owned firms
in a sector reduce the workers’ bargaining power. We have put forward several explanations such
as the footloose nature of multinational companies and the crowding-out of domestic
entrepreneurship.
Finally, a weakness of the theoretical model is that imperfect competition in the product
market is not explicitly modelled. Product market conditions enter the model through a revenue
shifter. In a follow-up paper, we aim at modelling imperfectly competitive product markets more
rigorously.
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APPENDIX A
To test whether changes in sector-specific international prices present pure demand shocks,
we follow Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Kramarz (2003). We compare Ordinary Least Squares
estimates of supply equations (quantities as a function of prices) to Instrumental Variables
estimates of the same supply equation in which the output price is instrumented by the sector-
specific price of imports and the sector-specific price of exports. Least squares estimates of the
elasticity of supply with respect to the output price could be either negative or positive, depending
on the variance of demand and supply shocks and on demand and supply elasticities (see Abowd
and Lemieux, 1993). Once these output prices are instrumented using sector-specific international
prices, however, the elasticity should become positive if international prices are exogenous demand
shocks that trace down the supply curve. In the first column of Table A.1., we estimate the relation
between firm-level real sales and sector-level value-added prices and a time trend in the cross-
section dimension. In the second column, we control for firm-level fixed effects. In the third
column, we instrument value-added prices using 4-period lagged sector-specific export and import
prices. The estimated supply elasticity using the OLS and the fixed-effects estimation methods is
negative and statistically significant, reflecting that supply shocks dominate demand shocks. On the
other hand, the IV estimate points to a positive and significant supply elasticity. The elasticity is
equal to 0.543, which is slightly above the one estimated by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and very
well in line with the one estimated by Kramarz (2003). The Hansen-Sargan test does not reject the
joint validity of the instruments. The F-statistic rejects the nullity of the instruments in the first-
stage regression. Our findings are hence consistent with the fact that international prices represent
pure demand shocks that increase product market competition in Belgium.
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Table A.1   Supply Equation, 1987-1995.
 ESTIMATION
METHOD OLS Firm Fixed Effects TSLS
a
Constant 25.889
***
(6.545)
-48.546***
(1.387)
19.472***
(1.492)
Price of Value
Added
-0.757***
(0.106)
-0.126***
(0.028)
0.539***
(0.204)
Time Trend -0.010
***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.001)
Hansen-Sargan IV
Test
(p-value)
0.102
Nullity of the
Instruments
(F-statistic)
337
# Obs. 71594 71594 45390
2R 0.001 0.026 .
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is firm-level real sales. The prices are measured at the sectoral level.All variables and instruments
are expressed as natural logarithms. The price of value added is deflated by the CPI  (1990=100), while sales are deflated
by the producer price. Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: test of correlation among instruments and residuals,
asymptotically distributed as 2df .  Nullity of the Instruments (F-statistic): tests the nullity of the instruments for the price
of value added. A full stop in the 2R box indicates that the calculated 2R was negative and hence is not reported.
a: instruments: export prices t-4 , import prices t-4.
APPENDIX B
Table B.1   Sectoral Classification for the First-Stage Regressions.
Sector # Firmsa NACE-70 NACE-Bel
Sec 1 Food, beverages and tobacco 2392 41+42 15+16
Sec 2 Textiles 866 43 17
Sec 3 Wearing apparel and leather and products 869 44+45 18+19
Sec 4 Wood products and furniture and fixtures 1380 46 20 + 36.1
Sec 5 Manufacture of pulp, paper and board 227 471+472 21
Sec 6 Printing and allied industries 1883 473+474 22
Sec 7 Chemical industry and man-made fibres 492 25+26 24
Sec 8 Rubber and plastic products 505 48 25
Sec 9 Non-metallic mineral products 787 24 26
Sec 10 Basic metal industries 85 22 27
Sec 11 Metal products 2197 31 28
Sec 12 Non-electrical machinery 715 32 29
Sec 13
Office and computing machinery,
electrical machinery and professional
goods
883 33+34+37 30-33
Sec 14 Other transport equipment 301 35+36 34+35
Sec 15 Other manufacturing 435 49 36-36.1
                                                          
a The number of firms in each sector is computed as the average number of firms over the period 1987-1995.
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APPENDIX C
The sectoral classification for the second-stage regressions is based on Table B.1 of
Appendix B and covers the period 1991-1995, except for the tariff data and the outsourcing
variables.
The data for the trade variables are obtained from the OECD International Trade by
Commodities Statistics (ITCS). These data are in the Standard Industrial Trade Classification
(SITC) and are converted to the NACE-70 classification with a correspondence table obtained from
the OECD.45 The production data are obtained from the OECD (1999) Stan Database for Industrial
Analysis. Our narrow and broad outsourcing variables are derived from the 1990 and 1995 input-
output tables for the Belgian economy.46 The data for 1990 are in the NACE-clio classification for
which a conversion was used, while the data for 1995 are in the NACE-bel classification (see Table
B.1 of Appendix B for a conversion to the NACE-70 classification). The tariff data are based on
Messerlin (2001) and refer to the average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs of the European
Union. These tariff data cover the years 1990 and 1995. For some sectors, the data are more
disaggregated than the sectoral classification of Table B.1. Hence, we used sectoral import shares
as a weight to construct tariff data based on the classification of Table B.1.
Regarding inward foreign direct investment, we experiment with three variables: the number
of foreign-owned companies relative to the total number of companies, the total employment of
foreign-owned firms relative to the total Belgian employment and the total value-added of foreign-
owned firms relative to the total Belgian value-added for each sector in the manufacturing industry.
The Belgian Federal Planning gathers data on all multinationals in the Belgian economy. A
multinational firm is defined as a firm that is at least 50% foreign-owned (see De Backer, 2002 and
De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003 for a further description of this data set).
We experiment with three technology variables. We use the sectoral R&D intensity, which is
defined as R&D expenditures divided by output, as a measure for innovative input. The R&D data
are obtained from the Dienst voor Wetenschappelijke, Technische en Culturele Aangelegenheden
(DWTC, Belgian Federal Science Policy Office).47 For the years 1990 and 1991, missing
observations are filled in with the aid of a spline interpolation technique. The data are in the
NACE-Bel classification and are converted to the NACE-70 classification based on NIS (1997).
The production data are obtained from the OECD (1999) Stan Database for Industrial Analysis. We
also use granted patent data as a measure of innovative output. These patent data are obtained from
the EPO (European Patent Office) and are converted to the NACE-70 classification based on the
                                                          
45 The data were first converted through the International Industrial Classification (ISIC) and subsequently converted to the NACE-70
based on Schumacher (1992).
46 See http://www.plan.be/.
47 See http://www.belspo.be/
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conversion table of Verspagen et al. (1994).48 The patent variable used is patents divided by
production times milliards. The third technology variable is Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This
variable is expressed in indices where 1990 is the base year. The percentage change of Total Factor
Productivity can be expressed as follows:
         ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA Q L K L                                                                     (C1)
In this expression, the first term reflects the percentage change in the output-labour ratio. In
the second term, α  refers to the capital share in production. Therefore,  1 α  is the labour share
in production, which is calculated as the average share of labour costs in value-added.  ˆ ˆK L
refers to the percentage change in the capital-labour ratio. We construct our capital stock data
starting from real investment data from the OECD (1999) Stan Database for Industrial Analysis and
using a perpetual inventory method following Griliches (1979).49 We first compute an initial capital
stock for 1990. If we assume that both the depreciation rate    and the annual growth rate    of
investments prior to 1990 are constant, the initial capital stock 1990K  equals:
                                   
     
 
2 32 3
1990 1990 1990 1990 1990
1990
1 1 1
1
1 1
K I I I I
I
     
 
      

 
 
 
 
          (C2)
                        
where  1 1   . The growth rate    is estimated as the mean annual growth rate of
investments over the period 1985-1990. Like Maskus (1991), we use a depreciation rate of 13.33
percent. After having obtained the initial capital stock, deflated investment series are accumulated
and depreciated from 1990 onwards. The deflators are calculated from the value-added series in the
OECD (1999) Stan database.
The sectoral unemployment rate is a first control variable and is obtained from the
Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening (RVA). The short-term unemployment rate is obtained from
the Belgian Labour Force and is related to those workers who lost their job less than one year ago.
Another control variable is the C5- concentration ratio which refers to the five-firm concentration
ratio. This ratio is computed with the aid of the Belgian National Bank Balance sheet data using the
sales variable. A third control variable is the capacity utilisation rate which is obtained from the
                                                          
48 Again, the conversion has occurred through the ISIC-classification.
49 A more complete description of how the capital series are constructed is available from the authors upon request.
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Belgostat database of the Belgian National Bank.50 These data are provided quarterly and are
disaggregated according to the different sectors in the manufacturing industry. For some sectors,
the data are more disaggregated than the sectoral classification mentioned in Table B.1 of
Appendix B. First, we compute the average utilisation rate in each sector.51 Some sectors are
aggregated up using the value of production as weights. The sector “Other Manufacturing” (sector
49 of the NACE-70) was lacking. Therefore we did not use this sector in our estimations. A last
control variable is the sectoral skill intensity. We use the total amount of skilled to total
employment as a measure for skill intensity. Skilled workers are defined as those workers who
obtained higher education. These data are obtained from the Belgian Labour Force Survey.
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1.    INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on wage determination in Bulgaria and contributes to three topics in the
empirical labour economics literature. The first topic concerns rent sharing. In a prominent attack
on traditional analysis, Sumner Slichter (1950) showed that wages in the US manufacturing sector
appeared to be positively correlated with various measures of firms’ ability-to-pay. In the spirit of
Slichter, labour economists have devoted much effort to test for imperfect competition in labour
markets in the US and Canada1 and in Western Europe.2 The few related firm-level studies for post-
communist Europe compare mainly rent-sharing behaviour before and during the transition period
(Basu et al., 1997a [Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic]; Basu et al., 1997b [Poland];
Grosfeld and Nivet, 1997 [Poland]). These studies indicate that, except in Poland and to a lesser
extent in the Slovak Republic, wages were set relatively independently of firms’ performance under
communism. During the transition period, however, wages started to vary with sales per worker,
suggesting the presence of rent sharing. Commander and Dhar (1998) and Köllö (1997) investigate
respectively for Poland and Hungary whether rent-sharing behaviour differs between firms with
increasing and decreasing real sales.
Besides adding Bulgaria to the list of country studies,3 we contribute to this literature by
allowing the rent-sharing coefficient to vary across firms. More specifically, we investigate
whether labour market imperfections differ between (1) state, private domestic and foreign
companies and (2) small and large firms. In contrast to Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999 [Poland] and
Luke and Schaffer, 1999 [Russia], our analysis draws upon a unique representative panel of firms
in manufacturing with detailed information on output and input factors and on firm ownership for
the period 1997-1998.
The positive relationship between wages and firm size is another well-documented empirical
regularity. In their seminal paper, Brown and Medoff (1989) found a significant positive firm size-
wage effect in the US. This effect has also shown up in more recent studies in the US (see Oi and
Idson, 1999 for a review of the literature) as well as in other (mostly West European) countries.4
Testing the firm size-wage hypothesis in post-communist countries has remained a largely
unexplored field. Post-communist countries provide, however, certain advantages since firm size
                                                          
1 Among them are Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Budd and Slaughter, 2004; Christofides et al., 1992; Currie
and McConnell, 1992.
2 e.g. Abowd and Allain, 1996 [France]; Abowd et al., 1999 [France]; Blanchflower et al., 1989 [UK]; Budd et al., 2004 [West and East
European Countries]; Goos and Konings, 2001 [Belgium]; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997 [UK]; Lever and Marquering, 1996 [the
Netherlands]; Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 [France and Norway]; Nickell and Kong, 1992 [UK]; Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990 [UK];
Piekkola and Kauhanen, 2003 [Finland]; Teulings and Hartog, 1998 [the Nordic countries and Germany].
3 Note that Jones and Kato (1996) provide evidence that the compensation of chief executives in Bulgarian not fully state-owned firms is
positively related to labour productivity.
4 e.g. Australia (Meagher and Wilson, 2000), Austria (Oosterbeek and van Praag, 1995), Canada (Morrisette, 1993), France (Abowd et
al., 1999), Germany (Criscuolo, 2000; Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991; Winter-Ebmer, 1995), Italy (Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991),
Japan (Idson and Ishii, 1993; Rebick, 1993), Sweden (Edin and Zetterberg, 1992), UK (Main and Reilly, 1993).
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can be considered largely exogenous to productivity in these countries (Svejnar, 1999). The reason
is that at the onset of transition firm size was mostly politically determined by the central planners.
To our knowledge, only one study investigates explicitly the firm size-wage effect in a post-
communist country, Russia (Idson, 2000). Our analysis goes one step further as we test additionally
whether the firm size-wage effect depends on the ownership structure of the firm.
A third empirical issue is the impact of foreign ownership on the firm’s wage policy. In the
literature on multinational enterprises, it is a stylised fact that foreign firms pay on average higher
wages than their domestic counterparts, even controlling for a wide range of worker and/or firm
characteristics.5 In transition countries, newly established private firms pay higher wages than other
firms (Svejnar, 1999). Previous studies investigating ownership effects on wages in these countries
had to rely on ownership dummy variables (Earle et al., 1995 [Russia], Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999
[Poland], Jones and Kato, 1996 [Bulgaria] and Luke and Schaffer, 1999 [Russia]). Having data on
the fraction of shares held by state, private domestic and foreign owners, we can investigate the
ownership-wage effect in more detail.
In the remainder, we first discuss the institutional context of wage determination in Bulgaria
during the transition period. In section 3 we set out the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes
the empirical setting whereas section 5 presents the data set. Section 6 confronts the hypotheses
with Bulgarian firm-level data and reports some robustness checks. Section 7 summarises and
interprets the results. Our main conclusions are that rent sharing is very pronounced in state-owned
firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly confirm
the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a positive
firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If these effects
exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.
2.    INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Under central planning, collective bargaining was absent and wage levels and structures
were determined by central planning authorities without union input. Trade unions acted merely as
workplace representatives of the Communist Party in state-owned enterprises (Flanagan, 1998).
In Bulgaria, the transformation of industrial relations started in 1989-1990. To establish
industrial relations in line with the European standards, an institutional and legislative framework
                                                          
5 See e.g. Dale-Olsen, 2002 [Norway]; Doms and Jensen, 1998 [US]; Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999 [US]; Globerman et al., 1994 [Canada];
Howenstine and Zeile, 1994 [US]; Lipsey, 1994 [US] and Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001 [Indonesia]. For a survey of the literature on
foreign firms in Mexico, Venezuela and the US, see Aitken et al., 1996.
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was laid down in the Labour Code in 1993. The Labour Code is based on two fundamental
principles: tripartite dialogue among social partners, i.e. social dialogue among governments,
reformed and alternative unions and employer organisations, and independence of the social actors
(Beleva et al., 1999). In line with the requirements of the Labour Code, the National Council for
Tripartite Cooperation emerged in Bulgaria at the beginning of 1993. Only those trade unions and
employer organisations which passed the criteria of representation established by law could
participate in the social dialogue (Iankova, 1998). Once recognised by the government, the
representative status was automatically transferred to the lower organisational levels (see infra).
Until 1998, four employer organisations and six trade unions participated in tripartite negotiations.
On the employer side, the Bulgarian Industrial Association (BIA), the Chamber for Trade and
Industry, the Union for Private Enterprising and the Union Revival covered the criteria for national
representation. During the 1990s, the Bulgarian Industrial Association played the most important
role in the social dialogue (Gradev, 2000). On the employee side, the most powerful syndicates
were Prodkrepa Confederation of Labour and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions
(CITUB) (Beleva et al., 1999). Although union membership declined sharply in all Central and
East European Countries, union membership in Bulgaria is significantly higher than in most other
CEE countries. Estimates of union membership amount to more than 70 percent of total
employment in Bulgaria compared to only 20 percent in other CEE economies (IMF, 2001;
Worldbank, 2001).
The development of tripartism has led to a multi-level bargaining structure in Bulgaria
(Iankova, 1998). Negotiations are carried out on four independent levels: the national, branch,
regional and enterprise level. The branch and regional levels are not well developed. Basic issues
of working conditions, unemployment insurance and the minimum wage, as well as the initial level
of average wages in the public sector, are negotiated at the national level. Similar issues with local
importance are subject to agreements at branch and regional levels. All specific parameters
concerning wages, employment, job evaluation and the level of additional payments are bargained
at the enterprise level (Beleva et al., 1999).
In many countries union influence at the enterprise level is limited. Wages are generally
determined unilaterally by management. As mentioned above, union power is relatively large and
wage determination occurs through bargaining in Bulgaria (Martin and Cristescu-Martin, 1999).
This institutional feature motivates our choice of Bulgaria for analysing wage determination at the
firm level.
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3.    THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In accordance with the wage determination system applicable to Bulgaria, wages are
considered to be the result of bargaining between the union6 and the firm represented by its
manager. To this end, we rely on the Right-To-Manage model (Nickell and Andrews, 1983). Under
the assumption that union members are risk neutral and -given our short-run focus- that
employment is not an argument in the union’s utility function, the real wage w  is assumed to result
from the maximisation of the following Nash-bargaining maximand:
{ } { }1w-A Y-wN= φ −φΦ (1)
with A  the workers’ outside option expressed in real terms, Y  real value added, N  the
employment level and Y- N =w π  real profits. The bargaining strength of employees, i.e. insider
power, is represented by φ .
Maximisation of this function with respect to the wage rate gives the following first-order
condition:
1
= A+
N
πw φ− φ (2)
According to this model, real firm-level wages are affected by both internal conditions (represented
by profits per employee) and external factors (taken up by the outside option or the alternative
wage) and the bargaining power of employees.
In the empirical part, we use value added to capture the firm’s ability-to-pay. Our motivation
is that although profits per worker have the advantage that they control for all costs, they have the
disadvantage that they are negatively related to wages by construction, hence creating a severe
endogeneity bias. Switching to value added per employee eliminates the direct endogeneity
problem.7
                                                          
6 Although worker influence on enterprise policies may occur through trade unions, works councils and employee ownership, in Bulgaria
worker participation is largely exercised through trade unions (Flanagan, 1998).
7 This does not imply, however, that endogeneity is not an issue anymore. For example, wage shocks affecting productivity may cause
endogeneity problems when using real value added per employee.
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By adding the term 
1
φ
− φ w  to both sides of equation (2), we obtain an expression for the
optimum wage as a function of real value added per worker:8
( )1 YA
N
w − φ φ= +     (3)
Although a well-developed theory of the determinants of bargaining power is lacking, some
authors have made φ  heterogeneous. Bughin (1991), Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989) link the
firm-level or sectoral bargaining power parameter to meso- or macroeconomic variables like the
consumer price index, sectoral unemployment rates and proxies for product market concentration.
Others consider firm-specific variables like the elasticity of labour supply at the level of the firm,
firm size, risk of bankruptcy and technology level as important determinants of rent sharing (e.g.
Piekkola and Kauhanen, 2003). The focus in this paper is on the potential influence of ownership
status and firm size on the employees’ bargaining power and the degree of rent sharing. Depending
on these structural variables, we presume that different relative weights will be given to the
workers’ interests and to profitability considerations. We adopt a straightforward specification:
φ 0 own N own*Nγ γ OWN +γ N +γ OWN*N= +    (4)
In this equation OWN  refers to the ownership status of the firm: state-owned, private
domestic or foreign. Firm size is measured by the firm’s employment level ( N ).
Substituting (4) into (3), we obtain the following basic equation for bargained real wages:
      +              0 own N own*N *
Y Y Y Y
A OWN A N A OWN N A
N N N N
= A+γ - - + γ - γ -w γ + (5)
                                                          
8 In the empirical section, all real variables are deflated by the (exogenous) producer price (
P
P ). The real wage w  will be the real
product wage. It could be argued that workers bargain over different wages. Workers’ utility is affected by wages deflated by the
(exogenous) consumer price index ( cP ). Algebraically, equation (1) would be { } { }1-' Y-wN= wκ-Aκ φ φΦ with w  the real product
wage and P
c
P
P
κ= . Since the effect of κ  on the maximand is multiplicative, the bargained real wage ( w ) in equation (3) is unaffected.
Assuming risk-averse workers does not change that result for a large range of utility functions.
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4.    EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
4.1.    Empirical Framework
In this section we test the model described by equation (5) using panel data for 1514
Bulgarian firms during the period 1997-1998. Equation (6) reflects this panel data set-up. Note that
in this equation we explicitly model the effect of the three possible ownership categories mentioned
before. Furthermore, for generality and in line with the literature, we have extended equation (5) by
allowing for an intercept term (α ) that can also differ according to ownership status and firm size.9
A final element of flexibility is the coefficient on A  (as a separate variable). Rather than imposing
1, we estimate this coefficient freely ( δ ). We justify this choice below.
      [ ] [ ] [ ][ ]
it 0 privd it for it N it privd*N it it for*N it it t
0 it t privd it it t for it it t
N it it t privd*N it it it
PRIVD FOR PRIVD FOR
PRIVD FOR
PRIVD
valad_N valad_N valad_N
valad_N valad_N
=α +α +α +α N α N α N δA +
        γ A +γ A +γ A +
        γ N A γ N
w + + +
- - -
- + -[ ] [ ]t for*N it it it t i itFOR valad_N D97A +γ N A +α + +ε
        
-
 (6)
where subscript i  is used to index observations on individual firms and t  represents year.
The dependent variable is the annual real wage per worker. Among the explanatory
variables, valad_N  stands for real value added per worker and N  for employment. To check
robustness, we will later use real profits per worker as a proxy for internal conditions. The variables
PRIVD  and FOR  are ownership categories. They refer to the fraction of shares held by private
domestic and foreign owners. The ownership category that is left out is the state, which refers to
the fraction of shares in the firm held by the state, municipalities or Treasury.
To stick as close as possible to the theory, the workers’ outside option ( A ) is proxied by its
expected value: the regional probability of employment times the real average regional wage.10
Controlling for region-specific variables is in the context of Bulgaria particularly important as there
are considerable disparities between the regions in which the firms are located (UNDP, 2000).
Obviously, assuming our proxy to equal the theoretical A  is rather strong. Allowing some
flexibility in the coefficient on tA  ( δ ) is therefore justified.11 ε  represents a white noise error term.
                                                          
9 Note that excluding firm size in the intercept term of the wage equation would bias the estimate of the rent-sharing effect.
10 Ideally, the proxy for A  would be: (regional probability of unemployment * unemployment benefits) + (regional probability of
employment * real average regional wage). Since the level of unemployment benefits is determined at the national level (IMF, 2001),
however, there is no variation between firms. Therefore, we proxy A  by regional probability of employment * real average regional
wage.
11 Note however that we do not allow flexibility in the variable ( valad_N A- ). The reason is that we can not impose proportional
restrictions in STATA. From the estimates, it follows that the coefficient on A  is 0.7 on average. As a test, we have therefore created
the variable ( valad_N 0.7*A- ) and re-estimated the model. The results were broadly similar to those reported in the paper.
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All specifications include a year dummy ( D97 ) to capture possible unobservable aggregate shocks
in 1997. Finally, we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity by including a firm-level fixed
effect ( iα ), even within the separate ownership groups.
The heterogeneity that we have introduced in the wage intercept and the rent-sharing
parameter affects the interpretation of the coefficients in equation (6). 0 Nα + α N  is the wage
intercept in state-owned firms whereas 0 N privd privd*Nα + α N + α α N+  and 0 N for for*Nα + α N + α α N+
indicate the wage intercept in private domestic and foreign firms respectively. Likewise, 0 Nγ γ N+ 
reflects the degree of rent sharing in state firms while 0 N privd privd*Nγ + γ N + γ γ N+  and
0 N for for*Nγ  + γ N + γ γ N+  indicate the degree of rent sharing in private domestic and foreign firms
respectively.
We specify the variables in equation (6) in levels rather than logs for two reasons. First, the
levels-levels specification is the most consistent with the theoretical model (equations (2) and (3)).
Second, given the presence of loss-making firms in our data, the use of logs would have
necessitated discarding observations from poorly performing firms. This would possibly introduce
problems of selection bias.
4.2.     Testable Hypotheses
In the literature, various explanations have been put forward for the wage differential
between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms. Strand (2002) refers to the fact that foreign
firms try to attract a higher quality work force and to differences in labour turnover costs. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) point to efficiency wage mechanisms. Other authors explain the wage
differential by differences in firm size and technological superiority (Aitken and Harrison, 1999;
Djankov and Hoekman, 1998). A very recent explanation for the multinational wage premium is
international rent sharing (Budd and Slaughter, 2004; Budd et al., 2004). The idea is that profits
within multinational firms are shared across borders. Our data do not allow an explicit test of these
explanations. However, we believe that technological superiority and international rent sharing are
two potential explanations for finding a multinational wage differential in Bulgaria. Therefore we
expect for privdα >α .
Explanations for the positive relationship between firm size and wages build on different
aspects of wage formation: labour quality (Hammermesh, 1980; Kremer, 1993; Weiss and Landau,
1984), compensating differentials (Masters, 1969), efficiency wages (Oi, 1983; Garen, 1985) or
more generally firm-specific compensation policies (Bullow and Summers, 1976), internal labour
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markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), union avoidance and union demand (Weiss, 1966), job
seniority (Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991) and rent sharing. Based on the literature, we expect Nα
to be significantly positive. We also investigate whether the firm size-wage effect differs according
to ownership status. A priori, no clear prediction can be made about the magnitude of the firm size
effect in the different ownership categories ( privd*Nα  and for*Nα ), however.
In the rent-sharing literature, higher total rents increase the incentives for workers to
appropriate a proportion of these rents. Hence, we anticipate an upward responsiveness of real
firm-level wages to rents per worker. At the same time, we expect the insider effect to be
determined by ownership form and/or firm size. Intuitively, we expect to find a strong rent-sharing
effect in state firms and a small one in foreign firms. The idea is that foreign firms, being much
more efficient than state firms, are concentrated in sectors with high value added. In contrast, value
added in state-owned firms is much lower. Therefore, workers in state firms need to capture a large
part of the rents to secure an acceptable wage while the opposite is true for workers in foreign
firms. Moreover, employees in foreign firms are able to appropriate some portion of the rents from
their parent firms (international rent sharing) which is translated into a higher inside wage level.
Therefore, we expect 0for privd< <γ γ .  In addition, the bargaining strength of the employees is
expected to be positively correlated with firm size, i.e. N γ  is expected to be positive. Whether this
effect is different in private domestic and foreign firms than in state-owned firms ( privd*Nγ  and
for*Nγ ) is ex ante unclear, however.
5.    DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
We use a panel of 1514 manufacturing firms from the 28 Bulgarian regions (‘oblasti’). To be
included in the data set at least one of the following conditions has to be satisfied. Either total
assets or total sales exceed 8 and 16 million USD respectively, or the number of employees is
larger than 100.
All variables are taken from published annual company accounts which are collected by
“Bureau Van Dyck” and marketed as the Amadeus data set. Nominal variables are expressed in
millions of leva.12 Although the data cover the period 1994-1998, we will focus the analysis on the
period 1997-1998 as only for these two years detailed information on the ownership structure of the
firms is available.
This unique data set allows us to make at least two major contributions. First, until now the
scarce existing empirical work in this field typically had to rely on small samples of firms collected
                                                          
12 In 1997 the exchange rate (annual average) was 1.674 leva per USD (EBRD, 2000).
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through surveys. In contrast, our sample contains virtually the entire population of medium and
large firms in manufacturing. Comparing the employment and sales coverage of our data with total
employment and sales in manufacturing reported in the statistical yearbooks, reveals that our data
cover 82% of total sales and 66% of total employment in manufacturing.13 Furthermore, the
Amadeus data set is collected from company accounts at the three-digit level of sectoral
disaggregation. To our knowledge, this kind of detailed firm-level data for a transition country has
not been used before for this purpose.
A second strength of the data set is that it offers detailed information on the ownership
structure of firms for two consecutive years. In particular, we know the fraction of shares held by
the state and by private investors and can observe their evolution over time. Next, we are able to
make a distinction between private domestic investors and foreign investors. Earlier studies for
Central and Eastern Europe had to rely on ownership dummies to investigate the crucial question of
how wage formation is related to form of ownership (Earle et al., 1995, Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999,
Jones and Kato, 1996 and Luke and Schaffer, 1999). Detailed information on the shareholding
structure also enables us to perform some additional robustness checks. Table 1 shows the
distribution of ownership on average.
Table 1   Distribution of Ownership
1997 1998
Mean (St.Dev.) Mean (St.Dev.)
Fraction of shares held by the state (STATE)          0.34 (0.38)             0.27 (0.35)
Fraction of STATE  firms in total number of firmsa          0.70             0.66
Fraction of STATE in all STATE  firms          0.49 (0.36)             0.40 (0.35)
Fraction of shares held by private domestic owners (PRIVD)          0.62 (0.39)             0.68 (0.37)
Fraction of PRIVD firms in total number of firmsb          0.79             0.83
Fraction of PRIVD in all PRIVD  firms          0.78 (0.26)             0.82 (0.23)
Fraction of shares held by foreign owners (FOR)          0.04 (0.17)             0.05 (0.19)
Fraction of FOR firms in total number of firmsc          0.06             0.08
Fraction of FOR in all FOR firms          0.68 (0.23)             0.63 (0.29)
Number of majority state firms          332             269
Number of majority private domestic firms          897             1150
Number of majority foreign firms          63             83
Source: Amadeus Database
a: STATE firms are firms for which STATE > 0.
b: PRIVD firms are firms for which PRIVD > 0.
c: FOR firms are firms for which FOR > 0.
In 1997 the fraction of shares held by foreign owners was only 4% on average, meaning that
only a relatively small fraction of firms had some foreign participation. However, if we look at
shareholding in foreign firms only, i.e. firms with at least some shares held by foreign owners, we
                                                          
13 Sales coverage ratio = total sales of firms in Amadeus in 1998 divided by total national sales as reported by the National Statistical
Offices. Idem for employment.
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can see that the low average share of foreign ownership hides the fact that foreign investors were
concentrated in a few firms. For example, in 1998 119 firms had a foreign owner who held an
average share of 63%. In 83 firms foreign owners were holding more than 50% of the shares.
Hence, in most cases foreign investors owned a majority share. Looking at shareholding in private
domestic firms only reveals that private domestic investors held on average 80% of total shares.
Finally, we can observe that the fraction of private domestic and foreign firms in the total number
of firms increased over time.14 During the 1990s, the inflow of foreign direct investment rose
rapidly. By 1998 inward FDI was almost 10 times higher than in 1991 (EBRD, 2000). The rising
total number of firms reflects a better coverage in the latest year and indicates that our analysis
draws upon an unbalanced panel.
The regional variable tA  (at the NUTS3-regional level) is collected from the National
Statistical Institute (NSI, 1998; 1999) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP,
2000). Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the regression analysis.
Table 2   Summary Statistics
VARIABLES 1997 1998 1997-1998
# Obs. Mean St. Dev. # Obs. Mean St. Dev. # Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Employment  (N) 1306 374.12 759.47 1381 348.03 693.74 2687 360.71 726.41
Average wage (w) 1043 98.62 101.86 1109 112.22 76.55 2152 105.63 89.95
Alternative wage (A) 1514 83.22 18.32 1514 93.92 16.77 3028 88.57 18.35
Profits per employee (prof_N) 1038 178.08 601.59 1106 303.45 3277.26 2144 242.75 2391.06
N * prof_N 1038 81070.1 453430.5 1112 59549.7 352974.7 2150 69939.5 404647.2
Value added per employee (valad_N) 1038 277.09 663.89 1108 415.98 3279.45 2146 348.80 2401.73
valad_N -  A 1038 192.95 661.23 1108 321.51 3278.29 2146 259.33 2400.41
N * (valad_N -  A) 1038 99075.6 537981.3 1108 80076.9 431478.2 2146 89266.4 485894.2
Source: Amadeus Database, NSI (1998, 1999), UNDP (1999)
Wages are constructed as the reported wage bill divided by the average number of
employees, which is standard for corporate data in the rent-sharing literature (e.g. Hildreth and
Oswald, 1997). The wage bill includes wage and salary payments to employees as well as
mandated employer contributions to government social insurance funds.15 Annual wages are
expressed as real wages per worker, i.e. nominal wages deflated by a three-digit producer price
index, normalised to 1 in 1995. This price index is obtained from the central statistical offices. ‘ A ’
represents the conditions on the labour market, measured as the regional probability of employment
times the real average regional wage. Profits and value added per worker are also expressed in real
terms. They are constructed in the standard way. Value added is calculated as sales minus material
                                                          
14 Note that the sum of the fractions of respectively state, private domestic and foreign firms in the total number of firms does not add up
to 1 as each firm can have multiple owners.
15 The wage measure hence refers to paid wages. Wage arrears could bias the rent-sharing effect. To our knowledge, however, the
problem of wage arrears is a very important issue in Russia and Ukraine but less severe in Bulgaria (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Earle
and Sabirianova, 2001; Ivanova and Wyplosz, 1999; Lehmann et al., 1999).
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costs and profits as value added minus the wage bill (see e.g. Blanchflower et al., 1996). Our profit
measure hence corresponds to the economic concept of rents available for sharing with workers.
Variables per worker are constructed by dividing by the average number of employees in each firm
for each year respectively. Employment ranges from 6 to 16280 employees. Its average level is
361. From Table 2, it is clear that profits as well as value added vary much more than wages.
Table A.1 in Appendix presents summary statistics by ownership category. In this table firms
are classified according to majority shareholding. The average employment level is the highest in
majority foreign firms (652), followed by majority state firms (441) and the lowest in majority
private domestic firms (331) (see lower part of Table A.1). Workers in majority foreign firms get
the highest wages (mean wage of 153). Wages in majority state and majority private domestic
companies are much lower (mean wage of 100 and 106 respectively).
Privatisation is clearly associated with better firm performance. Majority private firms
outperform majority state firms. Furthermore, majority foreign firms outperform majority state
firms as well as majority private domestic firms. Using the same data set, recent empirical research
by Estrin et al. (2001) confirms these findings. Strikingly, 18% of majority state companies (87 out
of 476) are classified as loss-making firms, reporting negative profits per employee over the sample
period.
6.    RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
6.1.    Estimation Method
Our estimation strategy consists of three parts. First, in order to get some grip on the more
long-term relationships of the model, the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimator is used as a
benchmark for cross-sectional time-series estimates. Second, the Panel Data Estimation Method
allows us to control for firm-specific heterogeneity which may capture various unobservables, such
as the quality of capital and labour. In the last part, we check the robustness of the fixed-effects
estimator. In addition, we try to deal with two problems that have not been addressed so far. First,
simultaneity may obscure the true relationship between wages and the variables reflecting internal
conditions. Moreover, firm size will be endogenous in that any effect from size to wages will
induce the firm to economise on labour. Second, the level of employment entering both the
definition of the wage and the measure of rents per worker, raises the standard problem that
measurement error may induce spurious correlation between these two key variables. To
circumvent these problems, we use the first-difference Instrumental Variables method suggested
for dynamic fixed-effects models by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). Under the assumption that
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endogeneity is constant across years, these results are expected to be in line with those obtained by
the fixed-effects estimator.
6.2.    Results
We use the pooled OLS, panel and first-difference TSLS method to estimate four alternative
specifications of equation (6). Gradually, we loosen a number of restrictions. In the first
specification it is imposed that only ownership status matters for the wage intercept and the degree
of rent sharing. Firm size does not, i.e. N privd*N for*N N privd*N for*N0 α = α = α = = γ = γ = γ . The second
specification relaxes the restriction that N N privd*N for*N 0 α = γ = γ = γ =  whereas in the third
specification we drop the restriction that N privd*N for*N N 0. α = α = α = γ =  In the final specification all
coefficients are freely estimated. As noted above, the benchmark ownership type is state-owned
firms.
The pooled OLS results using real value added per worker to capture the firm’s good fortune
are reported in the left part of Table 3. Consider first ownership-, size- and cross-effects on the
wage intercept, i.e. the effects on inside wages for given rent sharing. Even after controlling for
differences in firm size, private domestic and foreign ownership exerts a significantly positive
effect on the wage intercept in all specifications. In accordance with the MNE-literature and our
first hypothesis, foreign firms pay the highest wages ( for privd 0α >α > ). Furthermore, we find a
significantly positive relationship between firm size and wages in specification 2 ( N 0α > ),
confirming our second hypothesis and the findings of Idson (2000) for Russia. There is also
evidence that the firm size-wage effect differs according to ownership structure. From specification
3, it follows that the combined effect of private domestic as well as foreign ownership and firm size
is significantly positive. Concentrating on privately-owned firms the larger the firm, the higher the
wages. Once the positive combined effect of private ownership and firm size on rent sharing is also
taken into account, however, the effects on the wage intercept are less clear.
Focusing on the degree of rent sharing, the results clearly indicate that ownership status is a
crucial determinant of insider power. Each of the four specifications shows that workers in state-
owned firms succeed in appropriating a significant part of the rents ( 0γ is about 0.12). In contrast,
the employees’ capacity to capture productivity gains is very low in both private domestic
( 0 privdγ + γ ) and foreign firms ( 0 forγ + γ ). These results confirm our third hypothesis. Moreover, the
results regarding state-owned and private domestic firms are in line with the existing empirical
research for Poland (period 1992-1994) and Russia (1996-1997) in this field (Grosfeld and Nivet,
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1999; Luke and Schaffer, 1999). Both these studies use ownership dummies to discriminate
between state, privatised and commercialised enterprises and find that the share of rents taken by
workers in privatised companies is significantly less than the share taken by employees in state-
owned firms. From specification 3, it is clear that workers’ bargaining power is positively
correlated with firm size ( 0Nγ > ). This effect is highly pronounced in private domestic and foreign
firms as indicated by the significantly positive combined effect of private domestic and foreign
ownership and firm size. Finally, the estimates show that outside forces play an important role in
the wage determination process ( δ  is about 0.65).
Table 3   Wage Equation 1997-1998, dependent variable wage it  - Pooled OLS
Constant 22.869
**
(11.168)
28.734***
(10.599)
28.653***
(10.878)
0.054
(14.422) Constant
23.810**
(11.430)
26.940***
(10.968)
27.202***
(11.187)
26.458**
(11.013)
PRIVD 20.400
***
(5.315)
12.663***
(5.070)
8.693*
(5.551)
17.906***
(5.504) PRIVD
16.914***
(5.445)
11.085**
(5.257)
6.054
(5.739)
11.259**
(5.689)
FOR 74.432
***
(11.458)
60.705***
(11.346)
50.439***
(14.835)
60.435***
(14.601) FOR
73.489***
(11.662)
64.097***
(11.547)
49.997***
(15.227)
55.473***
(15.087)
N 0.009
***
(0.003)
-0.011***
(0.004)
0.019***
(0.005) N
0.016***
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.016***
(0.005)
PRIVD * N 0.033
***
(0.007)
-0.020***
(0.008) PRIVD * N
0.034***
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.008)
FOR * N 0.030
**
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.018) FOR * N
0.030**
(0.015)
0.015
(0.018)
A 0.705
***
(0.108)
0.620***
(0.103)
0.670***
(0.105)
0.615***
(0.103) A
0.738***
(0.111)
0.653***
(0.106)
0.703***
(0.108)
0.658***
(0.107)
valad_N - A 0.128
***
(0.010)
0.126***
(0.010)
0.105***
(0.010)
0.129***
(0.010) prof_N
0.098***
(0.011)
0.099***
(0.011)
0.079***
(0.011)
0.099***
(0.011)
PRIVD *
(valad_N - A)
-0.124***
(0.010)
-0.124***
(0.010)
-0.102***
(0.010)
-0.126***
(0.010) PRIVD * prof_N
-0.095***
(0.011)
-0.098***
(0.011)
-0.077***
(0.011)
-0.098***
(0.011)
FOR *
(valad_N - A)
-0.118***
(0.011)
-0.120***
(0.011)
-0.100***
(0.011)
-0.123***
(0.012) FOR * prof_N
-0.092***
(0.013)
-0.093***
(0.013)
-0.076***
(0.012)
-0.091***
(0.013)
N * (valad_N - A) -0.00003
***
(0.00001)
0.00004***
(0.00001)
-0.00004***
(0.00001) N * prof_N
-0.00004***
(0.00001)
0.00003***
(0.00001)
-0.00004***
(0.00001)
PRIVD * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.0001***
(0.00001)
0.0002***
(0.00002)
PRIVD * N *
prof_N
0.0001***
(0.00001)
0.0001***
(0.00002)
FOR * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.0001***
(0.00002)
0.0001***
(0.00002) FOR * N * prof_N
0.00004**
(0.00002)
0.00003
(0.00003)
Year 1997 -1.841(3.971)
-2.505
(3.752)
-2.758
(3.839)
-2.638
(3.754) Year 1997
-1.408
(4.064)
-2.463
(3.885)
-2.481
(3.951)
-2.283
(3.893)
# Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040 # Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040
2R 0.132 0.229 0.193 0.231 2R 0.091 0.173 0.146 0.174
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.  Standard errors in parentheses.
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The panel estimates are reported in the left part of Table 4. We control for firm heterogeneity
for each individual firm, even within the different ownership categories. In all specifications, the
Hausman test indicates that we should rely on the fixed-effects model.16
Since unobserved fixed effects, of which the unobserved quality of workers is probably an
important one, are likely to be positively correlated with private ownership, we are implicitly
controlling for one of the potential sources of endogeneity of ownership by using the fixed-effects
estimator (Estrin et al., 2001). In line with the previous results, private ownership is positively
correlated with the wage intercept although this effect is not always statistically significant for
private domestic firms. Foreign firms pay the highest wages. The results also point to a
significantly positive firm size-wage effect in private domestic firms, even after controlling for the
cross-effect on rent sharing.
With respect to rent sharing, we find again that employees in state-owned firms manage to
cream off a significantly larger share of the rents than workers in private domestic and foreign
companies, although this share is smaller than in the pooled OLS estimates. Foreign-owned firms
are in fact characterised by zero rent sharing. On average, the bargaining power of workers in large
firms is higher than in small firms. Specification 2 suggests that this effect is only significant in
private domestic firms. From specification 4, however, it follows that the cross-effect on rent
sharing is not statistically significant. This would suggest that the positive effect of firm size on the
degree of rent sharing does not differ according to ownership status. Again, external labour market
conditions appear to be important for wage setting.
                                                          
16 A critique to the use of within-group estimation is that the assumption of non-zero correlation between the time-invariant fixed effect
and the exogenous variables does not allow for doing out-of sample inference (Baltagi, 1995). Since we rely on a large and
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Table 4   Wage Equation 1997-1998, dependent variable wage it  - Panel (Fixed Effects)
Constant 23.123(17.216)
27.691
(18.123)
30.107*
(18.319)
31.641*
(18.345) Constant
27.345*
(17.401)
26.923
(18.340)
25.808
(18.673)
28.594
(18.717)
PRIVD 19.259
**
(8.951)
17.279**
(9.080)
10.789
(9.517)
11.681
(9.599) PRIVD
20.754**
(9.010)
17.606**
(9.161)
16.127*
(9.763)
15.561*
(9.833)
FOR 63.980
***
(14.398)
65.070***
(14.729)
65.546***
(17.500)
63.234***
(18.148) FOR
68.921***
(13.999)
69.989***
(14.383)
75.542***
(17.415)
69.951***
(18.139)
N -0.001(0.011)
-0.011
(0.012)
-0.011
(0.013) N
0.007
(0.010)
0.006
(0.013)
0.003
(0.013)
PRIVD * N 0.015
***
(0.005)
0.012*
(0.007) PRIVD * N
0.004
(0.007)
0.005
(0.008)
FOR * N 0.003(0.012)
0.008
(0.015) FOR * N
-0.008
(0.012)
0.002
(0.016)
A 0.723
***
(0.171)
0.692***
(0.172)
0.711***
(0.171)
0.696***
(0.172) A
0.754***
(0.173)
0.750***
(0.174)
0.765***
(0.174)
0.750***
(0.174)
valad_N - A 0.050
***
(0.010)
0.054***
(0.011)
0.045***
(0.011)
0.048***
(0.011) prof_N
0.033***
(0.011)
0.040***
(0.011)
0.037***
(0.012)
0.038***
(0.012)
PRIVD *
(valad_N - A)
-0.018
(0.012)
-0.031**
(0.013)
-0.021*
(0.012)
-0.027**
(0.014) PRIVD * prof_N
-0.035***
(0.014)
-0.043***
(0.014)
-0.037***
(0.014)
-0.042***
(0.014)
FOR *
(valad_N - A)
-0.047***
(0.017)
-0.053***
(0.018)
-0.053***
(0.017)
-0.051***
(0.019) FOR * prof_N
-0.075***
(0.017)
-0.072***
(0.019)
-0.079***
(0.018)
-0.072***
(0.020)
N * (valad_N - A) 0.000003(0.00001)
0.00003***
(0.00001)
0.000029*
(0.000015) N * prof_N
-0.000016*
(0.00001)
-0.00001
(0.00002)
-0.00001
(0.00002)
PRIVD * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.00002***
(0.000007)
0.00001
(0.00001)
PRIVD * N *
prof_N
0.000017*
(0.00001)
0.00001
(0.00001)
FOR * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.000001
(0.00001)
-0.00001
(0.00002) FOR * N * prof_N
-0.00002
(0.00002)
-0.00002
(0.00002)
Year 1997 -8.186
***
(2.460)
-8.542***
(2.468)
-8.591***
(2.462)
-8.619***
(2.470) Year 1997
-7.721***
(2.498)
-7.635***
(2.504)
-7.735***
(2.504)
-7.690***
(2.511)
Hausman test 2 (7)χ =46 2 (11)χ =40 2 (11)χ =74 2 (13)χ =36 Hausman test 2 (7)χ =116 2 (11)χ =48 2 (11)χ =355 2 (13)χ =31
# Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040 # Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040
2R 0.182 0.189 0.190 0.192 2R 0.158 0.166 0.163 0.166
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Hausman test checks for orthogonality of individual effects and other regressors. Standard errors
in parentheses.  
2R = R -sq within.
In Table 5, we calculate the size of the total impact of private ownership on firm-level wages
(using the values of the variables from Table 2). The main conclusion is that ownership effects on
wages differ consistently between ownership regimes. The first two rows refer to the pooled OLS
and the panel estimates using value added as proxy for the firm’s ability-to-pay. From the pooled
OLS estimates, it follows that the strongly negative effect of private domestic ownership on rent
sharing dominates the positive effect of private domestic ownership on the wage intercept, resulting
in a negative total impact of private domestic ownership on wages. On average over all four
specifications, a 1% increase in the fraction of shares held by private domestic owners decreases
                                                                                                                                                                               
representative sample of manufacturing firms, however, we argue that this critique does not apply to our results.
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the average wage by 8 000 leva (in 1995 prices). In contrast, the total impact of foreign ownership
on wages is positive and amounts to 38.784 on average. The multinational wage premium clearly
compensates for the negative effect of foreign ownership on rent sharing. The fixed-effects
estimates are more in line with our expectations: the total effect of private domestic as well as
foreign ownership on wages is positive and highest in absolute value for foreign ownership (on
average over all specifications 6.894 for private domestic ownership and 51.232 for foreign
ownership).
Table 5   Ownership Effects on Wages
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
PRIVD
w∂
∂ FOR
w∂
∂ PRIVD
w∂
∂
w
FOR
∂
∂ PRIVD
w∂
∂ FOR
w∂
∂ PRIVD
w∂
∂ FOR
w∂
∂
OLS (valad_N) -11.757 43.831 -10.567 38.512 -5.855 35.327 -4.131 37.464
FE (valad_N) 19.259 51.791 11.025 51.326 -0.035 51.802 -2.673 50.008
fd TSLS (valad_N) -1.317 80.338 -6.617 118.218 -6.050 197.962 -16.438 127.810
OLS (prof_N) -6.147 51.156 -5.711 44.319 -6.428 42.369 -5.537 33.383
FE (prof_N) 12.258 50.715 8.357 52.511 7.145 56.365 5.366 52.473
        
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
it it
it it
privd privd*N it privd it t privd*N it t
privd privd*N it privd it privd*N it
it
it
valad_N : PRIVD valad_N valad_N Idem for FOR
prof_N : PRIVD prof_N prof_N Idem for FOR
α α N + γ A γ N A . .
α α N + γ γ N . .
+ - + -
+ +
w
w
∂ ∂ =
∂ ∂ =
6.3.    Robustness Checks
To test whether the estimation results are robust to the use of different variables and
estimation techniques, two robustness checks are carried out.
The first one is related to the measurement of internal conditions and ownership status.17
Following the empirical literature, we substitute profits per worker for value added per worker.
Next, we define three slightly different samples to investigate whether our results are robust to the
use of discrete instead of continuous shareholding variables.18 More specifically, to test for jump
effects we define the ownership dummies in three different ways. The first option is private
domestic (foreign) ownership in the strictest sense: the dummy PRIVDDUM10 (FORDUM10)
equals 1 if private domestic (foreign) ownership exceeds 10%. The 10% threshold is chosen since it
is an internationally accepted standard (see e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Konings, 2001).
Furthermore, it is the criterion used by the IMF to characterise foreign ownership. Second, we
check for majority shareholding: the dummy PRIVDDUM50 (FORDUM50) equals 1 if private
                                                          
17 Note that for all specifications, the Hausman test rejects the random effects estimator.
18 When we estimate the model using the continuous shareholding variables ranging between zero and one, we assume a linear
relationship between the fraction of shares held by the different owners and the control over the firm. To get rid of this  -arguably strong-
assumption, we use dummies for shareholding to check the robustness of our findings. These results, which are not reported, are
available upon request (for a discussion of the results, see p. 3.18).
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domestic (foreign) ownership is higher than 50%. Third, we define fully-owned private domestic
(foreign) firms as those owned for at least 95% by a private domestic (foreign) shareholder
(dummy PRIVDDUM95 (FORDUM95)).
The second check refers to the estimation method. We check the robustness of the fixed-
effects estimator by applying the first-difference Instrumental Variables approach.
Including profits per worker, the pooled OLS estimates (right part of Table 3) are very well
in line with the earlier results, except for the last specification. This specification points to a
positive firm size effect on the wage intercept ( Nα ) which is however independent of the firm’s
ownership status. Note that the rent-sharing estimate for state firms is lower than the estimate using
value added. The direct endogeneity bias might be an explanation for this finding. The fixed-effects
estimates using profits per worker are reported in the right part of Table 4. In contrast to the
previous panel results, we find no significant firm size-wage effect. Remarkably, the rent-sharing
coefficient in both private domestic and foreign firms is found to be negative and highest in
absolute value for foreign firms. Table 5, however, shows that the size of the total impact of private
ownership on wages using profits per worker to capture the firm’s internal conditions accords very
well to the one using value added per worker.
The pooled OLS results using discrete shareholding variables correspond strongly to those
using continuous shareholding variables. From the results, it follows that no systematic differences
in the estimates across the various ownership dummy categories can be detected. This suggests that
the degree of private ownership does not affect the previous qualitative conclusions. The results of
the panel estimates using majority shareholding as criterion are very similar to those using
continuous shareholding variables. In contrast, when the 10% threshold is used both the firm size-
wage effect and the negative correlation between private domestic ownership and rent sharing
totally disappear. The estimates using the fully-owned ownership definition suggest that firm size
has no effect on rent sharing.
To correct for possible simultaneity between value added and wages as well as between firm
size and wages and to allow for firm-specific effects, we report the results of the first-difference
Instrumental Variables procedure in Table 6. The various specifications include the first differences
of all variables. As suggested by Arellano (1989), the instruments are in levels. The 3-period
lagged value of value added combined with the 3-period lagged value of real wages at the firm
level are used as instruments for value added. Firm size is instrumented by its 3-period lagged
value. To check instrument validity, we present the probability values of a chi-square statistic
testing overidentifying restrictions, the Hansen-Sargan test. It is clear that all specifications pass the
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overidentification test. To check the usefulness of the instruments, we have performed F-tests. For
all specifications, the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression is rejected.19
In line with the panel estimates, foreign firms pay very high inside wages, followed by
private domestic firms. Specifications 2 and 3 point to a positive effect of firm size on the wage
intercept. In contrast to the panel estimates, however, this effect does not differ across ownership
structure. In line with the panel estimates, the results confirm the existence of crucial differences in
the degree of rent sharing across the various ownership types. Comparing the fixed-effect estimates
(left part of Table 4) with the first-difference TSLS estimates (Table 6) reveals that the extent of
rent sharing in state-owned companies is underestimated using an OLS technique. A rather
unexpected result is that the coefficients on rents in private firms are negative in all
specifications.20 No significant effect from firm size on rent sharing is found in specifications 2 and
3. Specification 4 suggests, however, that workers in large private domestic firms have more
bargaining power than those in small firms. From Table 5, it follows that the first-difference TSLS
estimates result in a negative total effect of private domestic ownership on wages and a strongly
positive effect of foreign ownership on wages.
                                                          
19 For sake of brevity, these test statistics are not reported but are available upon request.
20 A potential explanation for this result may be the limited forecasting power of our instruments. Due to data availability we are forced
to use lags to instrument financial conditions. These instruments, however, are not capturing exogenous demand shocks hitting the
industry. Therefore, this unexpected result might partly be due to weak instrument bias, yielding downward biased insider effects (for a
recent discussion of the issue of weak instruments, see Stock and Yogo, 2002 and Chao and Swanson, 2003).
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Table 6   Wage Equation 1997-1998, dependent variable wage it  - First-difference TSLS
Constant 6.309
*
(3.413)
6.809**
(3.495)
4.968
(4.188)
7.875**
(3.759)
PRIVD 45.622
***
(15.122)
36.432***
(14.779)
43.741***
(18.440)
29.047*
(17.609)
FOR 160.73
***
(28.213)
183.31***
(34.718)
291.58***
(91.314)
205.09***
(79.101)
N 0.066
***
(0.026)
0.053*
(0.030)
0.017
(0.030)
PRIVD * N -0.004(0.019)
0.023
(0.017)
FOR * N -0.109(0.083)
-0.007
(0.076)
A 0.845
***
(0.221)
0.894***
(0.227)
0.960***
(0.246)
0.814***
(0.228)
valad_N - A 0.099
***
(0.024)
0.105***
(0.025)
0.118***
(0.028)
0.096***
(0.027)
PRIVD *
(valad_N - A)
-0.181***
(0.052)
-0.166***
(0.053)
-0.192***
(0.056)
-0.184***
(0.054)
FOR *
(valad_N - A)
-0.310***
(0.065)
-0.251***
(0.066)
-0.361***
(0.075)
-0.298***
(0.078)
N * (valad_N - A) -0.00003(0.00002)
-0.00006
(0.00006)
0.00005
(0.00005)
PRIVD * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.00002
(0.00002)
0.000025*
(0.000015)
FOR * N *
(valad_N - A)
-0.00007
(0.00005)
-0.00005
(0.00005)
Hansen-Sargan
 IV Test
(p-value)
0.834 0.976 0.938 0.328
# Obs. 695 695 695 695
2R . . . .
      ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses. A full stop in the 
2
R box indicates that the calculated
2
R was negative and hence is not reported. Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: test of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically
    distributed as 
2χ .df  The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. All variables are in first differences, the instruments are in levels.
7.    CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, our results clearly show that ownership status is an important determinant of
both the wage intercept and the degree of rent sharing. Rent sharing is very pronounced in state-
owned firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly
confirm the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a
positive firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If
these effects exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.
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In our view, the higher technology level of foreign firms and the presence of international rent
sharing are two plausible explanations for the significant multinational wage premium in Bulgaria.
The resulting high wage may prevent insiders in foreign firms from translating productivity gains
into wage increases. This may partly explain the result that the share of rents taken by workers in
foreign companies is considerably less than the part taken by state-owned employees. Another
explanation is that foreign ownership seems to be concentrated in firms with high value added.
Consequently, workers in these firms need to capture only a small fraction of the rents to secure an
acceptable wage. A third possible explanation for the observed differences in rent-sharing
behaviour across ownership categories is that firm mobility may curb insider power. If one thinks
about a two-stage game in which the location decision of foreign firms occurs after firms and
insiders bargain over wages, the ‘threat of relocation’ possibility of foreign firms vis-à-vis the
insiders increases the relative bargaining power of the firm. If bargaining breaks down, the conflict
payoff (or outside option for the firm) is positive as foreign firms can relocate activity to other
countries. This may lead to a low responsiveness of real wages to productivity gains (Zhao, 1995).
The strong positive relationship between firms’ ability-to-pay and wages in state-owned firms
may partly be explained by the fact that insiders in these companies still play an important role.
This is however not a sufficient explanation as increased product market competition (resulting for
example from increased FDI) may prevent insiders from exploiting their power at the bargaining
table. More plausible explanations are the relatively low inside wage level (for given rent sharing)
and the low value-added profile in these firms which may induce (or necessitate) employees to
cream off a considerable part of the rents to obtain an acceptable wage.
Finally, a caveat to our results is the possibility of residual selection bias. It could be that
some categories of owners were able to obtain shares in better firms, in ways which are
unobservable to the researcher but possibly observable to the buyers. This problem arises in all
studies of privatisation and firm performance. In our analysis, we argue that the fixed-effects
estimator controls for ownership endogeneity. This is valid if the unobservable quality is fixed for
each firm. The effect may be dynamic, however, if for example the unobservable quality relates to
potential for restructuring and improvements in productivity rather than being intertemporally
fixed. We implicitly control for this dynamic effect by using the first-difference TSLS method.
Nevertheless, the possibility of selection bias should be borne in mind in interpreting our findings.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1   Summary Statistics by Ownership Category
VARIABLES # Obs. Total Sample
Mean (St. Dev.)
# Obs. Maj. State
Firms
Mean (St. Dev.)
# Obs. Maj. Priv. Dom.
Firms
Mean (St. Dev.)
# Obs. Maj. Foreign Firms
Mean (St. Dev.)
1997
Employment 1163 400.4  (799.0) 303 528.6  (1398.4) 802 335.0  (390.4) 58 635.3  (553.3)
Average wage 933 101.7  (105.6) 265 98.2  (84.2) 620 100.3  (114.3) 48 137.9  (89.0)
Profits per employee 931 167.3  (595.5) 265 111.5  (396.3) 618 179.1  (667.2) 48 323.8  (495.2)
Value added per employee 931 269.1  (663.3) 265 209.7  (446.5) 618 279.6  (742.0) 48 461.7  (545.8)
1998
Employment 1371 346.8  (695.0) 236 328.5  (609.3) 1058 327.8  (708.5) 77 664.1  (685.7)
Average wage 1102 112.2  (76.7) 211 102.0  (78.0) 828 110.8  (71.5) 63 164.7  (112.2)
Profits per employee 1099 303.4  (3287.5) 211 98.5  (271.5) 827 337.2  (3741.0) 61 553.9  (2153.0)
Value added per employee 1101 415.9  (3289.7) 211 200.6  (304.1) 828 447.6  (3743.2) 62 725.8  (2145.3)
1997-1998
Employment 2534 371.4  (744.8) 539 441.0  (1126.8) 1860 330.9  (592.5) 135 651.7  (630.1)
Average wage 2035 107.4  (91.2) 476 99.9  (81.5) 1448 106.3  (92.4) 111 153.1  (103.2)
Profits per employee 2030 241.0  (2452.7) 476 105.7  (346.3) 1445 269.6  (2863.8) 109 452.6  (1641.7)
Value added per employee 2032 348.7  (2463.3) 476 205.6  (389.5) 1446 375.8  (2874.2) 110 610.5  (1649.7)
Source: Amadeus Database
Note: In Table A1, the sample is restricted to firms which are classified according to majority shareholding. By contrast, the sample in Table 2 also
contains firms which have multiple owners. Consequently, the number of observations in Table A1 differs from the number in Table 2.
REFERENCES
Abowd J. and L. Allain, 1996, “Compensation Structure and Product Market Competition”, in: Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique, 41/42, 207-18.
Abowd J., F. Kramarz and D.N. Margolis, 1999, “High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms”, in:
Econometrica, 67, 251-333.
Abowd J. and T. Lemieux, 1993, “The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining
Agreements: The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada”, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
108(4), 983-1014.
Aitken B. and A. Harrison, 1999, “Do Domestic Firms Benefit From Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence
from Venezuela”, in: American Economic Review, 89(3), 605-17.
Aitken B., A. Harrison and R.E. Lipsey, 1996, “Wages and Foreign Ownership: A Comparative Study of
Mexico, Venezuela and United States”, in: Journal of International Economics, 40(3-4), 345-71.
Alfandari G. and M. Schaffer, 1996, “Arrears in the Russian Enterprise Sector, in: Enterprise Restructuring
and Economic Policy in Russia”, in: S. Commander, Q. Fan and M. Schaffer (eds.), EDI Development
Studies, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 87-139.
Anderson T.W. and C. Hsiao, 1982, “Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models using Panel Data”, in:
Journal of Econometrics, 18, 47-82.
Arellano M., 1989, “A Note on the Anderson-Hsiao Estimator for Panel Data”, in: Economic Letters, 31,
337-41.
Baltagi B.H., 1995, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA                                                                                           3.23
Basu S., S. Estrin and J. Svejnar, 1997a, “Employment and Wage Behavior of Enterprises in Transitional
Economies”, WDI Working Paper 114, The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business
School, Ann Arbor MI.
Basu S., S. Estrin and J. Svejnar, 1997b, “Employment and Wage Behavior of Industrial Enterprises in
Transition Economies: the Case of Poland and Czechoslovakia”, in: Economics of Transition, 5, 271-87.
Beleva I., V. Tzanov, T. Noncheva and I. Zareva, 1999, Background Study on Employment and Labour
Market in Bulgaria, European Training Foundation - Employment and Social Affairs, Torino.
Blanchflower D.G., A.J. Oswald and M.D. Garrett, 1989, “Insider Power and Wage Determination”, NBER
Working Paper 3179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Blanchflower D.G., A.J. Oswald and P. Sanfey, 1996, “Wages, Profits and Rent sharing”, in The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 111(1), 227-51.
Blomström M. and F. Sjöholm, 1999, “Technology Transfer and Spillovers: Does Local Participation with
Multinationals Matter?”, in: European Economic Review, 43(4-6), 915-23.
Brown C. and J. Medoff, 1989, “The Firm size-Wage Effect”, in:  Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1027-59.
Budd J.W., J. Konings and M.J. Slaughter, 2004, “Wages and International Rent Sharing in Multinational
Firms”, in: Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
Budd J.W. and M. Slaughter, 2004, “Are Profits Shared Across Borders? Evidence on International Rent
Sharing," Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
Bughin J., 1991, ”Wage Premia, Price-Cost Margins and Bargaining over Employment in Belgian
Manufacturing: an Analysis of Distinct Behaviour Among Various Skilled Workers”, Working Paper
9112, Departement des Sciences Economiques, Université Catholique de Louvain, 38 p.
Bullow J. and L. Summers, 1976, “A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Applications to the Industrial
Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment”, in: Journal of Labor Economics, 4, 376-414.
Chao J.C. and N.R. Swanson, 2003, “Consistent Estimation with a Large Number of Weak Instruments”,
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1417, Yale University, Connecticut.
Christofides L.N. and A.J. Oswald, 1992, “Real Wage Determination and Rent sharing in Collective
Bargaining Agreements”, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 985-1002.
Commander S. and S. Dhar, 1998, “Enterprises in the Polish Transition”, in: S. Commander (ed.), Enterprise
Restructuring and Unemployment in Models of Transition, Chapter 4, The Worldbank, Washington , 109-
42.
Criscuolo C., 2000, “Firm size-Wage Effect: A Critical Review and an Econometric Analysis”, Working
Paper 277, University of Siena, Siena.
Currie J. and S. McConnell, 1992, “Firm-specific Determinants of the Real Wage”, in: Review of Economics
and Statistics, 74(2), 297-304.
Dale-Olsen H., 2002, “Different Owners, Different Wage Strategies? Efficiency Wage Considerations or
Technology Explanations?, ISF Paper 2002:046, Institute for Social Research, Oslo.
Djankov S. and B. Hoekman, 1998, “Avenues of Technology Transfer: Foreign Investment and Productivity
Change in the Czech Republic”, CEPR Discussion Paper 1883, Centre for Economic Policy Research,
London.
Doeringer P. and M. Piore, 1971, Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, D.C. Heath, Lexington.
OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA                                                                                           3.24
Doms M.E. and J.B. Jensen, 1998, “Comparing Wages, Skills and Productivity between Domestically and
Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Establishments in the United States”, in: R. Baldwin, R. Lipsey and J.D.
Richardson (eds.), Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 235-55.
Earle J.S., S. Estrin and L.L. Leshchenko, 1995, “Ownership Structures, Patterns of Control and Enterprise
Behavior in Russia”, Discussion Paper 315, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of
Economics, London.
Earle J.S. and K.Z. Sabirianova, 2001, “How Late to Pay? Understanding Wage Arrears in Russia”, in:
Journal of Labour Economics, 20(3), 661-707.
EBRD, 2000, Transition Report 2000, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.
Edin E. and J. Zetterberg, 1992, “Interindustry Wage Differentials: Evidence from Sweden and a Comparison
with the United States”, in: American Economic Review, 82, 1341-49.
Estrin S., J. Konings, Z. Zolkiewski and M. Angelucci, 2001, “The Effect of Ownership and Competitive
Pressure on Firm Performance in Transition Countries: Micro Evidence from Bulgaria, Romania and
Poland”, LICOS Discussion Paper 104/2001, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, Catholic
University of Leuven.
Feliciano Z.M. and R.E. Lipsey, 1999, “Foreign Ownership and Wages in the United States, 1987-1992”,
NBER Working Paper 6923, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Flanagan R.J., 1998, “Institutional Reformation in Eastern Europe”, in: Industrial Relations, 37(3), 337-57.
Garen J., 1985, “Worker Heterogeneity, Job Screening and Firm Size”, in: Journal of Political Economy, 93,
715-39.
Globerman S., J.C. Ries and I. Vertinsky, 1994, “The Economic Performance of Foreign Affiliates in
Canada”, in: Canadian Journal of Economics, 27(1), 143-56.
Goos M. and J. Konings, 2001, “Does Rent sharing Exist in Belgium? An Empirical Analysis using Firm
Level Data”, in: Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique, XL(1-2), 65-79.
Gradev G., 2000, “Employer Function and Its Representation: The Specific Pressures in Bulgarian
Transition”, ETUI Discussion Paper 2000.01.05, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels.
Grosfeld I. and J.F. Nivet, 1997, “Firms’ Heterogeneity in Transition: Evidence from a Polish Panel Data
Set”, WDI Working Paper 47, The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School,
Ann Arbor MI.
Grosfeld I. and J.F. Nivet, 1999, “Insider Power and Wage Setting in Transition: Evidence from a Panel of
Large Polish Firms, 1988-1994”, in: European Economic Review, 43, 1137-47.
Hammermesh D.S., 1980, “Commentary”, in: J.J. Siegfried, (ed.), The Economics of Firm Size, Market
Structure and Social Performance, Federal Trade Commission, Washington.
Hildreth A. and A. Oswald, 1997, “Rent sharing and Wages: Evidence from Company and Establishment
Panels”, in:  Journal of Labor Economics, 15(2), 318-37.
Howenstine N.G. and W.J. Zeile, 1994, “Characteristics of Foreign-Owned U.S. Manufacturing
Establishments”, in: Survey of Current Business, 74 (1), 34-59.
OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA                                                                                           3.25
Iankova E.A., 1998, “Multi-level Bargaining Cartels in Periods of Transition: On the Example of Bulgaria”,
CAHR Working Paper 98-22, Centre for Advanced Human Resource Studies, Cornell University, New
York.
Idson T., 2000, “Firm size Effects in Russia”, WDI Working Paper 300, The William Davidson Institute,
University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor MI.
Idson T. and H. Ishii, 1993, “Gender Differences in Firm size Effects in Japan and the United States”,
Proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association.
IMF, 2001, “Labor Markets in Hard-Peg Accession Countries: The Baltics and Bulgaria”, IMF Country
Report 01/100, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Ivanova N. and C. Wyplosz, 1999, “Arrears: The Tide that is Drowning Russia”, RECEP Working Paper
1999/1, Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy, Moscow.
Jensen M.C. and W. Meckling, 1976, ”Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure”, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-60.
Jones D. C. and T. Kato, 1996, “The Determinants of Chief Executive Compensation in Transitional
Economies: Evidence from Bulgaria”, in: Labour Economics, 3(3), 319-36.
Köllö J., 1997, “Three Stages of Hungary’s Labour Market Transition,” in: S. Commander (ed.), Enterprise
Restructuring and Unemployment in Models of Transition, Chapter 3, The Worldbank, Washington DC,
57-108.
Konings J., 2001, “The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firms: Evidence from Firm-Level
Panel Data in Emerging Economies”, in: Economics of Transition, 9(3), 619-35.
Kremer M., 1993, “The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development”, in: The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108, 551-76.
Lehmann H., J. Wadsworth and A. Acquisti, 1999, ”Grime and Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears
in the Russian Federation”, in: Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, 595-617.
Lever M.H.C. and W.A. Marquering, 1996, “Union Coverage and Sectoral Wages: Evidence from the
Netherlands”, in: Empirical Economics, 21(4), 483-99.
Lipsey R.E., 1994, “Foreign-Owned Firms and U.S. Wages”, NBER Working Paper 4927, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Lipsey R.E. and F. Sjöholm, 2001, “Foreign Direct Investment and Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing”,
NBER Working Paper 8299, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Loveman G. and W. Sengenberger, 1991, “The Reemergence of Small-Scale Production: An International
Comparison”, in: Small Business Economics, 3(1), 1-37.
Luke P.J. and M.E. Schaffer, 1999, “Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation”, CERT
Discussion Paper 99/08, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Edinburgh.
Main B. and B. Reilly, 1993, “The Firm size-Wage Gap: Evidence from Britain”, in: Economica, 60, 125-42.
Margolis D.N. and K.G. Salvanes, 2001, “Do Firms Really Share Rents with Their Workers?”, IZA
Discussion Paper 330, The Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.
Martin R. and A. Cristescu-Martin, 1999, “Industrial Relations in Transformation: Central and Eastern
Europe in 1998”, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 30(4), 387-403.
OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA                                                                                           3.26
Masters S.H., 1969, “Wages and Plant Size: an Interindustry Analysis”, in: Review of Economics and
Statistics, 51, 341-345.
Meagher F. and H. Wilson, 2000, “Using the Theory of the Firm to Better Understand the Firm Size Effect
on Wages”, Discussion Paper 2000/7, The University of New South Wales, Sydney.
Morrisette R., 1993, “Canadian Jobs and Firm Size: Do Smaller Firms Pay Less?”, in: Canadian Journal of
Economics, 26, 159-74.
Nickell S. and M. Andrews, 1983, “Unions, Real Wages and Employment in Britain 1951-79”, in: Oxford
Economic Papers, 183-205.
Nickell S. and P. Kong, 1992, “An Investigation into the Power of Insiders in Wage Determination”, in:
European Economic Review, 36, 1573-99.
Nickell S. and S. Wadhwani, 1990,  “Insider Forces and Wage Determination”, in: The Economic Journal,
100, 496-509.
NSI, 1998, Statistical Yearbook 1998, National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
NSI, 1999, Statistical Yearbook 1999, National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
Oi W., 1983, “Heterogeneous Firms and the Organization of Production”, in: Economic Inquiry, 21, 147-71.
Oi W. and T. Idson, 1999, “Firm Size and Wages”, in: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor
Economics, Chapter 33, Vol. 3C, Elsevier Science B.V., 2155-214.
Oosterbeek  H. and M. van Praag, 1995, “Firm-size Wage Differentials in the Netherlands”, in: Small
Business Economics, 7, 173-82.
Piekkola H. and A. Kauhanen, 2003, “Rent Sharing as Firm-Level Pay”, in: International Journal of
Manpower, 24(4), 426-51.
Rebick M.E., 1993, “The Persistence of Firm-Size Earnings Differentials and Labour Market Segmentation
in Japan”, in: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 7, 132-56.
Schmidt C. and K. Zimmermann, 1991, “Work Characteristics, Firm Size and Wages”, in: Review of
Economics and Statistics, 73, 705-10.
Slichter S., 1950, ”Notes on the Structure of Wages”, in: Review of Economics and Statistics, 32, 80-91.
Stock J.H. and M. Yogo, 2002, “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression”, NBER Technical
Working Paper 284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Strand J., 2002, “Wage Bargaining and Turnover Costs with Heterogeneous Labor and Perfect History
Screening”, in: European Economic Review, 46(7), 1209-27.
Svejnar J., 1986, “Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence
from US Industry”, in: Econometrica, 54, 1055-78.
Svejnar J., 1999, “Labor Markets in the Transitional Central and East European Countries”, in: O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Chapter 42, Vol. 3B, Elsevier Science
B.V., 2809-54.
Teulings C. and J. Hartog, 1998, Corporatism or Competition? Labour Contracts, Institutions and Wage
Structures in International Comparison, Chapter 4-5, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
UNDP, 1999, National Human Development Report Bulgaria 1999, Volume I-II, United Nations
Development Program, GED Ltd., Sofia.
OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA                                                                                           3.27
UNDP, 2000, Bulgaria 2000 Human Development Report, The Municipal Mosaic, United Nations
Development Program, GED Ltd., Sofia.
Veugelers R., 1989, “Wage Premia, Price Cost Margins and Bargaining Power in Belgian Manufacturing”,
in: European Economic Review, 33, 169-80.
Weiss A. and H.J. Landau, 1984, “Wages, Hiring Standards and Firm Size”, in: Journal of Labor Economics,
2(4), 477-99.
Weiss L.W., 1966, “Concentration and Labour Earnings”, in: American Economic Review, 56, 96-117.
Winter-Ebmer R., 1995, “Does Layoff Risk Explain the Firm-Size Wage Differential?”, in: Applied
Economics Letters, 2(7), 211-14.
World Bank, 2001, Bulgaria. The Dual Challenge of Transition and Accession, Chapter V: Labor Market and
Social Policy, Washington DC.
Zhao L., 1995, “Cross-hauling Direct Foreign Investment and Unionised Oligopoly”, in: European Economic
Review, 39, 1237-53.
